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A Socialist- Oriented State: Instrument of Revolutionary Change



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ГОСУДАРСТВО
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ОРИЕНТАЦИИ —
ОРУДИЕ
РЕВОЛЮЦИОННЫХ ПРЕОБРАЗОВАНИЙ

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INTRODUCTION

The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, which burst the chain of world imperialism and resulted in the formation of the world's first socialist state, also marked a turning-point in the development of the national liberation movement. It ushered in the crisis of the colonial system and opened real prospects for the victory of national liberation revolutions.¹ "...The morrow of world history," V. I. Lenin forecasted in 1922, "will be a day when the awakening peoples oppressed by imperialism are finally aroused and the decisive long and hard struggle for their liberation begins."²

The subsequent course of events confirmed this prediction. The colonial system of imperialism began to fall apart as a result of the crisis which gripped it after the Second World War, and in the mid-1950s it entered the final stage of collapse. More than eighty new states emerged on the ruins of colonial empires in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania, and today not more than half of 1 per cent of the world population still live in colonial bondage. The struggle of the colonial peoples for national liberation continues in Zimbabwe, Namibia and elsewhere, but the colonial system has been abolished on the whole. In terms of historic importance this circumstance ranks second after the formation of the world socialist community.

¹ In 1919 colonies, semi-colonies and dependencies accounted for 77.2 per cent of the world's land surface and 69.2 per cent of the world population.

² V. I. Lenin, "Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 611.

The downfall of colonialism and the achievement of national independence by an overwhelming majority of formerly oppressed peoples are a result of world-historic significance not only of the consistent struggle of the oppressed peoples themselves, but also of the aid furnished by the socialist countries, the international working-class movement and all democratic forces. The leaders of the young sovereign states made it clear on many occasions that were it not for the existence of the world socialist system, imperialism would have brutally crushed the national liberation revolutions.

The emergence of new states on the ruins of the colonial empires did not follow a single pattern. In many countries the people won independence only after a protracted armed struggle against the colonial troops (Algeria, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Southern Yemen); in others by peaceful means in combination with armed action (Burma, India and Tunisia, for example); while in some countries of Tropical Africa and Oceania they employed primarily peaceful methods in their fight for independence.

In all of them the outcome of struggle, which led to the rise of new states, was the passing of state power from the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie (colonialists) into the hands of one or another class (classes and social strata) of the former colony. Consequently, the formation of young states was always a product of the national liberation revolution, regardless of whether it was chiefly peaceful or non-peaceful.

The abolition of colonial oppression and the formation of an independent state is the first political victory of a national liberation revolution. Yet, the achievement of political independence, which, moreover, is of a formal nature in countries that are pursuing proimperialist policy, does not resolve the basic problems of the revolution. State independence cannot be consolidated without economic independence. Compelled to make concessions the imperialist powers impose unequal treaties and agreements on the young states, continue to plunder their natural wealth, inhibit socio-economic reforms, inveigle them in military-political groupings and blocs and maintain military bases on their territories. The strategic objective of this neocolonialist policy is to use new forms and methods of keeping the developing countries within the sphere of world capitalism and its political, eco-

nomical and ideological influence, thus preserving them as the object of neocolonialist exploitation.

Neocolonialism is a great threat to the frail independence of the young states and they will be able to overcome imperialism's political and economic pressure and radically reform the states only by following the path of social progress.

Some young states, where the exploiters (the national bourgeoisie, the bourgeois-feudal bloc and the compradores in alliance with the tribal nobility) have seized power and are capitalising on the gains of the national liberation struggle, have taken the capitalist path of development. Although under specific conditions this path may lead to a certain growth of the productive forces, it is also a path of suffering for the people. The economic growth attained by some of these countries does not make for a general upsurge of the economy and the improvement of the welfare and cultural level of the population; this growth is secured as a result of the unrestrained exploitation of the working people and is not accompanied by social development. That is why the peoples of the liberated countries reject this path as the only possible alternative.

Countries that have liberated themselves from colonial dependence can achieve real social progress only by taking the non-capitalist path of development, the path of socialist orientation. The Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress called such countries "the advance contingent of the present-day national liberation movement".¹ Rejecting capitalism as an historical perspective, the non-capitalist path of development does not immediately provide for the transition to socialism. But it does initiate socio-economic development, which leads to socialism and creates the necessary prerequisites for the construction of socialist society. This is also the aim of the political processes, including the reform of the state.

In the Report to the 24th Party Congress, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said: "Today, there are already quite a few countries in Asia and Africa which have taken the non-capitalist way of development, that is, the path of building a socialist society in the long term. Many states have now taken this path. Deep-go-

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 215.

ing social changes, which are in the interests of the masses of people, and which lead to a strengthening of national independence, are being implemented in these countries, and the number of these changes has been growing as time goes on."¹

The path of socialist orientation has been taken by nearly 20 states where political authority is exercised in the interests of the bloc of patriotic anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces at present headed by revolutionary democrats, as is the case in the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, the Republic of Guinea, the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, the People's Republic of the Congo, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of Benin, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, the People's Republic of Mozambique, the People's Republic of Angola, Ethiopia and some other countries, with a total population of over 145 million. The programmes of the revolutionary-democratic parties in the socialist-oriented countries (the 1967 Arusha Declaration of Tanganyika African National Union-TANU-the 1972 Programme of the Congolese Workers' Party, the 1975 Programme of the United National Front Political Organisation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) as well as the constitutions (Burma, the Congo, Algeria, Madagascar and others) set the task of building socialist society. Important social measures, which even the most radical section of the bourgeoisie is unable to promote, are instituted in these countries. As the revolution deepens these changes acquire an increasingly anti-capitalist nature; they are directed not only against the imperialist bourgeoisie, the feudal lords and tribal nobility, but also against the exploiters in general. Naturally, as they introduce these changes the socialist-oriented countries more and more often utilise the experience of the socialist states.

In the liberated countries the choice of the path of development is accompanied by an acute class struggle. The anti-colonial forces that have come to power are heterogeneous in terms of their social nature and political objectives. While they act jointly against imperialism, feudalism and tribalism, they are torn by acute disagreements over basic issues of social orientation. "A complicated process of class differentia-

tion is under way in many liberated countries, with the class struggle gaining in intensity," said General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress. "It is taking different forms. New progressive changes have occurred in the economy and the political life of the socialist-oriented Arab, African and Asian countries. But there are also countries where development follows the capitalist way."¹

Exceptional dynamism of the socio-political processes and frequent regrouping of the class forces are a typical feature of the liberated countries. Some countries, which initially followed the capitalist road, have rejected it as a result of revolution and have become socialist-oriented (military-revolutionary coups in Burma and Ethiopia, the coming to power of the left wing of the revolutionary-democratic parties in Iraq and Syria, etc.). Countries that had not precisely defined the direction of their development after the winning of independence are also taking this path (Tanzania). All this shows that states currently following the capitalist road or those which have not yet determined their path of development (this group includes in the main some countries of Tropical Africa with a still underdeveloped social structure) are a potential reserve in the fight for social progress.

At the same time, counter-revolutionary coups may take place in the socialist-oriented countries in view of the political immaturity and organisational weakness of their ruling revolutionary-democratic parties and the inadequate participation of the masses in state administration (for example, the 1966 events in Ghana). There have been cases, in Egypt, for instance, when internal reaction assisted by imperialism managed to swing the development of some liberated countries back to the capitalist path.

Yet, in spite of occasional setbacks and even defeats, the number of countries advancing along the non-capitalist path is steadily growing. Progressive changes are taking place in other liberated countries, too: the shifting of the emphasis in industrial development to the state sector, the abolition of feudal landownership, the nationalisation of foreign enter-

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1976, p. 15.

¹ Ibid., pp. 23-24.

prises to assure the young states' effective sovereignty over their natural resources and the formation of their own personnel. In short, "far-reaching progressive changes are taking place in that part of the world, despite difficulties. This is, certainly, a process of historical importance".¹

It is this process, which expresses the main trend of contemporary development of countries, that had liberated themselves from colonial dependence.

CHAPTER I

A SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE— INSTRUMENT OF PEOPLE'S POWER

1. The Class Nature of the Socialist-Oriented State

The complicated tasks of surmounting the backwardness inherited from colonialism and creating conditions for the transition to socialism can be successfully accomplished only if political power is used as a lever to carry through deep-going social changes. In other words, the fulfilment of these tasks presupposes the establishment of a state which expresses the interests of the broadest sections of the population, the working people in the first place, and which relies on their active support in its entire activity. In a country with predominant or widespread precapitalist social relations such a state should be socialist-oriented.

In order to comprehend the intricate social nature of a state developing along the non-capitalist path, it is necessary to delve into history. The experience of humanity dating back several millennia shows that a state of any historical type is essentially an instrument of the political power of the economically dominating class (or classes). A slave-owning state, even in the most democratic republic, (in Athens, for example, in the period of its florescence) was an organ of the dictatorship of the slaveowners over the slaves; a feudal state (including in the countries of the Orient) was an instrument of the dictatorship of the feudal lords over the serfs. The bourgeois state, which replaced feudalism as a result of the victory of bourgeois revolutions in England in the 17th century, in France in the 18th century and in Japan in the 19th century, is a political organisation of bourgeois class rule.

The socialist state is also an organisation of political rule. At first, prior to the abolition of the exploiting classes and

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1976, p. 15.

the building of socialism, it functioned as a dictatorship of the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry and other sections of the working people. But, in contrast to all the earlier historical types, the proletarian state is an organ of the political rule of the majority of the population over the exploiting minority, which has been overthrown by the revolution and is still to be liquidated. Eventually the dictatorship of the proletariat develops in the rule of the whole people. A state of a developed socialist society, which consists only of the friendly classes of workers and peasants and the working intelligentsia, is a state of the whole people.

It is clear from the above that a state of any historical type is an organisation of political rule characteristic of a class society. It expresses and upholds the interests of a certain class or classes, the only question being whether it is an organisation of all working people (the state of the whole people), an instrument of the political rule of the working majority over the exploiting minority (dictatorship of the proletariat) or an organ of the dictatorship of an insignificant group of exploiters over the majority of the people (slave-owning, feudal or bourgeois state).

The socialist-oriented state is not an exception. It is not a neutral force standing above classes and impartially regulating relations between the various sections of society which is advancing along the non-capitalist path. A state of this type is also a class organisation functioning in the interests of specific classes and social strata.

Some leaders of revolutionary-democratic parties characterise the socialist-oriented state as an organ of "people's dictatorship". In the Directives issued in 1970 on the formation of revolutionary committees at enterprises in the People's Republic of the Congo, state power is called "dictatorship of national democracy". The Address of the National Liberation Front and State to the Population of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen of November 30, 1970, in connection with the third anniversary of national independence, calls state power "national democratic".¹ The 1970 Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen says that state power relies on the sovereignty of the work-

¹ Address of the National Front Political Organisation and State of 30th November 1970. People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 1970, p. 3.

ing people, on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry, intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie (Articles 7, 62). Article 9 of the Burmese Constitution stipulates that the state safeguards the interests of the working people.

Hence, a socialist-oriented state is an organ of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the people. This rule basically differs from bourgeois rule, which is a dictatorship of the exploiting minority.

However, the concept of people as a specific social community is historically precise and may have a different social essence in different conditions, countries and even at various stages of development of one and the same country. Above all a people is a community of the working classes, but it can also include other sections of the population, which owing to their objective position, participate in promoting historical progress in the given time and in the given circumstances. Thus, a broad united front embracing almost all classes may come into being in the course of the fight against foreign invaders. Under these circumstances the national bourgeoisie or a certain section of it and also other exploiting strata may become a part of the people, although in the long term they break away from it. The bourgeoisie struck a deal with the feudal lords and imperialism in Ivory Coast, Indonesia, Morocco, the Philippines and a number of other Asian and African countries and betrayed the interests of the people. Under the impact of the changed conditions, particularly, the increased imperialist oppression or domination of the feudal lords, which impair the interests of the national bourgeoisie, the latter may once again change its stand and for a period rejoin the working people in the struggle for national objectives.

In a number of countries, those that have chosen the non-capitalist path of development, some of the non-working sections continue to be a component of the people, supporting, though indecisively, certain anti-feudal and anti-imperialist changes. But insofar as the position of the national bourgeoisie is contradictory (while participating to a degree in the struggle against imperialism it is simultaneously afraid of the activity of the working class) and the basic interests of the working and non-working sections of the population do not coincide, the non-working sections come out against the interests of the people as social changes become more profound. Acts of sabotage, direct counter-revolutionary

activity and even moves in support for imperialist intervention have taken place and are taking place in many countries.

It follows, therefore, that far from all the classes making up a people should be regarded as the motive forces of a national-democratic revolution. Revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the people does not mean that full power is wielded by the most consistent revolutionary forces. On the contrary, petty-bourgeois toiling sections of the population constitute one of the mainstays of this power, and a certain proportion of the non-working people, which in the long run oppose a deepening of revolutionary transformations, take part in implementing it. There is a paradox in this. But such is the dialectics of reality that reflects the specifics of the balance of class forces which has taken shape and owing to which the working people are forced to permit some non-working sections to exercise power. But even under these circumstances a socialist-oriented state is first and foremost a dictatorship of the working population, with the peasantry making up the largest part. And the spokesmen of the identical interests of these sections are the revolutionary democrats.

This means that the distinctive feature of a socialist-oriented state is by no means the fact that it is above class. As any state it is a class state, the only difference being that it is not an organisation of political rule of one class or an alliance of classes as is the case, for example, in the bourgeois-landowner countries of Asia and Latin America, but a bloc of classes and social sections, which arose on the basis of the unity of the fundamental interests of its participants (workers, peasants and the working intelligentsia), on the one hand, and as a result of the coincidence of national, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal objectives (working people and a part of the non-working people), on the other. Gathered in what the 1972 Programme of the Congolese Workers' Party called "the contradictory union" are different social classes and social strata of the population from the point of view of their interests. Such classes or social strata, unite on the basis of their "common immediate interests".¹

There are similar points in the documents of the National Liberation Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. "National people's rule is an instrument of the bloc of democratic forces," proclaims the 1972 Programme of the

National Front Political Organisation of the Republic. "It is a people's democratic dictatorship of the mass of workers and peasants and their allies in the struggle against the forces of feudalism, semi-feudalism, compradores and their allies."¹

Characterising the composition of such a bloc the constitutions of some socialist-oriented countries mention only the working sections of the population. For example, Article 7 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen stipulates that "the working people exercise full power in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen", and proclaims that the "firm alliance of the working class with the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie is a mighty political foundation of the national-democratic revolution in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen".

Some constitutions that were adopted at the outset of non-capitalist development or even during the choice of such a path (the Constitution of the Republic of Guinea adopted in 1958 and the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania adopted in 1965) do not comprehensively define the class nature of the state. As a rule, they contain a general formula which stipulates that power belongs to the people and in some respects is similar to the principles set down in some bourgeois-democratic constitutions. The 1965 Constitution of Tanzania² spoke of the right of all people to take part in the administration of the country. In other acts, however, in the policy documents and the rules of the ruling parties the social nature of the state is more precisely defined. The Arusha Declaration of the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU), adopted in 1967, speaks of the "state of peasants and workers".³

A distinguishing feature of the class nature of the socialist-oriented state is that power is exercised by a bloc of socially heterogeneous class forces which can and in fact does include antagonistic social sections. And although the interests of these sections coincide on the basis of the struggle

¹ See *Programme of the National Front Political Organisation at the Stage of the National-Democratic Revolution*, Second Ed., Aden, 1972, p. 43 (in Arabic). The main points of this document have been incorporated into the Programme of the United National Front Political Organisation adopted in October 1975.

² In April 1977 the Tanzanian National Assembly adopted a new constitution.

³ *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1967, p. 3.

¹ Etumba, Brazzaville, No. 295, 1973, p. 6.

for general democratic objectives they may diverge on questions of the fight for socialism. In this connection the process of revolutionary development in the socialist-oriented countries is accompanied and will be permanently accompanied by a regrouping of class forces. The social nature of power in these countries is characterised by considerable dynamism and their political regimes by a certain degree of instability.

Since the transition from a backward colonial society to a socialist one covers a long period of time all these phenomena are unavoidable and should be taken into consideration in politics. The struggle between the socialist and anti-socialist forces will continue and may gain in intensity at certain stages. There is only one way of deepening the social change and strengthening the popular nature of power, and that is by ousting bourgeois and bourgeoisified elements from power and consolidating the positions of the forces supporting socialism.

At the same time, it should be noted that the progressive forces in a socialist-oriented state are working for the broadest unification of all truly patriotic forces in the ranks of a single national-democratic front. All the forces of a nation can participate in the bloc, but only so long as their objective status enables them to take part in the struggle for social progress, for deepening social change in the interests of the people. All advanced, democratic forces can act in a bloc not only during the struggle for national independence; such a bloc is both possible and essential also in the period of national-democratic change. The creation and consolidation of the united front of democratic forces strengthens people's power.

Although state power in the socialist-oriented states is in the hands of the national-democratic bloc as a whole, not all its participants play an equal part in exercising it. Since the working people, primarily workers and peasants, constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of any country, then, in conformity with the constitutional principles of the alliance of the forces of the working people, it is they who should hold decisive positions in the execution of state authority. This principle is set forth in the programmes of revolutionary-democratic parties. "The vanguard and custodian of a Socialist-Democratic state are primarily peasants and workers," proclaims the Policy Declaration of the Burmese Revo-

lutionary Council.¹ The Arusha Declaration of TANU points out that the government should be elected by farmers and workers and be under their control.

The role played by the various working classes in the execution of state power is likewise different. Many revolutionary-democratic leaders underline the numerical preponderance of the peasantry and regard it as the vanguard of people's rule.

At the same time, there is growing conviction in some socialist-oriented countries that the leading role should be played by the working class, as the most advanced class of society. This is reflected both in the statements of the leaders of these countries (Angola, Ethiopia, the People's Republic of the Congo, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) and in their constitutions. For example, Article 7 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen states: "The historical role of the working class, which will ultimately become society's leading class, is growing all the time". Such constitutional principles reflect the actual dynamics of social processes in the socialist-oriented countries.

The popular revolutionary-democratic rule in the socialist-oriented states means that the decisive role there is played by the masses. It often happens that by various means, including action from below, the masses predetermine the substance of some key socio-political measures (for example, the formation of administrative committees at enterprises and farms abandoned by their owners that laid the foundation of the self-managing sector of the economy in Algeria; the actions of the people's militia and revolutionary committees in Ethiopia against the counter-revolutionary forces; the decisive role of the masses in the defeat of the mercenaries in Benin in 1977; the working people's support for the popular power in Guinea during the 1970 Portuguese intervention there). But as a rule, the popular masses so far play inadequate, and at times even an insignificant role in state administration. Key positions are held by revolutionary democrats most of whom belong to military circles and the local intelligentsia and whose status is close to that of the working classes. Expressing the coinciding interests of the

¹ *The Burmese Way to Socialism*, The Policy Declaration Issued by the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma on April 30, 1962, *New Times*, No. 20, May 16, 1962, p. 17.

diverse social sections making up the democratic bloc, they hold it under the political guidance and consequently are in control of all the main levers of state power.

The fact that state power is exercised by the bloc of democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces means that a socialist-oriented state has a very broad social base. Nevertheless, this power basically differs from popular socialist rule in spite of the fact that sometimes revolutionary democrats identify these two concepts. The power of the whole people takes shape only during the second stage of the development of the socialist state, after the abolition of the exploiting classes and elements and in conditions of a mature socialist state. As regards a state which advances along the non-capitalist path, it relies on the coincidence of the aims and interests of diverse, including some non-working sections of the population, and not on the socio-political unity of society. And in its movement towards socialist rule of the whole people it will have to pass through a long period of historical development. It is necessary, therefore, clearly to distinguish the popular, general democratic nature of authority in a revolutionary-democratic state from the socialist rule of the whole people as the higher stage of the development of socialist statehood.

Consequently, a socialist-oriented state is a transitional one. Some of its basic features bring it close to a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but at the same time it reflects the peculiarities of the social structure of the liberated countries and the conditions attending the contemporary stage of their development. So far their state power is a transitional stage to the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, a stage through which Mongolia had had to pass.

Taking into account that at this stage of the revolution not only the working people, but also a part of the non-working sections comprise the people, such a state has a very complex nature. It is no longer a bourgeois-type state, but it is not yet a socialist-type state, a fact which is recognised in the programmes of some revolutionary-democratic parties. According to TANU's Arusha Declaration Tanzania is a state of peasants and workers, but is not yet a socialist state. This means that the state reform which is carried out in the course of non-capitalist development merely creates the pre-

requisites for the formation of a socialist state. At the same time, a state of this type has its specific trends of development and if the latter is not cut short by counter-revolutionary forces (a reactionary coup or imperialist intervention) it will lead to the establishment of a socialist state. The Programme adopted by the Congolese Workers' Party in 1972 says that ultimately a dictatorship of the proletariat will be established.¹ Taking these trends and the rise and development of socialist elements in the popular democratic rule into account, a socialist-oriented state can be characterised as a transitional one leading to the establishment of a socialist state. At the present stage, however, it is still a revolutionary-democratic state. It should be noted that the constitutions of some countries already speak of a socialist state. Article 1 of the 1973 Permanent Constitution of Syria speaks about a "socialist popular democracy"; Article 1 of Burma's 1974 new Constitution reads: "Burma is a sovereign independent socialist state of the working people", and Article 8 states that "there shall be no exploitation of man by man" in Burma. At the present stage of the national-democratic revolution such formulas reflect the people's aspiration to socialism and their determination to create a state of the socialist type.

2. The Functions of the Socialist-Oriented State

The social nature of any state is most fully reflected in its policy towards various classes and sections of the population, in its approach to the solution of the fundamental social problems and in the main trends of its activity.

Lenin noted that the state plays an active role. He wrote that it "always acts and acts very energetically, it is always active and never passive".² It is particularly active in countries, which have set themselves the aim of building a socialist society. Here state power is used as a means for carrying through fundamental socio-economic changes, as an instrument for creating a new social order and promoting the economy and culture, and, in the developing countries,

¹ Etumba, No. 295, 1973, p. 5.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Economic Content of Narodism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 355.

as a means of creating a modern material and technical basis. A socialist-oriented state is yet another effective instrument of a country's development along the path of progress. Article 12 of the 1970 Provisional Constitution of Iraq proclaims "the establishment of the socialist order on scientific revolutionary principles" as one of the state's main objectives.

There are several prominent trends in the state's diverse activity. The basic fields of state activity in the economic, political, ideological and international relations are commonly known as state functions. They fall into two groups: internal and external. The first group reflects the state's activity inside the country; the second—its policy on the international scene. Internal functions are of decisive importance for characterising a state; foreign policy is the continuation of domestic policy.

Since the class nature of the state and its social designation is manifested in its functions, the functions of states of diverse types (bourgeois or socialist, for example) and those with an opposite social orientation (capitalist or socialist) are basically different. Of course, some aspects of one or another functions (economic, for instance) may also be of positive importance in capitalist-oriented states (measures to surmount economic backwardness inherited from colonialism, in particular). Yet, in the long run, their economic activity is aimed at creating and developing a system of economy based on the exploitation of man by man. On the other hand, a socialist-oriented state, which carries through changes that are outwardly similar but, nevertheless, immeasurably deeper, strives to create a socialist society which ensures a steady rise in the material welfare of its citizens. Thus, in order correctly to comprehend the nature of the activity of one or another state it is necessary above all to take into consideration the social purpose of its functions, their ultimate objectives, and not merely to define the spheres of its activity.

The nature of the functions of a socialist-oriented state stems from its intricate class nature. Here various aspects of the old and the new intertwine and formerly unknown trends of activity come to the fore. All these tendencies gain in complexity under the impact of a range of contradictory processes and are promoted in the course of a struggle between diverse social forces. At the same time, practice shows that

the main trend in the development of a state's activity in the process of creating conditions for the building of socialism is the revolutionary break-up of the old and the establishment of the new, and an ever more precise social orientation of its functions.

The most important internal state function in countries advancing along the non-capitalist road is that of suppressing the resistance of reactionary classes and social groups (the proimperialist bourgeoisie, feudal lords and tribal nobility), which, with the support of neocolonialists, hope to cut short the progressive development chosen by the people. One cannot expect the feudal and tribal elite, the compradores and the national bourgeoisie connected with imperialism to surrender their economic and political positions without a fight. Judging by developments in Burma, Benin, Guinea, Syria and other countries, the reaction with outside support is fiercely resisting the introduction of socio-economic changes. It organises counter-revolutionary conspiracies to overthrow revolutionary-democratic governments (the People's Republic of the Congo, Angola), clamps down on the activists, who organise peasant co-operatives (Tanzania), sabotages the government's economic measures (Algeria, Burma) and enters into direct contacts with imperialism with the view to organising armed intervention against its own country (Guinea, 1970). The reaction instigates armed separatist movements (Iraq, the struggle of the Kurds after the adoption of the 1974 law on the autonomy of Kurdistan; Burma). Capitalising on economic difficulties and sometimes on the errors of revolutionary democrats in their social policy, it incites the working people to organise strikes at state-operated enterprises and stage mass disorders (Burma, 1975).

Underestimation of the strength and influence of the feudal and tribal elite and also of the emergent bourgeoisie may result and, as developments in Ghana show, do result in the defeat of the revolution (counter-revolutionary coup in 1966). Therefore, in response to the exploiters' efforts to establish their political domination, the revolutionary-democratic authority employs the strength of the state machinery to put down the resistance of the counter-revolutionary sections of the population.

The acts of the new order to suppress the resistance of the hostile classes and social strata are far from being naked

violence. It does so on the basis of revolutionary laws, which prescribe certain social and political rights for the exploiters and the introduction of a range of political, economic and ideological measures, including the prohibition and dissolution of the parties of the proimperialist bourgeoisie and the feudals (Burma and other countries), abolition of the institute of tribal chiefs and deprivation of the latter of all administrative power (countries of Tropical Africa), confiscation of surplus land and nationalisation of the means of production, confiscation of illegally acquired property by property check-up commissions (Guinea, Tanzania). In some countries (Burma, Syria) ceilings have been imposed on property and incomes; in Egypt, during Nasser's presidency landowners, who hindered the introduction of the agrarian reform, were ordered to move to large towns so as to deprive the feudals of their traditional influence over the peasants. In some states the political rights of specified categories of exploiters have been curtailed. In Guinea and Tanzania exploiters are not permitted to hold posts in the ruling party and the state apparatus. In some countries big landowners, traders and profiteers may not join co-operative societies. Under Burmese law rich peasants, whose holdings exceed 20 acres, persons exploiting the labour of more than five workers, and also some other elements may not be elected members of co-operative boards, although these categories of people have the right to take part in electing the elective part of the co-operative organs (in Burma a third of the membership of the co-operative boards are appointed by administrative bodies).

An important role in the function of social repression is played by the state's punitive activity, namely, disclosure of conspiracies and conviction of those involved by specially set up people's courts and revolutionary tribunals; open trials of counter-revolutionaries; defeat of armed sorties of reactionary elements; fight against corruption in the state apparatus; punishment of the embezzlers of socialist property, etc.

In performing the function of social repression it is always important clearly to distinguish between the enemies, who oppose the popular system, and friends, who advocate a further deepening of socio-economic changes and resolutely uphold the revolutionary-democratic government, but who sometimes criticise the halfway character of some of its

measures (for example, in carrying through the land reform). By prompting revolutionary democrats to act with greater determination, such criticism strengthens popular rule and, consequently, the position of the genuinely revolutionary government. The employment of repressive measures against workers and Communists weakens the alliance of the progressive forces and the positions of the revolutionary democracy itself. The experience of some developing countries in Asia and Africa shows that anti-communism and anti-Sovietism are detrimental to the people's liberatory aspirations and national interests and merely promote the interests of international imperialist forces. The further development of the national-democratic revolution implies the cohesion of all sincere adherents of the socialist orientation.

Mirroring the specific character of the socialist-oriented state, its function of repression has a very important peculiarity: inasmuch as at certain stages of development a part of the non-working sections may participate in the democratic bloc, the function of repressing the exploiters has not yet become a characteristic feature of this state. So far it is confined to suppressing the resistance of the reactionary forces standing in the way of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal transformations.

Inasmuch as the counter-revolutionary forces seek imperialist support, their resistance heightens from time to time and the class struggle intensifies. This being the case, the state's activity to suppress counter-revolution is most effective if it is not confined to measures at the top, but is combined with the development of the revolutionary energy of the masses and has the support of the working sections of the population. The operations of the "self-defence detachments" in the "socialist villages" (*ujamaa*) in Tanzania (1972), the activity of people's defence committees in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (since 1975) and of other armed organisations of the popular masses are an example of this.

As it puts down the resistance of the reaction, a socialist-oriented state is called upon to create the material conditions for the transition to socialism in an economically backward society where foreign capital still plays a considerable, and sometimes even a predominant role. In order to solve this problem the state's economic function has to be developed to the fullest extent possible. "With the help of economic

measures the state promotes the unity of the masses and organises them against exploitation of man by man," proclaims Article 34 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo. The TANU Rules, which are a component of the Constitution, also emphasise the significance of the economic activity of the state and make the point that it is the latter's responsibility to intervene in the economic life of the nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens and to prevent the exploitation of one person by another or one group by another and the accumulation of wealth to an extent, which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society (Article 2).

Thus, the economic function in a socialist-oriented state is not only anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, but also anti-capitalist in character. Its basic content is the state's efforts to create the material and technical prerequisites for socialism and new relations of production, by developing and consolidating the public ownership of the means of production in its two basic forms—state and co-operative—through the gradual limitation and expulsion of foreign and local capital and the introduction of state planning.

A decisive role in the establishment of new relations of production is played by the state sector of the economy. It begins to take shape immediately following the winning of independence inasmuch as means of communications, administrative buildings and other local facilities once owned by the colonial authorities became the property of the new state on the basis of the right of succession. In some countries, however, (Algeria and, particularly, Guinea) the colonialists dismantled and shipped out a part of this property in order to create serious difficulties for the peoples who had liberated themselves from colonial oppression. Moreover, the monopolies did not invest into industry, but into trade, which was one of the most important means of plundering the colonies through unequal exchange (some of the colonies had a developing mining industry, which supplied the home country with raw materials). As a result, the nature of the state sector in the liberated countries was initially one-sided.

The nationalisation of the property owned by the imperialist monopolies (banks, transport and in some countries, land) resulted in the further growth and consolidation of the state sector.

The state cannot carry on its transformative activity without resorting to nationalisation, but its forms and tactics depend on specific conditions in the given country. Judging by the experience of some socialist-oriented countries nationalisation should by no means be effected within the shortest possible time and embrace extensive spheres of the economy and include petty trade, for instance. In some cases the state had to return small nationalised enterprises to their owners because their transition to the state proved unprofitable, and the technical base and the state apparatus proved to be unprepared to administer them. Reprivatisation took place not only in the countries of Tropical Africa (reprivatisation of small-trading establishments in Guinea), but also in Algeria, Syria and Burma.

In general, prompt nationalisation is essential when the state takes over key branches, when it serves as a means for countering sabotage by the proprietors, who disorganise the economy, and when it brings immediate advantages. Unwarranted nationalisation resulting from the leftist desire to display the so-called revolutionary spirit may weaken economic management instead of strengthening it. The socialist-oriented countries draw on each other's experience in the field of nationalisation. The legislation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen underlines that the nationalisation of petty trading establishments, cattle, etc., should not be carried out under the conditions obtaining in the country; in Angola foreign oil companies continue to operate on a temporary basis; in Tanzania some highly profitable plantations are still owned by Europeans.

Nationalisation in the socialist-oriented states followed diverse patterns. First, they nationalised property owned by foreign imperialists. In some countries, particularly in Tropical Africa, the transition of this property to the state was initially selective and effected through the promulgation of special acts on the nationalisation of individual enterprises (the nationalisation of the French air company and diamond mines in 1962 and 1964 in Guinea, the nationalisation of six companies in Algeria in 1970 in connection with their owners' refusal to increase the production of oil, the nationalisation of electric power stations in the People's Republic of the Congo in 1966, etc.). In many cases the nationalisation involved crucial branches of the economy (the timber industry in Burma in 1965, the mining industry in Algeria in 1966, textile mills

in Tanzania in 1967, the sugar industry in the People's Republic of the Congo in 1970, the nationalisation of the giant foreign monopoly, the Iraq Petroleum Company in Iraq and its pipelines in Syria in 1972, the nationalisation of the property of Shell, Mobile Oil and other companies in the Congo in 1974).

Later other enterprises were nationalised (for example, in accordance with the edict of the Presidential Council, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in February 1972 nationalised large hotels and cinemas, and private pharmacies were closed down in Guinea in 1972).

Some countries carried out a partial nationalisation of foreign property. In 1971 in Algeria the state took over 51 per cent of all the shares of foreign oil companies. Partial nationalisation also took place in Tanzania (60 per cent of the shares of 33 companies producing sisal).

As a rule, foreign firms are nationalised on a compensatory basis, either full and immediate (in Burma the government was compelled to redeem immediately the full cost of some nationalised British enterprises) or partial (in Algeria compensation was both full and partial). Usually, however, compensation is paid out in full although in instalments. Under Law No. 37 adopted in 1969 in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen compensation for nationalised enterprises, including 2 per cent interest, will be paid out over twenty-year period.

Besides the nationalisation of the property of foreign monopolies all socialist-oriented states have partially nationalised specified means of production owned by the local bourgeoisie (depending on their economic significance), and also the shareholdings of the local bourgeoisie in imperialist firms. In these cases nationalisation depended on the value of the property involved, on whether the property had been illegally acquired (Guinea, the Congo, Tanzania), on whether the proprietors were involved in counter-revolutionary activity (Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and others), on the significance of the branch of the economy concerned (enterprises for the processing and distribution of rice in Burma) and on the number of workers employed (for example, at first over 50 and then over 10 in Syria). In 1975 a law was passed in Guinea-Bissau under which the property of people guilty of treason was nationalised.

The local bourgeoisie is also entitled to compensation, but

as a rule only partial. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the compensation is to be paid in the twenty-year period after the 1969 nationalisation. In Burma the deferred payment of the compensation is established legislatively.

The land is also of a significant importance for the state sector of economy. In some countries all the land has been nationalised (the Congolese Constitution of 1973, the Burmese Constitution of 1974 and the corresponding law passed in Guinea-Bissau in 1975), in others all transactions in land have been prohibited and land laws tantamount to nationalisation were introduced (Guinea). But private ownership in land is permitted in many countries and only a part of the land has been nationalised there (land owned by former feudal rulers, large estates, which had not been fragmented out of practical considerations, etc.). At present no compensation is paid out to landowners whose land was confiscated (at the outset the payment of such compensation had been envisaged in some countries).

The nationalisation of the means of production laid the foundation for the creation of a powerful state sector of the economy. But it has not been completed and, judging by the range of measures which are being taken by revolutionary-democratic governments, will continue.

Currently, the state's activity in organising the state sector of the economy is a matter of prime and ever increasing significance. With the support of the socialist countries, the socialist-oriented states build industrial and other enterprises, state-owned irrigation systems, develop uncultivated and fallow lands and pursue a policy of industrialisation.

With the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries a large number of industrial and other enterprises and projects have been put in operation in the states taking the non-capitalist road of development. Some of the projects are unique in terms of their size and production and technological level not only in the developing countries, but in world practice in general.

The socialist-oriented states are using the assistance of the socialist countries to build projects, which are of vital importance to them. Thus, countries with a relatively developed economy, Algeria, for example, are availing themselves of Soviet aid in building enterprises manufacturing the means of production. In the less developed countries (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), which are extremely

short of consumer goods, the USSR is assisting in the construction of factories producing such commodities from local materials. It should be noted, however, that in spite of the different methods employed in carrying through nationalisation, the socialist-oriented states, thanks to their co-operation with the socialist states, are in a position promptly to build key heavy industry factories, power plants, large irrigation systems and other projects. The matter here is confined to ensuring science-based harmonious economic development, since without adequate attention to agriculture, the construction of factories lacking local raw materials may produce very serious deformities in the economy.

As a result of these measures the socialist-oriented states have already built up a powerful state sector of the economy, which yields nearly 90 per cent of the GNP in Syria and 70 per cent in Iraq. In Algeria the state and the so-called self-management sectors account for 80 per cent of the means of production in industry and for 60 per cent in agriculture. In some countries (Burma, the Congo, Angola), the state sector has still to gain a dominant position in the economy, but even so it is the bulwark of the popular rule and determines the country's development. The Burmese twenty-year development plan envisages that by 1994 the state sector will yield 48 per cent of the GNP (the co-operative sector will account for 26 per cent), while the share yielded by the private sector will decrease to 26 per cent.

Performing its economic function a socialist-oriented state carries through fundamental socio-economic changes in the countryside, the most important being the agrarian reform and the promotion of co-operatives embracing small producers.

The agrarian reform is conducted on the basis of the principle that the land belongs to those who till it. This formula is set forth in legislation passed in Algeria in 1972 inaugurating a land reform there.

In countries, where there were landlord property rights prior to liberation, the people's rule has fixed the maximum size of privately owned land (under a law adopted in 1970, a large family in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen may hold 16.8 hectares of irrigated land and 33.6 hectares of non-irrigated land, while one person or a small family are allowed to hold an area half as big; the corresponding figures in Syria are from 15 to 55 hectares of irrigated land and from

80 to 300 hectares of non-irrigated land, depending on its location; in Iraqi Kurdistan the size of private holdings is limited to 10 hectares of dry-farming land and 12.5 hectares of arid land. Plots exceeding the fixed size are confiscated and either portioned out to landless and land-hungry peasants and also to agricultural labourers (from 1.2 to 4.2 hectares in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 1.2 hectares of palm plantings in Zanzibar, up to eight hectares of irrigated land in Syria), or become the property of the state, or co-operatives are organised on it. Land owned by the former feudal rulers, sultans, their ministers and courtiers is also confiscated.

As a rule, no compensation is paid for the confiscated land. This is done only in exceptional cases. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen compensation will be paid out in regular instalments to individual proprietors over a period of 25 years. Under a law passed in the country in 1970, the first payment is made five years after confiscation. In the course of the reform launched in Algeria in 1972 only those owners, who had purchased land during the national liberation struggle, are not entitled to compensation.

Peasants, who are allotted land as envisaged by the reform, pay the state and not the landowner for it. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the aggregate price paid by the peasants is equal to the compensation paid out by the state to the former proprietor, plus 1.5 per cent interest. The peasants pay out the sum in equal instalments over a twenty-five-year period.

In some socialist-oriented countries the agrarian reform has its specific features. In Algeria, for example, land is confiscated from those people who lease it to the peasants, while permanently residing in towns. In 1965 Burmese peasants were freed of the need to pay rent to the landowners and were allowed to retain their plots which they had formerly leased.

In the countries of Tropical Africa, where there was no landownership and, consequently, there is a lot of free land, agrarian reforms were not carried out (with the exception, for example, of the northern area of Guinea where land was partially redistributed in favour of the poorest peasants). In these countries the solution of the land question is closely connected with the development of new lands, the establishment of centres for the modernisation of agriculture and the

introduction of new forms of economic management in rural regions. The state also sets up co-operative settlements. It allots the necessary land, builds schools and hospitals (medical centres) and grants credits, and the peasants, who settle there, are obliged to work collectively. Under the agrarian reform in Algeria 1,000 new villages will be set up in the country.

Since it takes a long time to build up a new economy, several types of property and, consequently, several social and economic structures (sectors) are to be found in a society developing along the non-capitalist path. The state pursues a specific policy towards each of them. As regards the state and the co-operative sectors, which are public forms of the economy, the state does everything to strengthen and develop them. Its policy towards the small commodity production sector embracing individual peasants, handicraftsmen and artisans is one of assisting the small producer so that he will not fall into bondage to the landowners and kulaks. Article 20 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen reads: "The state looks after the small traders, artisans and fishermen and supports them." But the main feature of the government policy towards the small producers is promotion of their co-operation. The laws of all socialist-oriented countries encourage co-operation and the state extends privileges to the co-operatives. In some countries the peasants, who receive land as a result of the agrarian reform, are obliged to join a co-operative (for the other peasants co-operation is a voluntary matter). Yet, in many cases the production tasks of the co-operatives are not fully reflected in legislation, and co-operatives are regarded chiefly as associations of individual peasants running their farms as they wish.

With the view to safeguarding the interests of broad sections of the peasantry the state sometimes decrees that small peasants and artisans should comprise the majority of the members of co-operative boards. In practice, however, the kulaks and often the former landowners exert considerable influence on the affairs of the co-operatives. In some countries the development of peasant self-management is also held up by the state's excessive patronage: although the board is elected it often happens that the co-operative is headed by an appointed official.

Despite encouragement by the state, co-operation is still inadequately developed. Co-operative associations in the

Congo unite not more than 1 per cent of the population, and in Guinea they have been replaced by production teams under the "local revolutionary authorities" (such co-operatives have been set up in 2,000 villages out of approximately 8,000) or "centres of revolutionary training". Tanzania is the only country in Tropical Africa where co-operatives embrace the major portion of the peasant population. In Syria 25 per cent of the peasants are united in co-operatives, and in Iraq members of co-operatives till 38 per cent of the country's arable land. Yet most of the co-operatives are of the sales and supply type. Even in Tanzania, where the *ujamaa* co-operatives are regarded as socialist villages, the majority of their members (90 per cent) cultivate only individual plots, about 10 per cent till the commonly owned field and individual plots and about 1 per cent cultivate only the common field. In 1975 Tanzania passed a law on the *ujamaa* villages under which they are divided into several categories depending on the level of socialisation of the means of production, and the name *ujamaa* is bestowed on a village by the TANU Central Committee.

The further development of the co-operative movement depends on the search for and the introduction of such forms of co-operatives which are consistent with specific conditions in each socialist-oriented state and stimulate the activity of the working people. Being both a labourer and proprietor a peasant has a natural tendency to vacillate; as a result the number of co-operatives in some countries diminishes from time to time. It is necessary, therefore, to conduct extensive educational work and explain the advantages of co-operation, thus helping the peasant to appreciate these advantages through personal experience. Life shows that there should be no coercion towards the peasant, for he cannot fail to accept collectivisation and socialist change upon realising that they are in his own interests.

As regards the patriarchal and feudal structures, the state is set on liquidating them and takes decisive steps to abolish feudal relations and tribalism. With respect to private capitalist property, the state, taking account of the current situation does not intend to abolish it immediately. Article 20 of the Constitution of Burma stipulates that the state may permit such private enterprises, which do not undermine the "socialist economic system"; and the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen decrees that "the state sup-

ports the private national production sector". These principles are the legal basis for private economic activity, for at the given stage a socialist-oriented state is compelled to permit and use private capital to surmount economic backwardness. Foreign capital is also used for this purpose (Article 24 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).

But while it does permit the activity of local and foreign capital a socialist-oriented state keeps it within certain limits. Articles of the Constitution saying that private property is permitted underline that the private sector should promote the development of the national economy (Article 20 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). Article 14 of the Syrian Constitution says in reference to private property: "The manner in which it is exploited should not be permitted to contradict the interests of the people." Article 16 of the Provisional Constitution of Iraq stipulates that private property and private enterprise are permitted provided they are not used to the detriment of the country's economic development plan. "No one may use his right of private property to the prejudice of the general good," proclaims Article 33 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo. Constitutions also impose certain restrictions on foreign capital. The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for example, permits foreign capital investments only to the extent required by the development of the national economy and in the forms corresponding to the objectives of the national liberation revolution and the country's laws (Article 24.) The 1972 Programme of the Congolese Workers' Party sets the task of "gradual, but full liquidation of foreign capital".¹

Thus, in addition to nationalisation the state imposes a range of restrictions on private capital. Large profits are heavily taxed. Many socialist-oriented countries prohibit the establishment of new private enterprises, barring building organisations. Laws passed in Guinea in 1964 and 1968 fix the maximum number of tradesmen, who can operate in each specific district. Commissions for checking up and confiscating illegally acquired property have been set up in Guinea, Tanzania and the Congo.

¹ Etumba, No. 295, 1973, p. 7.

The state controls the activity of private capital. Article 32 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo reads: "By relying on the state sector of the economy and the co-operatives the state exercises general control over the private sector of the economy."

Private property is also limited by keeping private capital out of certain branches of the economy. In the countries of Tropical Africa these branches include gold and diamond mining, finance, credits, railways and air lines, mineral prospecting and mining, the purchase and export of farm products, power engineering and others. Foreign capital has been pushed out of foreign trade in some countries and private wholesale trade is allowed but only on certain conditions (limitation of the maximum size of fixed capital; availability of storage facilities etc.).

Private property is also being ousted by narrowing the circle of people who are permitted to possess it. In some countries, where measures are being taken against the "bourgeoisification" of the party and state apparatus, civil servants and party workers may not engage in private enterprise. All persons employed in the state sector may not carry on private trade (the ban extends to the spouse, too). In some countries high-ranking civilian and military officials who dispose of the state's funds may not build houses for the sake of profit. Under the General Law on Revolution, promulgated in Guinea in 1973, exploiters, owners of transport facilities, industrial projects and employers may not be given jobs in the party and state apparatus. It also prohibits civil servants and administrative and party workers to engage in commercial activity, own enterprises and also to lease houses and receive more than one salary. Illegally acquired property is subject to confiscation and its owners, who hold official posts are dismissed.

At the same time, the policy of a socialist-oriented state towards private national and foreign capital is very complex. Restricting and ousting it in general, the state, nevertheless, is forced to involve it in the development of certain branches of the economy. "It is necessary to make the bourgeoisie participate in the creation of a productive national economy,"¹

¹ The Programme of the National Front Political Organisation at the Stage of the National Liberation Revolution, Second Ed., Aden, 1972, p. 34 (in Arabic).

says the 1972 Programme of the National Liberation Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. There are foreign firms in Guinea and the People's Republic of the Congo, which even enjoy privileges: they are exempt from certain taxes for a period of up to 25 years and are supplied with raw materials on preferential terms. In 1974 the Burmese Government for the first time allowed private firms to operate in two industries—oil and mining.

All things considered, the policy of the state with regard to private capital calls for a great deal of political flexibility, sagacity, skill and a clearly defined class approach.

Planning is an important component of the state's economic function. The socialist-oriented countries adopt long-term development plans: three-year plans in the Congo and Benin, four-year plans in Burma and Algeria and a five-year plan in Tanzania. In these countries planning has not attained the level of a developed socialist planning, but it already fundamentally differs from the programming in capitalist and capitalist-oriented countries.¹

As distinct from the capitalist-oriented countries where the plan is regarded as a possible, but by no means an essential element of regulating the economy, planning in the socialist-oriented states is a key constitutional principle (Article 17 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Article 13 of the 1973 Permanent Constitution of Syria).

Planning is quite realistic in a country following the non-capitalist road for it is the state sector and not the private one that determines the development of the economy. Besides, the state actively interferes in the activity of private enterprises, sets them assignments, defines the type of goods they are to produce and supervises their activity.

Planning and the introduction of measures to secure the fulfilment of the plan in the socialist-oriented states rest on the creative energy of the people. "As it realises the general plan," reads Article 32 of the Congolese Constitution, "the state relies on the trade union organisations of workers and employees, on the peasant co-operatives and other organisa-

¹ Owing to setbacks in regulating the economy some capitalist-oriented countries have given up long-term planning and compile only government programmes.

tions of the toiling masses." The basic provisions of the plans for enterprises are formulated with the participation of workers, and general state plans are sometimes submitted for discussion by the population.

Finally, unlike the bourgeois countries where planning is partial, there is a tendency for structural planning in the socialist-oriented states. Its purpose is to alter the social system as well as to embrace the main aspects of economic activity. It follows that although more than 50 countries, which had cast off colonial dependence, now have long-term plans, only the socialist-oriented states conduct genuine planning. In other countries it is merely partial programming of economic growth.

On the other hand, so far planning in the socialist-oriented countries is not identical with the planning in socialist countries. It has only specific tendencies and does not embrace all the main spheres of public life. Many of the plans are not comprehensive documents, but constitute an aggregate of diverse projects and are compiled on the basis of geographic or branch principles. The search for funds to finance the measures envisaged in the plan is often the chief occupation of many planning agencies. Finally, planning still largely depends on the participation of foreign capital. For example, the current plan in Tanzania (1973-1978) envisages that foreign investments are to account for 33 per cent of its fulfilment (a major achievement because her preceding plan envisaged that 80 per cent of it would be financed by foreign sources).

The socialist-oriented states acquired a dire heritage from the colonial period: almost total illiteracy, national discord, oppressed status of women, a terribly short duration of life, etc. This accounts for the exceptional importance of the social function in them. It reflects the state's efforts to promote education, health protection and social maintenance, to regulate production relations and alter the mode of life. In countries, where the unequal status of women was prescribed by archaic laws and customs, measures to involve them in socio-political life, to rectify inequality in the field of marriage, family and property relations constitute an important part of this function. The state's social function also includes its efforts to abolish tribalism, secure the rational distribution of the population and educate the younger generation. Consequently, the social function of the state in countries following the non-ca-

pitalist path embraces a wide range of public relations and its main objective is to create social preconditions for the subsequent transition to socialism.

The deepening of the revolution and broadening of socio-economic changes ensure the further development of this function and strengthen its material prerequisites. The revolutionary-democratic party and the state continuously swell the funds to finance social activity. In January 1972, for instance, the Executive Committee of TANU decided to modify the second five-year plan and double the expenditures envisaged in the budget on education and the health service.

The programmes and constitutions of the socialist-oriented states set forth the basic principles of the state's social activity in various spheres of public life. They provide for the abolition of illiteracy, as one of the main national duties (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Iraq), and say that "the system of education and culture is designed to form a socialist patriotic Arab generation armed with a scientific outlook" (Article 21 of the Provisional Constitution of Syria); that it is necessary to create a system of education based on socialist morality (Burma); that society should be freed of the evil views spread by imperialism, and of diverse gentile and tribal survivals (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen); that it is essential to improve living standards in rural regions. Articles 27 and 37 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen say that in the sphere of upbringing and education the state attaches particular attention to those who thus far had been deprived of this opportunity in view of their social status. All these constitutional principles attest to fundamental changes, which occur in the nature of the social function of a state when it orientates itself on socialist development, and to its new class substance.

At the same time, revolutionary-democracy is inconsistent in defining the state's social tasks. Some constitutions say that it is the duty of the state to promote religious education and preserve the original character of the family, although there are countries where women do not enjoy equal family status with men.

Performing its social function in countries following the non-capitalist path, the state carries through a range of cardinal measures. One of them is providing employment for

the citizens. The new states have inherited unemployment on a vast scale from the colonial system (in Algeria, for example, it embraced 20 per cent of the population). At present unemployment has declined sharply, but it still exists. Therefore, the state's centralised system of providing employment plays an important part in resolving this problem. Businessmen and the administration of state-operated enterprises are limited in their right to hire personnel; ministries of labour and special agencies have a planned system of placing workers and employees at enterprises and offices. Jobs are given to those who have permits from the labour inspections, employment bureaus and other agencies, which register the unemployed and place them in jobs. In the People's Republic of the Congo organisations of the Congolese Workers' Party have been handling all questions of employment since 1972. Unemployment is being wiped out also by the introduction of compulsory labour conscription (for instance, in Algeria it covers men, who have reached the age of 19, for a two-year period).

In keeping with constitutions, which qualify work as a matter of honour, voluntary and unpaid work of the population on the construction of public projects such as roads, bridges, irrigation canals, schools and hospitals has become widespread.

So far distribution according to labour is a programme target. This principle is only partially implemented—at state-operated enterprises and co-operatives. The state also fixes the minimum wage at private enterprises. In 1975, in connection with cases of violation of the law by private enterprises in Algeria (particularly, unequal remuneration of male and female labour), their activity was placed under the control of the trade unions.

It is important to note that in the performance of its social function in the field of labour relations the state upholds the just demands of the working people in the event of conflicts between the employers (foreign firms, in particular) and the workers. The state always supports strikers, who demand the Africanisation of the personnel, the raising of their wages to equal the minimum wage at state enterprises and improvement of living conditions.

In its social activity the state pays a great deal of attention to promoting public education. This is a matter of vast political importance in the socialist-oriented countries and is

inseparably bound up with the development of the mental outlook of the working sections; with the invigoration of their activity in political affairs and with the creation of a new intelligentsia from working people.

At present special significance is attached to the problem of abolishing illiteracy. When Asian and African countries won state independence, from 65 to 95 per cent of their adult population (even 99 per cent in some countries) were illiterate. The governments of the socialist-oriented countries set up commissions to combat illiteracy, train an ever larger number of teachers, build schools at a rapid pace and organise a system of study courses, including evening classes for adults. Gradually the state gains control over the entire system of education by nationalising private schools and other privately run educational institutions. All schools were nationalised in Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo (1965), Burma (1966), Angola (1976) and other countries. Special funds are allotted for promoting adult education, and illiteracy-liquidation courses are set up (for instance, in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen under a law passed in 1973). Committees for supervising education at union, regional and district levels have been established in Burma in 1972. They are made up of representatives of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, and of worker and peasant councils. There are also illiteracy-liquidation commissions, which were formed in 1972. Although illiteracy is diminishing it is still considerable: 38 per cent in Syria and 30 per cent in Burma (1974). In many countries of Tropical Africa the proportion of the illiterate is much higher.

The social security system, the pension scheme, in the first place, effectively protect the interests of the working people. There are different kinds of pensions: old-age, disability, and unemployment. In actual fact the pension system was first introduced after winning independence, for during the colonial rule it covered a very small circle of people. The pensionable age (the biggest pension category) has been considerably lowered as compared with that of many bourgeois states. Thus far, however, pension laws extend only to workers and employees of the state sector, reflecting what a socialist-oriented state is capable of doing in this field at the present stage. Needless to say, the social conditions will continue to improve as the economy develops. But already today the new state's concern for the working people is yielding good results. As far

back as at the 15th Congress of TANU in 1971 it was noted that within a decade the life span in Tanzania increased by four years.

An important component of a state's social function in the group of Asian and African countries under review are efforts to give women equal rights with men. Corresponding legislation has been passed in all countries. The law on the family adopted in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1974 is a good example. In order to guarantee freedom of marriage it lays down that the proposal and acceptance are made in the presence of witnesses. The law defines this condition as an "essential element of marriage", which is invalid if this condition is not observed. The law fixes the marriageable age, grants equal inheritance rights to both sexes, abolishes the formerly compulsory bride-money and limits conditions under which a man is allowed to take a second wife (chiefly reasons of a medical nature certified by a medical board). At the same time, the law retains some features of the old order. It proceeds from the assumption that the husband is by law the head of the family. The law allows the payment of bride-money without making it a compulsory matter; in practice this law is interpreted on the basis of the general principles of Muslim law and tribal customs.

In order to effect the transition to socialism it is necessary to create ideological conditions as well as material and social ones. That accounts for the significance of the socialist-oriented state's ideological function designed to enhance the political awareness of the masses and enlighten and educate the population in the spirit of socialism, national equality, democracy, peace and friendship between peoples. Owing to their very nature, the organs of a popular state are called upon actively to propagandise socialist ideology, elucidate the state's programme and policy of socialist reorganisation of society to the masses. Referring to the Soviet state Lenin emphasised that it draws its strength from the fact that the "people know everything, can form an opinion of everything and do everything consciously".¹ The heightening consciousness of the masses strengthens the socialist-oriented state, too.

Political education of the masses is promoted not only by a specialised apparatus, but also by entire activity of state organs. The masses base their opinion of the state precisely on the nature and methods of the activity of these organs. In this

connection addresses of heads of different departments to the population, regular meetings of state leaders and representatives of public organisations and the trials of conspirators and counter-revolutionaries at open court hearings have a major educational impact on the people. Of enormous political significance are mass discussions of the drafts of vital political documents: the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1970 and that of Syria in 1973; three successive drafts of the Burmese Constitution in the period between 1971 and 1973; programmes and charters of national action; the Charter of the National Progressive Front of Syria in 1972, and Iraq in 1972-1973; development plans in Tanzania; and codes of laws in Guinea. Some countries organise nation-wide campaigns to propagandise the ideas of scientific socialism.

But in the performance of its ideological function the state has to face certain difficulties, stemming among other things from the fact that on a number of questions the very ideology of some revolutionary democrats is somewhat inconsistent and contradictory.

We have examined the internal functions of a socialist-oriented state, which manifest its creative nature as the main instrument of the establishment of the material and technical basis and the promotion of new social relations. But the state operates not only inside a country. It also operates on the international scene and its activity in that sphere is the substance of its external functions.

The external functions of a socialist-oriented state are aimed at consolidating the political and economic independence in the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism and at obtaining international conditions most favourable for social progress. They also attest to the anti-imperialist nature of a socialist-oriented state.

The most important external function of a socialist-oriented state is that of defending the country against imperialist encroachments. This function is established as law in constitutions adopted lately by the socialist-oriented states.

The aggressive policy of the imperialist powers is designed to push the socialist-oriented states off their chosen path of development by all means, ranging from subversion

inside the country to the organisation of military coups and direct armed aggression. Therefore, the defence function of a socialist-oriented state is also a most important class function of protecting the progressive gains of the people from external enemies.

The defence function includes the efforts of states to act collectively or individually in self-defence in the event of an attack or threat of an attack on the given state. Examples of such efforts are the just struggle of Arab peoples and states against Israeli aggression, and the fight of the Angolese people against the intervention by South Africa in 1975.

Constantly on the alert for the intrigues of the imperialists, the peoples of the young states try to co-ordinate their actions in the event of aggression. A special commission on defence with the object of co-ordinating efforts in this field has been set up within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Such co-operation is also effected on a bilateral basis.

Another external function of a socialist-oriented state is that of working for peace and international security. Article 26 of the Constitution of Burma reads: "The state consistently practises an independent foreign policy, aimed at international peace and friendly relations among nations, and upholds the principles of peaceful coexistence of nations." The content of this function is the young states' vigorous fight to remove the causes giving rise to the threat to international peace and security. An inalienable component of this function, therefore, is their efforts to bring about the dismantlement of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the achievement of negotiated settlements of disputes between states and their fight against racist and colonial regimes, which are a permanent threat to peace.

The long and determined struggle waged by all socialist-oriented states resulted in the dismantling of imperialist military bases on their territories.

International co-operation is another important external function of the socialist-oriented states. They want to promote international co-operation with all countries regardless of their socio-political systems and maintain business contacts with the imperialist states on the basis of treaties and agreements, which do not infringe upon their sovereignty. Consistent with the principle of solidarity of the liberated peoples,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 256.

the socialist-oriented countries together with other Asian, African and Latin American states work for peace and international security, for the introduction of general democratic norms into the sphere of international relations. Countries with progressive regimes jointly struggle against imperialist aggression and co-ordinate their efforts to stimulate economic growth.

The widening and consolidation of ties with the socialist countries is a matter of particular importance for the socialist-oriented states. Such relations are by no means confined to economic co-operation. The socialist-oriented states co-operate actively with the USSR and other socialist countries in resolving fundamental international issues. Co-operation of this sort rests on their common concern to preserve peace and international security and is based on the profoundly democratic principles of international solidarity. The content of this activity reflects not only the coincidence of interests in the joint struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, for peace, freedom and independence of peoples, but also the common struggle for social progress. The Programme of the United National Front Political Organisation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen adopted in 1975 says that socialist states are democratic Yemen's natural allies with whom the people of Southern Yemen are acting in a united front. The co-operation of the socialist-oriented countries with the socialist states is one of the most important foreign policy conditions of their successful advance towards socialism.

The socialist countries are the natural allies of the socialist-oriented states. Defining the Soviet Union's attitude to the complex processes in the developing countries, L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress: "The Soviet Union does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. It is an immutable principle of our Leninist foreign policy to respect the sacred right of every people, every country, to choose its own way of development. But we do not conceal our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and regard them as friends and comrades in struggle."¹

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1976, p. 16.

3. Forms of State in the Socialist-Oriented Countries

A state's form is its organisation and structure examined from the point of view of its institutional, territorial and functional aspects. It is the unity of three sides: the form of government, the form of state structure and the form of political (state) regime. The form of government stands for the procedure governing the formation of state organs, particularly the central ones—head of state, parliament and government—and their mutual relations. Therefore, in the first place it is necessary to distinguish between a monarchy and a republic, and then within these two forms—between a parliamentary republic and a presidential republic; a parliamentary monarchy and a dualistic monarchy, etc. In the socialist-oriented countries there is only a republic, for the monarchistic form of government was promptly abolished as incompatible with popular rule (the sultanates of Southern Yemen, Zanzibar and others).

The state structure reflects a country's national-territorial and administrative-territorial division. There are unitary and federative states whose composition may include autonomous formations. The socialist-oriented states have one or the other form of state structure (Guinea, for example, is a unitary state, the United Republic of Tanzania is a federation, the Republic of Iraq is a unitary state with the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan).

Finally, the political (state) regime determines the basic methods of exercising state power. In capitalist countries the regimes are bourgeois-democratic (Britain, Italy, France and others) and authoritarian, fascist and racist (South Africa, Chile, etc.). The socialist countries have a regime of socialist democracy: proletarian or of the whole people (at the second stage of the development of a socialist state). The regime in the socialist-oriented countries is national-democratic.

The form of any state depends on its nature and is determined by its substance. At the same time, the specific features of any concrete form of state stem from the balance of class forces and class struggle, which is reflected in the organisation of state organs, that is, in the state structure. To an extent the form of state may be influenced by geographic conditions (for instance, the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania composed of continental Tanganyika and the

Island of Zanzibar), cultural level and local traditions. The form of the state largely depends on the method of solving the national question (the formation in 1974 of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, for example).

Although a state's form is derivative, it plays an important role in social development. A state form, which does not correspond to its substance, handicaps the state's functions, whereas an adequate form enables the state to perform its transformative role to the full. Consequently, the creation and development of new forms of state is an essential component of the reform of the state with the view to building socialism.

At the same time, some institutions, inherited from the past in a number of socialist-oriented countries, acquire a new content as instruments of social change: the institute of the president endowed with extensive powers, the institute of delegatory legislation, the right to dissolve parliament, administrative control by government-appointed officials (prefects, governors) over representative bodies elected by the population, and so forth.

The peoples of the socialist-oriented countries reject all forms of bourgeois state, including bourgeois democracy. The Policy Declaration of the Revolutionary Council of Burma states that it rejects bourgeois parliamentarism and will support only such a form of democracy, which ensures socialist development (Article 14). The Constitution of the Congo, the Provisional Constitution of Syria and a number of fundamental documents of revolutionary-democratic parties also contain provisions rejecting forms of bourgeois state. Turning down forms of bourgeois state, the peoples of the socialist-oriented countries strive to create state structures which promote social progress.

These countries employ two methods to embody the forms of state in their constitutions. First, it is done by including special provisions into the constitution (usually in its first articles), which contain a general characterisation of the state. The constitution not only proclaims that a given state is a republic, but also stresses its new social character. The Congo is officially called a people's republic, Southern Yemen and Algeria are people's democratic republics. The term "democratic" was officially included into the name of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar after the 1975 revolution, and in 1974 Burma officially proclaimed herself the Socialist Re-

public of the Union of Burma. In order to consolidate the status of people's republic the 1969 Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo stipulated that "the popular form of state cannot be the object of revision" (Article 64). The new Congolese Constitution adopted in 1973 also provides for the defence of the people's gains.

Second, the constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries set up new state organs, establish a special system of relations between them and proclaim new principles of state organisation and political (state) regime. These institutions and relations cardinally differ from the ones existing in bourgeois and capitalist-oriented states.

The scientific literature published in socialist countries characterises this new form of state as a national-democratic form or a national-democratic republic. On the one hand, this definition counterposes such a republic to a bourgeois republic, including a bourgeois-democratic republic, and, on the other, indicates that it differs from Soviet or a people's democratic socialist republic.

A national-democratic republic in different socialist-oriented countries has many distinguishing features, but it also has a range of common features, reflecting the most essential aspects of this concept.

In almost all socialist-oriented countries the organs and activity of the ruling revolutionary-democratic party, on the one hand, and the organs and activity of the state, on the other, are closely connected and in some cases are fused into one. This leads to the establishment of organisationally specific higher party and state bodies of political authority (revolutionary councils in some countries, for example), to the performance of the functions of state bodies by party bodies (a case in point are the village organisations of the Democratic Party, which have been proclaimed as "local revolutionary authority" in Guinea), to election of the state's supreme organs by party bodies (for example, the election of the Congolese President by a party congress), and, conversely, to the appointment of higher party bodies by presidential decree.

In many countries this procedure is a temporary one, since measures are already being taken to delimit party and state activity, but in others it stems from the concept of the party's leading role, which, according to the interpretation of some revolutionary democrats, means that the party is

the political power, while the state is its technical apparatus.

The structure, mutual relations and activity of the organs of a socialist-oriented state have their specific features. Some constitutions (the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) and legislative acts (the Charter of the Wilaya in Algeria of 1969, the Ordinance of the Revolutionary Council of Burma of March 15, 1972 on the reorganisation of state apparatus) describe democratic centralism as a principle of the organisation and activity of state organs. This means that the socialist-oriented countries reject the bureaucratic centralism of a bourgeois state. Yet, in contemporary conditions they still lack socialist democratic centralism. The organisation and activity of state organs, their mutual relations and state structure in the socialist-oriented countries (even if their population is multinational) are characterised by a predominance of centralistic features. So far most of these countries lack a uniform system of elective state organs. The principal way of forming them is by appointment, with legislative and executive powers being often united.

At present centralism in a socialist-oriented state is used to effect social transformations. But in view of the inadequate participation of the working masses in running the state, excessive centralism may lead to bureaucracy. Therefore, the reform of the state in a number of socialist-oriented countries is accompanied by a search for such a correlation between centralism and democracy, which would turn them into an organic whole.

A typical feature of the socialist-oriented countries is the incomplete system of state bodies and a combination of the old and new institutes. In the course of the state reform not only do the old state forms acquire a new content, but new state bodies come into being: people's assemblies of communes and wilayas in Algeria, local councils in Syria, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, the Provisional Supreme People's Council in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Council in Syria, the National People's assemblies in Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Cape Verde, collegial presidency (the Presidential Council in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), highest permanent bodies of supreme representation—state councils in Burma and Guinea-Bissau and permanent committees in Guinea and the People's Demo-

cratic Republic of Yemen. However, a number of socialist-oriented countries lack a complete system of representative bodies—from central to local.¹

A national-democratic state regime has taken shape in the socialist-oriented countries. Its basic features will be examined later in the book, but now it is important to underline that it is no longer an exploitative bourgeois-democratic regime, and not yet a socialist democratic regime. It characterises the implementation of state power in the interests of the bloc of class forces under the guidance of a revolutionary-democratic party.

Besides depriving a part of the exploiters of political rights (the right to be elected to representative bodies in some countries, to hold leading party or government posts and sometimes any party or government posts, etc.) a national-democratic regime envisages certain privileges for the working people. In Syria, for example, workers, peasants, artisans, people in the low income bracket (up to £S 15,000) have 50 per cent of the seats in the People's Council and 60 per cent of the seats in the local councils.² Identical privileges are provided in Algeria in forming representative organs of communes and the National People's Assembly. In spite of certain inaccuracies in defining people, who belong to the categories of workers and peasants, in the legislation of these countries (as a result, exploiters are sometimes elected to the councils), in spite of the fact that the norms of priority representation are also applied to the urban petty bourgeoisie, the establishment of such a system of representation reflects the new features of the state regime in the socialist-oriented countries.

These fundamental features characterising the form of the state manifest themselves in different ways in individual countries. This leads to the appearance of various forms of

¹ The People's National Assembly and the People's councils set up in the Congo in accordance with the 1973 Constitution were dissolved in April 1977 by the Military committee of the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party which provisionally concentrated state power in its own hands.

² During the 1973 elections to the People's Assembly in Syria 186 seats were contested by 1,656 candidates of whom 659 were representatives of workers, peasants and artisans (contesting 95 seats) and 997 of other sections of the population (contesting the remaining seats).

government. Sometimes they outwardly resemble bourgeois presidential republics, but are not in effect. These forms have another content and, therefore, they are other forms. Besides, the very system of relations between state bodies in the socialist-oriented countries differs considerably from that in bourgeois presidential republics, such as in the United States, the Philippines and Brazil, for example.

Bourgeois constitutional law draws a line between presidential and parliamentary republics, but this cannot be applied to socialist-oriented countries, which have their own specific forms of government. In Guinea-Bissau, Burma and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen all higher organs of the state (State Council and the Council of State Commissioners in Guinea-Bissau, the Presidential Council, Permanent Committee of the Supreme People's Council and the Cabinet in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Council of State, President, Council of Ministers, supreme judicial body, supreme body of the procurator's office, state committee of the working people's inspection in Burma) are elected by the supreme representative body, the People's Assembly, and are fully accountable to it.

In the majority of other countries the government is formed by the president, who often heads it in the capacity of prime minister. But as distinct from bourgeois presidential republic the parliament has the right to express non-confidence in the government, individual ministers and under certain conditions in the prime minister, too (Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). The parliament examines and approves the government's programme of action. Moreover, in some countries (Guinea) the president is responsible to parliament for the general policy of his cabinet, while the president, on the other hand, has the right to dissolve parliament. All these provisions are alien to a bourgeois presidential republic of the classical type. They create new relations between state bodies and, consequently, a new form of government.

It should be noted, nevertheless, that features of the departing old (the right to dissolve parliament, for instance) and of the emerging new (for example, the responsibility of all state bodies, including the president, to a people's assembly) combine in this new form.

A larger degree of centralisation is characteristic of another form of government. Usually, it is a provisional

form, which appears immediately after a revolutionary takeover and exists until the adoption of the constitution and the election (or formation by delegation of representatives by public and party organisations) of the higher representative body. Sometimes this form lasts for a long period of time due to various circumstances (in Burma up to 1974, in Algeria from 1965 to 1977 and in Ethiopia since 1974). Under such a form of government the basic competences of the head of state, the legislative body and the supreme organ of state administration are as a rule united in a single body—the revolutionary council (the Provisional Military Administrative Council in Ethiopia, the Revolutionary Command Council in Iraq). At first a revolutionary council usually consists only of the military (Algeria) or the military enjoy an overwhelming majority in it (Burma). Subsequently, however, it comes to include civilians, who sometimes gain the majority. The inclusion in the revolutionary council of representatives of different sections of the population strengthens the social base of this organ of power. In turn, such a reorganisation consolidates the bloc of patriotic forces.

The chairman of a revolutionary council enjoys certain powers of the head of state (in some countries he is regarded as president) and also holds the post of prime minister. Some of the ministers are responsible to him, and the government as a whole is responsible to the revolutionary council. A large part of the ministers are members of the revolutionary council or, in any case, hold key posts in the government.

Certain features of all these forms of state are connected with the processes of the establishment of national statehood. In the course of development these forms are improved, and new institutions and relations between state bodies and, consequently, new forms of state come into existence.

CONSTITUTION— THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE

1. The Constitution and State Development

Although the terms "constitution" and "fundamental law" date back to the slave-owning and feudal societies, the first constitutions appeared as a result of the bourgeoisie's struggle against feudalism and the consolidation of the bourgeois order. Bourgeois ideologues, who aspired to political power, demanded the adoption of a fundamental law that would curtail the arbitrary feudal rule, wipe out absolutism and eliminate feudal law, the law of the privileged. Fundamental laws were adopted in different countries following the victory of bourgeois revolutions, and gave rise to new social relations of a higher order than feudal relations.

Yet bourgeois constitutions, even those which were adopted at the time when the bourgeoisie still played an historically progressive role, had a clearly defined class character. They legalised Negro slavery in the USA (Constitution of 1787), introduced property qualifications depriving the working people of franchise and dividing citizens into politically active and politically passive categories, depending on the size of their property (in France the working people were "passive" citizens and as such were disfranchised), and kept alive the feudal survivals in the political system (the monarchy in Britain, Germany, Japan and a number of other countries).

In the course of a long struggle the working people achieved a certain democratisation of bourgeois constitutions. They were revised to include articles authorising universal suffrage, guaranteeing the social rights of citizens and restricting the competence of the upper house of parliament. Nevertheless, today, too, bourgeois constitutions legalise the

dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Either openly or covertly they consolidate the fundamental principles of the capitalist system of the economy and, in the first place, the domination of private ownership of the means of production. Formally proclaiming the equality of all people before the law, they in effect legalise exploitation of man by man, the class privileges of some people and the lack of rights of others.

Proclaiming rights and freedoms they encompass them with numerous amendments, and even if they do contain certain democratic norms they afford neither material nor political nor adequate legal guarantees to back them up. The working people lack the material means to exercise the rights proclaimed in the constitution. Political power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie; repressive measures, even in violation of the operating laws, are taken against the working people, particularly during periods of aggravation of the class struggle.

The socialist-oriented countries reject the principles of bourgeois constitutionalism and studying the experience of the socialist countries search for new forms of constitutional legislation.

The constitution of a state, including a state which has set itself the aim of building a socialist society, plays a very important role. Its political significance is that it legislatively consolidates the foundations of society's socio-economic structure and political organisation from positions that are advantageous and acceptable to the ruling class or classes. To an extent it regulates the foundation of the social system, the state structure; the system of state bodies is built in conformity with the constitution, which also consolidates the legal status of the individual. Quite often constitutions designate a state's foreign-policy principles and contain important programmatic principles.

A constitution is of considerable juridical significance. It is the fundamental law of a state and has supreme juridical power. All other legislative acts passed by the state, the activity of state organs and social organisations must be consistent with the constitution. This also applies to party organisations guiding the building of a new society. This conclusion was drawn after the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. In its decisions the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B), which met in 1919, pointed out that "the party

must implement its decisions through the Soviet organs within the framework of the Soviet Constitution".¹

Finally, a constitution has a tremendous ideological impact upon society's intellectual and cultural life, because it expresses in concentrated form the ideology of the ruling classes, i.e., an ideology predominant in a given society. The constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries set forth the basic tasks of society and the state: the building of socialism, abolition of exploitation and enhancement of the role of the working class in society (Algeria 1976, Angola 1975, Madagascar 1975, Mozambique 1975, etc.). Progressive constitutions are instruments of peace and friendship of peoples. All this profoundly influences ideological activity in the socialist-oriented countries.

A constitution derives its structure from the fact that it is a fundamental law governing the activity of special nature. The constitutions of socialist-oriented nations usually have a preamble, which sets forth the conditions under which the given state was formed, gives brief account of the stages of its development, designates the basic aims of the state and determines foreign-policy principles.

As distinct from bourgeois constitutions, the fundamental laws of the socialist-oriented countries give prominence to the norms of society's socio-political structure and political organisation. They fix the various forms of ownership (state, co-operative and others) of the means of production, define the role of the various structures in a country's economy and describe the class structure of society. Many constitutions speak about the role played by the working people in public and political life, about the co-operation of small producers and about the state's social policy. They directly and openly define the character of state rule as the rule of the alliance of society's labouring forces and stipulate that the "state safeguards the interests of the working people whose strength is based on peasants and workers" (the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Article 9).

A characteristic structural feature of the constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries is that they determine, and thus institutionalise, the role played by the revolutionary-

¹ The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings, Part I, Moscow, 1954, pp. 446-47 (in Russian).

democratic party. There are constitutions, which not only fix the pattern of relations between the party and state organs and social organisations, but also determine the procedure governing the formation of party bodies (Tanzania).

Lastly, constitutions attach considerable importance to regulating the legal status of citizens. The constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries define both the fundamental rights and the duties of citizens and in this respect they go beyond the limited nature of bourgeois constitutions. Among the rights of citizens an important place is occupied by social rights and the proclamation of rights is combined with the establishment of specific guarantees.

In this way the constitutions of the socialist-oriented states consolidate the gains made along the path of progressive development and also regulate all the main aspects of social and state activity. In terms of their substance and structure they are not only the constitutions of states (bourgeois constitutions mainly confine themselves to the establishment of the pattern of relations between state bodies), but also of political systems, and, taking some of their provisions into account, they are also very important programme documents.

In this connection it should be recalled that in some countries an important constitutional role is also played by the policy documents of the revolutionary-democratic parties and governments (the 1975 Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution; the 1976 National Charter of Algeria; and the Programme of 1976 of the National Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia).

2. Procedure for Drafting and Adopting a Constitution

The rise of a socialist-oriented state is always accompanied by crucial constitutional changes. One of the first acts of a new state is to abolish the old constitution (Burma, Benin) or the former constitutional colonial legislation (Tanzania, Guinea).

As it nullifies the preceding constitution, people's rule proclaims various acts of constitutional importance. In Burma it was the Policy Declaration of the Revolutionary Council (1962); in Algeria (up to 1976) it was a short, of six articles, Ordonnance of the Revolutionary Council of July 10,

1965; Tanzania had an Interim Constitution of 1965; Iraq has a Provisional Constitution of 1970; Benin has a Proclamation of 1972 and other acts promulgated by the National Council of the Revolution the Republic of Cape Verde has a Statute of the Provisional Political Structure of the Republic adopted by its Constituent National Assembly on July 4, 1975; other countries have constitutions (Guinea in 1958, Guinea-Bissau in 1973, etc.).

The enactments of revolutionary councils and also provisional constitutions are replaced by more stable political documents as the targets set forth in them are attained. In 1970 the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen adopted a Constitution, in 1973 Syria adopted a Permanent Constitution, which replaced the Provisional Constitution of 1969. In 1974 Burma and in 1976 Algeria adopted new constitutions. The adoption of provisional constitutions instead of declarations and the replacement of the former with permanent constitutions attested to the consolidation of legality, which is consistent with the task of building a new society.

Different countries have different procedures governing the drafting and adopting of constitutions. In some bourgeois states constitutions are adopted by specially elected constituent assemblies or by higher representative bodies exercising the functions of such assemblies. Insofar as this procedure enables the progressive forces represented in a bourgeois parliament to exert certain influence on the content of the constitution, all-out efforts are made in capitalist countries either to depreciate the role of the representative body or altogether do without it during the drafting and adopting of the constitution. For this purpose constitutions are octroied (for instance, by mother countries to former colonies), formulated and adopted by an organ formed without the participation of the electors (the 1949 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany) or drawn up by a consultative body, which is partially elected by Parliament and partially appointed by the government (1958 French Constitution).

As a measure to prevent the draft of a constitution from being discussed not only by the citizens but also by parliament, it is submitted to popular vote (referendum). Approval by a majority of the electorate is regarded as the final stage of the adoption of the constitution.

At first glance this looks like a democratic procedure. In effect, however, a referendum in bourgeois countries is often used as a means to attain anti-democratic objectives. The voters can neither discuss the draft nor propose any amendments in the course of the referendum; all they can do is either to approve or reject the draft in its entirety. Without preliminary discussion, including in parliament, the voters can hardly find their bearings in a document as complex as a constitution. Besides, the bourgeois mass media exert a tremendous influence on the voters. As a result, even the most reactionary constitutions are sometimes approved by referendum in bourgeois countries, (for instance, in Greece in 1968 under the conditions of the country's military dictatorship).

In the socialist countries the people and their representatives in the higher organs of state power play a most active part at all stages of the drafting and adoption of constitution. A draft of the constitution is framed by a special commission set up by the higher representative organ. This procedure has been used in a number of socialist-oriented countries. In 1972 the People's Council in Syria set up a commission charged with drafting a new constitution, which completed its work in 1973. Such a commission was established by the Central Committee of the Burma Socialist Programme Party in Burma in September 1971, which at the time did not have a higher representative organ. It included 97 representatives from party and state organs, social organisations and representatives of the various nationalities inhabiting the country. A composition of this kind ensures the participation of broad sections of the population as early as the initial stages of the framing of the draft. In some countries legal experts are included in the commissions and in others they are appointed as commission experts by decision of the higher representative organ.

All work connected with preparing draft constitutions in the socialist-oriented countries is guided by the central bodies of the revolutionary-democratic party. The decision to frame a new Constitution of Burma was adopted at the First Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1971. The final draft was approved by the party at its congress in October 1973. The 1973 draft Constitution of Guinea-Bissau was drawn up under the guidance of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape

Verde (PAIGC) and then approved by the supreme party organ (Supreme Council of Struggle) prior to its submission to the National People's Assembly; the draft of the 1973 Congolese Constitution was studied by the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party prior to its submission to popular vote and then approved by the party congress.

In socialist countries the discussion of the draft of the constitution by a representative organ and also by broad sections of the working people is an important element of the framing of the constitution. A nation-wide discussion of a draft constitution usually lasts several months. Thus the draft of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR was discussed four months. In the course of discussion people submit amendments and additions that are taken into consideration by the constitutional commission and the highest representative organ prior to the final approval of the text. In the German Democratic Republic, for example, 55 articles of the draft of the 1968 Constitution were modified following a nation-wide discussion (in the USSR 110 articles were modified). In this way it is possible to draw most extensively on the collective experience of the people and reflect its will in the country's fundamental law to the greatest possible degree.

In the socialist-oriented countries the population studied the latest constitutions prior to their approval. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for example, the final draft of the Constitution of August 1, 1970 was submitted to a nation-wide discussion, which lasted over three months. Under the guidance of the chairman of the constitutional commission alone 27 meetings were held in Aden and in all six of the country's provinces. As a result, about 40 important amendments were made in the draft. In its resolution of November 17, 1970 the Leadership of the National Liberation Front pointed out that it "approved the Constitution with the modifications introduced by the popular masses in the course of the discussion of its draft". In Burma, beginning with the autumn of 1971, members of the constitutional commission, which was divided into 15 working groups, discussed the basic principles of the future Burmese constitution with the population. The first draft was published in April 1972. The second and the third (final) drafts were drawn up in 1973 on the basis of a nation-wide discussion.

Over seven million people studied the first draft and on the basis of their suggestions four articles were deleted from the first draft and 14 articles added.¹

There is no doubt that consultations with the population on the basic items of the draft make it possible to take into account the interests of the population more fully. But this fact, however, does not preclude a nation-wide discussion of the final text of the draft.

In the socialist countries the draft constitution after a nation-wide discussion is submitted to the higher representative organ fulfilling the functions of a constituent assembly where it is discussed and put to vote. At the same time, this organ examines the amendments proposed in the course of the nation-wide discussion. In some countries the adoption of the constitution ends with voting in the higher representative organ, in others the constitution is put to popular vote (as was the case in the GDR in 1968, and in Bulgaria in 1971). Such a referendum is conducted after a nation-wide discussion and this means that in the socialist and socialist-oriented countries it pursues a totally different purpose than in capitalist countries: the electorate is once again summoned to express their approval or disapproval of a draft, which has been drawn up with their direct participation.

The socialist-oriented countries have diverse methods of adopting the constitution. Earlier we mentioned that the National Liberation Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen approved the country's constitution in 1970, which was the concluding stage of the adoption of the constitution. The 1969 Provisional Constitution of Syria, which was approved by the Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, was also adopted in this way. The Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo was adopted on December 31, 1969 at the Congress of the Congolese Workers' Party. The draft of the new Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo was endorsed by the Second Extraordinary Congress of the Congolese Workers' Party in 1972 and received its final approval at a referendum on June 24, 1973. The 1973 Constitution of Syria and the 1974 Constitution of Burma were also adopted by a referendum. The Constitution of Guinea-Bissau was adopted by the National People's

¹ See *The Guardian*, May 26, 1973.

Assembly in 1973, and the Provisional Constitutional Document of the Republic of Cape Verde by the National People's Assembly in 1975. In some countries constitutional acts were proclaimed by revolutionary councils and councils of revolutionary command (Iraq).

Life shows that the methods of adopting constitutions improve as political stability increases. In many countries the first constitutional acts were passed by revolutionary councils formed after the revolution. Provisional constitutions were adopted by permanent organs or party leadership (Syria). Permanent constitutions are adopted with the participation of the population; they are debated in parliament and put to popular vote. All these facts show that the process of drawing up and adopting constitutions in the socialist-oriented states is becoming more and more democratic.

There is also an established procedure for amending the constitutions. It is not necessary to elect a special constituent assembly and amendments may be introduced at a regular session of parliament (People's or National Assembly). But in contrast to the procedure for modifying ordinary laws, constitutional amendments may be adopted only by a qualified majority (usually two-thirds of the parliament, three-quarters in case of Syria). This provision is set forth in Article 132 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and in Article 149 of the Permanent Constitution of Syria. In Syria an amendment is considered finally adopted upon approval by the President of the Republic. There is also another procedure for amending the constitution. In keeping with Article 91 of the 1973 Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo the initiative in amending the constitution belongs to the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party and the law authorising the changes enters into force upon approval by the party congress and referendum. The Preamble and main articles of the Burmese Constitution may be amended only by means of a referendum, while other articles by a qualified majority (three-quarters) of the People's Assembly. Prior to the establishment of the People's Assembly in Syria modifications of the Provisional Constitution were made under the guidance of the leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Article 73). For instance, Article 61 was amended at a sitting of the leadership on May 31, 1972. In Iraq constitutional amend-

ments are adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Revolutionary Command Council (Article 63). Such modifications, necessitated among other things by the formation of the Council of Ministers, were made in 1973. The establishment of a precise procedure for amending the constitution is consistent with the tasks of consolidating revolutionary-democratic law.

The procedure for amending the constitution differs substantially from the procedure for abolishing the constitution. The question of abolishing the constitution comes up often enough during the reform of the state with the view to building socialism. The socialist-oriented countries employ two methods—the ordinary and extraordinary—for abolishing constitutions. The first is the adoption of a new constitution after which the old constitution ceases to operate. The extraordinary procedure is employed when the struggle between diverse political forces becomes particularly intensive. When this is done the old constitution is replaced by provisional enactments, which sometimes remain in force for several years prior to the adoption of a new constitution. In 1965 the Revolutionary Council, which was established in Algeria, in effect abolished the 1963 Constitution, and in 1968 the National Council of the Revolution in the Congo abolished the country's 1963 Constitution.

If carried out in pursuance of anti-democratic objectives the abolition of the constitution impedes non-capitalist development. On the other hand, if this happens as a result of the growing influence of the more progressive forces, the necessary judicial foundations are laid for deepening social change. In this case a new constitution, which consolidates the new gains of the people and becomes the legal basis for further development, is shortly adopted (in the People's Republic of the Congo, for example).

3. The Essence and Content of Constitutions in the Socialist-Oriented Countries

Lenin wrote that the essence of a constitution expresses the actual relation of forces in the class struggle.¹

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "How the SR's Sum up the Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 336.

The constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries lay down a balance of forces under which state power is wrenched from the hands of the reactionary classes—the feudal lords, the proimperialist bourgeoisie and the tribal nobility—and transferred into the hands of a wide bloc of democratic forces, which oppose feudalism and imperialism and favour the non-capitalist path of development. These are specific, national-democratic constitutions; that is how, for instance, the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is characterised in its Preamble.

The constitutions of a number of socialist-oriented countries have a range of features, which distinguish them from bourgeois constitutions, on the one hand, and from the socialist-type constitutions, on the other, such as:

1. Consolidation of a system of the economy, which can ensure the country's non-capitalist development and later the transition to socialism. The main elements of this system are: the decisive role of public forms of economy, particularly the state sector; rejection of the principle of inviolability of private property; partial nationalisation of foreign property and the property of the local bourgeoisie; resolute abolition of feudal relations; curtailment of exploitation; gradual co-operation of small producers and planned economic development.

Of course, not all states following the non-capitalist path have constitutions, which lay down these principles in identical forms and in adequate detail. These questions are set forth in detail in the constitutions of Burma, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the People's Republic of the Congo, in lesser detail in the Provisional Constitution of Iraq, and almost nothing is said about them in the Constitution of Guinea adopted in 1958, prior to the beginning of fundamental social transformations. There is no mention of socio-economic changes in the brief Constitutional Ordinance of Algeria of 1965. It should be noted, however, that the introduction of socio-economic measures is envisaged not only in constitutions, but also in a number of other acts of constitutional significance and in ordinary legislation. Besides, questions connected with the limitation of private property, establishment of a state sector of the economy and the introduction of planning are resolved by state bodies in their routine work, by means of revolutionary creativity of the masses. On the other hand, the inclusion of the correspond-

ing provisions into the text of the constitution is a matter of considerable importance because it strengthens the judicial foundations of socio-economic change.

2. Consolidation of the political rule of the democratic bloc of all anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, progressive (at a given stage of the revolution) and patriotic forces. We have already examined the corresponding provisions directly defining the class character of the state in the constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries. It remains to be said here that these constitutions disclose the social substance of the concept of a people and speak of the labouring forces of the people. Therein lies the basic distinction between these and bourgeois constitutions, in which the term "power of the people" is used as a cover for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

3. Constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries are constitutions of peace and friendship of peoples. They proclaim the state's peaceful foreign policy on the international scene and establish the equality of citizens whatever their race, nationality or tribe, and outlaw discrimination inside the country. The peoples and statesmen of these countries struggle on the international arena for the unity of the oppressed peoples, for an alliance of all nations fighting against imperialism and neocolonialism. But while calling for the unity of the fighting nations, some revolutionary democrats do not always attach primary importance to the question of class differentiation with the exploiters and class unification of the working people. In some cases there are manifestations of nationalism. There are constitutions, which speak of social solidarity in society, although in effect class contradictions exist in it. As anti-capitalist tasks move to the forefront some aspects of internationalism come to be reflected in the constitutions.

4. Guarantees of the rights and freedoms of citizens. So far it is still a question of incomplete guarantees due to objective reasons, including the existence of private ownership of the means of production and the participation of the non-working strata in government. Guarantees of the rights of citizens strengthen as economic development goes on, full state power is concentrated in the hands of the working people and legislation (with which juridical guarantees are connected) is perfected. A comparison of the first constitutional documents with the currently operating constitutions of Bur-

ma, Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Congo and other countries bears this out.

The stability of a constitution is one of its salient features. As they ensure this stability, the progressive forces strive to safeguard the gains of the people from encroachments by reaction, on the one hand, and from their being revised by those representatives of the exploiters, who participate in the patriotic bloc at a given stage of the revolution, on the other.

At the same time, the stability of the constitution in a country advancing along the non-capitalist path does not preclude, but, on the contrary, presupposes its development, and the basis, the initial judicial foundation of this development is its most progressive norms consolidating the gains of the people. Thus, in contrast to bourgeois countries, where the stability of the constitutions expresses the desire of the exploiters to perpetuate the bourgeois order, in the socialist-oriented countries it stands for the consolidation of the people's gains and at the same time for the introduction of necessary modifications to keep the constitution abreast with the development of the revolution.

A SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE AND DEMOCRACY

1. Basic Features of Democracy in a Socialist-Oriented State

The concept "democracy" has always been the object of a most acute ideological struggle in the course of the long period of development of the human society. The exploiters, particularly the bourgeoisie, interpret democracy from abstract positions as democracy in general. Scientific socialism rejects such an approach to democracy in a class society. In a society with antagonistic classes there can only be a class democracy. "There is no freedom in general, just as there is no democracy in general. This is a class concept," underlined the CC CPSU Report to the 24th Party Congress.¹

In class-antagonistic society there is democracy only for the ruling classes. For instance, in Athens, the most democratic slave-owning city-state of the ancient world, only free people, and even then not all of them, were permitted to participate in people's assemblies. In a feudal society not only the serfs, but also the emergent bourgeoisie were deprived of equal rights with the feudal lords. The bourgeoisie, which came to power, formally proclaimed the equality of all citizens. Bourgeois democracy marked a considerable step forward in social development. In the long run the bourgeoisie supplanted all former privileges with just one, that of the moneybags. "Up to now," Lenin wrote in 1919, "freedom and democracy have meant freedom and democracy for the propertied classes and only crumbs from their table for the propertyless."² Bourgeois democracy is merely one of the forms

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 99.

² V. I. Lenin, "First All-Russia Congress on Adult Education", Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 356.

of the economic and political domination of the bourgeoisie, of its class dictatorship enforced by more flexible methods.

A socialist-oriented state has no use for bourgeois democracy because it expresses the interests of the exploiting minority. This is mentioned in the Preamble of the Constitution of Burma. The Preamble of the Provisional Constitution of Syria of 1969 states that "rejection of parliamentarism does not signify a transition to dictatorial, individual, bureaucratic or military forms of rule, but is a transition to a wider and deeper democracy—people's democracy". This sort of democracy is characterised in the Preamble as an "ideal form, which guarantees the masses the possibility of exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties with the view to attaining the aims of the revolution". The Preamble of the Permanent Constitution of Syria of 1973 also describes people's democracy as an ideal form.

Provisions on the need to promote democracy are contained in the constitutions of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Burma. The Arusha Declaration of TANU underscores the very close links between democracy and the tasks of socialist construction. It states: "There cannot be true socialism without democracy."

Thus, it is clearly understood in the socialist-oriented states that the building of a new society, which is the cause of the broadest masses, calls for the development of democracy. However, the essence of democracy and the forms of implementing it depend on specific conditions obtaining in the given country. These conditions reflect the level of what has been achieved, the actual balance of class forces and a number of other objective and subjective factors.

Bourgeois scholars consider bourgeois parliamentarism and the pluralism of the political parties functioning in the country as a criterion of democracy and say that the developing countries are displaying a trend to set up less democratic systems and that the socialist-oriented countries are totalitarian and anti-democratic. It should be mentioned, however, that lately even bourgeois political scholars have started to move away from their former positions. Now some of them acknowledge that plurality of parties is an inadequate criterion of democracy and that there can be democracy in a one-party system. Nevertheless, they, too, continue to insist that in countries, which have liberated themselves from colonial dependence, democracy should develop along the

road of creating a multiparty system. Only then will they agree to recognise it as true democracy. Furthermore, they regard as democratic only those one-party states, which are advancing along the capitalist road. All these facts manifest the class position of bourgeois authors.

Of late, however, they are compelled to admit that attempts to impose Western democratic patterns on the developing countries are encountering difficulties. But they attribute this to the low level of economic development in these countries, lack of ideological preconditions and the existence of tribal traditions. And while conceding that Western constitutionalism is unsuitable for the developing countries today, they hope that in future they will accept it.

Democracy in the socialist-oriented countries is developing along a different path, which leads to a democracy of the highest type, namely, socialist democracy.

Socialist democracy is the highest form of democracy, it is true democracy for the majority of the population, for the broadest sections of the working people. Economically, it is based on the public ownership of the means of production. In the socialist countries suffrage is truly universal, direct and equal. All citizens irrespective of sex, nationality and race enjoy equal rights in the political, economic and cultural fields. Socialist democracy ensures the rights of citizens with material guarantees. For example, in socialist society the right to work is not merely proclaimed, it is legislatively sanctioned and effectively secured by the abolition of unemployment, absence of crises in production, etc. Therein lies the basic difference between socialist democracy and bourgeois democracy.

One of the basic programme targets of the socialist-oriented countries is the achievement of socialist democracy. The Preamble of the Constitution of Burma speaks of socialist democracy as the aim of the entire Burmese people. Therefore, the term "people's democracy" used in the constitutions of some countries does not imply a socialist form of democracy characteristic of the socialist countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. In the socialist-oriented countries it is still only that stage of democracy, which exists in a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. Usually it is called national democracy. The basic shortcoming of bourgeois democracy has been overcome at this stage, for national democracy is no longer a democracy for the minority of the people; it is a

democracy for the overwhelming majority, and, consequently, it is closer to socialist democracy.

Resting on the coincidence of interests of various social forces, national democracy is by no means above class. It is a class democracy and that accounts for the fact that the various members of the democratic bloc approach it from their specific positions. The working people regard it as a stage for the transition to the highest, socialist form of class democracy. On their part the exploiters seek to make use of the incomplete nature of national democracy in order to reverse this movement. But the balance of class forces in a socialist-oriented state is such that contrary to the wishes of the non-working part of the democratic bloc, national democracy as a whole is used in the interests of social progress.

An important distinctive feature of democracy in the socialist-oriented countries is that its political and social aspects are inseparably linked. In contrast to bourgeois conceptions, which absolutise certain external forms of political democracy and ignore its social exploitative substance, countries, which are developing along the non-capitalist path, stress the need to combine revolution with democracy and use democracy as a means for solving social problems. True, in these countries democracy is frequently identified with abstract conceptions of justice and social solidarity in spite of the fact that they are societies with inherent class contradictions (provisions on justice and social solidarity are also to be found in the constitutions of some countries). Emphasis is usually laid on the unconditional primacy of the interests of society and the state instead of on the tasks of combining the interests of the society, the state, the collective and the individual. As a rule, the leaders of revolutionary democracy assess democracy in terms of its substance and not its form. They perceive a connection between dictatorship which is exercised in the interests of the people and democracy, and are far from counterposing the one to the other.

While bourgeois ideologues want to reduce the problems of democracy to elections, parliamentarism and division of power, the revolutionary democrats are set on democratising not only state institutions, but also the entire socio-political system, including the methods employed by parties, trade unions, co-operative societies and other social organisations. To this end they set the task of making democratisation directly connected with the enhanced activity of the masses.

In a capitalist society even a curtailed formal bourgeois democracy embraces only the narrow sphere of political relations and completely bypasses the sphere of production relations.

Meanwhile, national democracy has already started to transcend the sphere of pure politics and is coming to embrace the sphere of production relations. Following the example of socialist countries, workers' councils, revolutionary councils, production committees and assemblies of working people, which are fully or partially elected by the working people, are set up at various enterprises (Algeria, Burma, Guinea, the Congo). In line with the ordinances which were adopted in the Congo on May 18, 1973 on the proposal of the trade unions, triple administrations consisting of representatives of the state, the trade unions and members of the party cell have been established at state and mixed enterprises and economic management bodies. These representatives make up the direction committee of an enterprise, the parity commission on recruitment and promotion, the permanent production committee, a production control committee and the comradesly court. The director of an enterprise is responsible to the direction committee and the latter to the general meeting.¹

In keeping with the ordinance "On Socialist Management of Enterprises" of November 16, 1971,² the election of working people's assemblies at Algerian enterprises and factory shops was launched in 1974 and completed in 1975. They have their representatives in the five standing committees (the directorate appoints 50 per cent of their membership) and in the administrative council of an enterprise.

Elected boards run the affairs of co-operatives; in some countries the general rule is that small peasants should make up the overwhelming majority of the board members. All these organs participate not only in solving questions connected with living conditions and public services (to which the activity of production councils at some enterprises in a number of bourgeois countries is limited), but also directly participate in the management of production, including the

¹ See *Bulletin quotidien de l'Agence congolaise d'information*, Brazzaville, June 2, 1973.

² See *Journal officiel de la République Algérienne*, No. 101, December 13, 1971, p. 1350.

drafting and adoption of plans and programmes of enterprises. Emulation is spreading in the socialist-oriented countries; organisations of innovators are springing up and a movement for economising on funds and raw and other materials is gathering momentum. The first socialist labour teams have been formed in some of them. Workers taking part in the self-help movement voluntarily and without remuneration build roads, schools and hospitals. All these forms of activity show that the masses are becoming involved in economic management.

But these are only the first steps. The organs through which the working people participate in economic management, which have been set up in many socialist-oriented countries, are still in their experimental stage, and there are countries where they do not exist at all. Their terms of reference are still too vague. The job ahead, therefore, is to work out the most effective forms of combining democracy and centralism in economic management. These forms must correspond to the demands of modern production, which presuppose adequate centralisation, and be consistent with the nature of social ownership of the means of production directly connected with democratic methods of management.

The democratisation of the entire socio-political system in the socialist-oriented countries, as we already know, hinges on the participation of the masses in building a new society and is an objectively essential process. On the other hand, however, it is clear that in a transitional state, where social progress is achieved in the course of a class struggle, the advanced forces cannot permit the revolutionary national liberation movement to jeopardise the achievement of their social aims for the sake of abstract concepts of formal democracy. In the struggle for true, all-embracing democracy the popular rule can and sometimes (particularly in the period of the exacerbation of the class struggle) does curtail the rights of the reactionary sections of the population.

But restrictions of democracy, dictated by revolutionary considerations, are justified only when they have a strictly defined class nature and are directed against the enemies of non-capitalist development without embracing those social strata and political organisations, which comprise a reliable foundation for socialist trends.

A national-democratic regime has a number of specific features. The most important of them are: the bloc of all pro-

gressive forces, the national front as the basis of national democracy; structural unification, integration of the various sections of the political organisation of society; the leading role of the revolutionary-democratic party in the society and the state; special interrelations between centralism and democracy.

It has been mentioned earlier that the establishment of a united front of all progressive forces is occasioned by the unity of interest of different classes and social sections involved in the realisation of general democratic and national tasks. The national front emerges in the course of the struggle for independence and reflects the balance of class forces at that time. Class forces regroup as anti-capitalist tasks acquire priority in the course of subsequent development. A certain part of the non-working social strata breaks away from the democratic bloc and even becomes hostile to it. But the objective foundation for the national front continues to exist at this stage, too, insofar as general democratic and national tasks still await their fulfilment. Moreover, the national front consolidates itself as it fulfils its social tasks. It gets rid of its temporary and unstable fellow-travellers and musters forces favouring further progress.

At a specific stage of development, however, the national front becomes inadequate as an alliance of classes and social strata so that the need arises to give it a concrete organisational form. The socialist-oriented countries solve this problem each in its own way.

In some of them (with a one-party system) mass ruling parties have the features of a national front (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania). On the other hand, in countries, where after winning independence there were several parties with long-standing traditions of involvement in political affairs, adequate unity of action of all parties favouring socialist-orientation was initially achieved by their representation in the government and other state bodies although the leading role in them was played by a single revolutionary-democratic party (Syria, Iraq). Currently new forms are appearing in them. An organisation of the national front is set up and its common programme is worked out on the basis of an agreement between political parties. For example, the National Progressive Front of Syria established in March 1972 includes the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, the Communist Party of Syria, the Arab Socialist Union and a number of small par-

ties. The Front has set up its leading organ consisting of representatives of all parties: nine from the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and two from each of the other parties it unites. The Front's head is the President of the Republic (he is also General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party). The Front has branches in the governorates (provinces). The members of the Front have approved its Rules and its Charter, which is in fact its programme. The Front has designated as its basic objectives: liberation of the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, consolidation of the national unity of the people, elaboration of five-year development plans, strengthening of the state sector and promotion of the co-operative movement. The National Progressive Front, states its Charter, will fight against US-led imperialism and make every effort to expand co-operation with the socialist countries.

In the elections to local councils of the governorates on May 3 and 4, 1972 the National Progressive Front of Syria had common list of candidates.

A decision on the need to establish a national front was taken at a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party in September 1972¹. An important role in the formation of this front was played by the First National Conference of Democratic and Patriotic Forces, which took place in July and August 1972. The Programme of the Congolese Workers' Party adopted in 1972 speaks of the need to unite all democratic organisations and social sections in an anti-imperialist front. For this purpose regular national conferences will be convened at which there will be an "exchange of views of the main issues of party, state and revolutionary development"².

A National Progressive Front was also formed in Iraq in 1973. It includes the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath Party), the Iraqi Communist Party and several other progressive organisations. The Arab Socialist Renaissance Party has eight representatives out of 16 (and the post of chairman) in the Higher Committee of the Front and the Communist Party has three representatives, three seats are reserved for the Kurds and one each for representatives of the Independent Democrats and Progressive Republicans.

¹ See *Bulletin quotidien de l'Agence congolaise d'information*, Brazzaville, September 23, 1972, pp. 3-4.

² *Etumba*, No. 295, 1973, p. 6.

The solution of problems related to social progress calls for the participation of all patriotic forces of a nation. Therefore, if a party of the working class is barred from this activity this merely weakens the national bloc.

The close cohesion of parties, social organisations and the state in some countries is an important feature of national democracy. It is not a question of the unity of society's political organisation, which took shape in the course of development and is typical of developed socialism due to the absence of antagonistic classes, but of a fusion of various components of society's political organisation in the course of non-capitalist development. In a number of countries party, state and social organisations are regarded as elements of a single mechanism in which the party is the organisation of political authority and the state is the administrative apparatus of the revolutionary-democratic party, and social organisations are its components inasmuch as members of youth, women's and other organisations are automatically members of the party. The Constitution of Tanzania, for example, emphasises that all political activity in the country is conducted under the party's aegis. This accounts for a certain level of centralisation not only of the state structure, which was mentioned above in connection with the forms of state, but of the entire political organisation of society.

This character of the system of national democracy springs from the theoretical conceptions of the revolutionary democrats. Perhaps, this is most clearly reflected in a document drawn up by a special commission, which has been set up in Tanzania with the view to studying the problems of democracy in a country with a one-party system. Noting that it is necessary to "destroy the distinction, which exists at present between the institutions of the party and those of the government", the document says: "The distinction between government and party has never been understood by the people. For the ordinary man uninterested in constitutional theory, TANU is the government and the government is TANU."¹

On the other hand, the need to delimit the functions of the ruling party, the state and social organisations is now ripening in a number of socialist-oriented countries.

¹ *The United Republic of Tanzania. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic and Party State*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1965, p. 16.

An important feature of national democracy is the guiding role played by revolutionary-democratic parties. This principle is legally secured in the constitutions and programmes of some socialist-oriented countries (Article 5 of the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau, Article 8 of the Permanent Constitution of Syria, Article 7 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Article 3 of the Congolese Constitution, etc). The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen says in part that "the National Liberation Front guides the political activity of the masses and mass public organisations on the basis of scientific socialism, setting itself the aim of advancing society towards the final completion of the national-democratic revolution following the non-capitalist road". Article 11 of the Burmese Constitution stipulates: "The Burma Socialist Programme Party is the sole leading political party."

In those socialist-oriented countries, which as yet have neither provisional nor permanent constitutions, the leading role of the party is mentioned in other documents.

In any event the leading role in the system of national democracy in all socialist-oriented countries is in fact played by revolutionary-democratic parties (with the exception of Ethiopia, the only country where such a party has not yet been formed). True, in Tanzania such guidance was divided between TANU, which exercised it on the basic, mainland part of the country, and the Afro-Shirazi Party, which exercised it on the Island of Zanzibar. But in 1977 these two homogeneous revolutionary democratic parties merged into a single ruling Revolutionary Party.

The increasing participation of the working people in administering society and determining state policy is another important aspect of national democracy. It stems from the very nature of national democracy as a type of authority, which reflects the interests of the broad masses. Under popular rule the working people, i.e., the majority of a country's population, take part in defining state policy. Accordingly, Article 35 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo states that the working masses are the decisive force of society and the state.

The role played by the working people in the system of national-democracy likewise originates from the fact that none but the people are capable of building a new society. Living, creative socialism is the cause of the masses, for

as Lenin used to say only the millions can build this society.¹

The various forms of the masses' decisive participation in social and state administration attain full and all-round development only under socialism, particularly in an advanced socialist society where the exploiter classes have been abolished. So far the working people in the socialist-oriented countries do not play a decisive role in running the state; their participation in it is often inadequate, even insignificant. Quite frequently the ruling revolutionary democracy tries to carry through measures promoting the interests of the masses from above and without their participation. But the growing role of the masses in social and state affairs is a characteristic feature of the system of national democracy, in spite of the difficulties attending the development of the socialist-oriented countries and sometimes even the existence of opposing tendencies.

The participation of the masses is characterised by diversity of forms, including the law-established representation of the workers and peasants in the elected bodies of state authority, party committees, boards of co-operative societies and administrative bodies of enterprises. The working people also widely participate in socio-economic reforms. In Algeria, for instance, in keeping with the law on the agrarian reform, the lists of people whose land is subject to confiscation must be approved at open public meetings. No less important, however, are the activity of the masses "from below" and the introduction of social measures without official authorisation. In Algeria the self-management sector came into being as a result of the initiative of the masses; working people set up management committees at the enterprises and farms that were abandoned by French colonialists and Algerian traitors. It was only later, in 1963, that this form acquired its legislative foundation. The form of workers' self-management discovered by the working people subsequently embraced other branches of the economy. In conformity with the 1971 law on socialist management of enterprises, working people's assemblies elected for a three-year term have been set up at all state-operated enterprises.

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "Second All-Russia Trade Union Congress", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 426.

An effective form of involvement of the working masses in governing the society and the state is the broad participation of the population in discussing basic political acts determining the country's development (constitutions, programmes) and also diverse problems of state, economic and cultural development at meetings and conferences of social organisations. Recommendations and proposals, submitted at these conferences, are taken into consideration by party and state bodies in their practical activity.

We have already mentioned such forms of the working people's direct participation in state affairs as the self-help movement, labour contributions of the population (Guinea) and social committees for the development of the communes (Tanzania). In some countries there are people's and civil defence committees, civilian militia, people's volunteer corps and workers' detachments at industrial enterprises and peasants' squads in co-operative farms to safeguard the gains of the people. Experience has given rise to other forms of participation of the population in social and state affairs, and these forms will develop and improve as social transformation becomes more profound.

Democratic centralism is a key organisational and political principle in a socialist society. Under socialism it permeates all spheres of human activity, playing a decisive role in the relations between state organs, the activity of social organisations, economic management, in the methods of resolving the national question, etc.

Democratic centralism is an indivisible unity of two aspects or beginnings: broad democracy and essential centralism. The first springs from the popular nature of government, from the fact that the building of a new society is the cause of the masses themselves. Since the creative energy of the working people should be utilised in democratic forms, the participation of the masses in social and state administration is directly connected with the development of democracy. On the other hand, the building of a new society determines the other aspect of this principle, a certain centralisation of leadership. "Only large-scale, planned construction," Lenin noted, "which aims at evenly utilising economic and business values, deserves to be called socialist."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Speech to Chairmen of Gubernia Soviets", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 36.

Firstly, democratic centralism signifies electivity of all leading bodies of the party and social organisations, the basic organs of the state (head of state, higher and local representative bodies, etc.); secondly, periodical reports of these bodies to their constituents and higher bodies; thirdly, strict discipline and self-discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority in the elected bodies; fourthly, the obligatoriness of decisions of the higher organs of the party, the state and social organisations for lower bodies.

The principle of democratic centralism is mentioned in the constitutions (Article 11 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Article 102 of the Constitution of Madagascar) and legislations of some socialist-oriented countries and stipulated in the rules of a number of revolutionary-democratic parties (Guinea, the Congo and others). The essence of this principle is disclosed in the Burmese Constitution, particularly in Articles 14 and 29. At the present stage, however, this principle has not been developed to the full in the socialist-oriented countries where many organs of the party and social organisations are appointed and the nomination of delegates is practised. Only in a few countries, including Algeria, Burma and Guinea-Bissau the political foundation of the state (the system of representative bodies) is formed by means of elections. As a result of the curtailment of the principle of electivity a part of the party and state apparatus and the leadership of the social organisations can go out of control of the masses. That is why a great deal of attention is being paid to promoting the principle of electivity in the socialist-oriented countries. The elections of higher and local party and state bodies, which have been held in recent years in a number of countries (Algeria, Burma, Syria), are proof of this. As a transitional stage leading to the creation of elective local representative bodies their members are at present delegated by state bodies and various social organisations.

So far such a feature of democratic centralism as accountability has been inadequately developed. In the socialist-oriented countries the ruling parties and some social organisations (peasants' unions, youth organisations and trade unions, for example) convene congresses, and their central organs report on their activity. The leaders of many countries often address the population and make nation-wide

tours. At the same time, the meetings and elections of local party organisations are not held at regular intervals; it has not become an established practice for deputies of higher and local representative bodies (in those countries where such bodies have been formed) to report to the population; and such a form of a deputy's accountability to his constituents as their right to recall him has so far been established only in Angola, the Congo, Burma, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Guinea-Bissau.

Neither have the other aspects of democratic centralism been developed to the full. Strict discipline and self-discipline are loosened by ideological differences within the ruling party and state bodies arising from the heterogeneous social composition of the party, social organisations and the state apparatus. Inasmuch as the latter are infiltrated by proponents of bourgeois views, careerists and turncoats these differences often precipitate an acute struggle in the leading bodies. Under the conditions of a certain personalisation of power the principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority is not fully implemented, and the obligatory nature of the decisions of the higher bodies for the lower sometimes rests on the centralisation of the leadership rather than on the consciousness of like-minded people.

2. Parties and Social Organisations in a Socialist-Oriented State

A socialist-oriented state has either a one-party or a multiparty system. For example, up to 1964 several parties were allowed to function in Algeria and Burma, two parties existed in Tanzania prior to the adoption of the special 1963 act and in Guinea prior to their merger in 1958, three parties existed in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen until their unification in 1975, etc. Now the majority of the socialist-oriented countries have a one-party system established under the constitution or specially adopted legislation. The usual explanation is that revolutionary-democratic parties equally represent the interests of all the sections of the people. In some Arab states all parties were banned for a period of time. This, according to the leaders of these states, was to have enhanced the unity of the society and

helped surmount inter-party differences. Eventually revolutionary-democratic parties were established in these countries.

Syria has several parties, which in 1972 united in the National Progressive Front. These parties (including Communists) have their representatives in the higher organ of state power, the People's Council, consisting of representatives delegated by various political parties and social organisations, and also in the government. Iraq also has a multiparty system embracing the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, the Communist Party and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, which have their representatives in the state bodies.

The formation of one or another party system depends on the specific conditions obtaining in each country. In countries, where there had been no other parties except a revolutionary-democratic party and also where there was a merger of different parties, the one-party system is an historically predetermined fact, a natural result of the specific conditions in a given country. Changes in conditions may lead to changes in society's party structure.

Progressive forces in countries where a one-party system has been introduced from above, by means of the adoption of special laws have a different view of this circumstance. The decisive criterion in this respect should always be the interests of the working people, and whether or not one or another party system promotes revolutionary change. Inasmuch as the ruling revolutionary-democratic parties express the interests of broad sections of the population and lead the country along the path of social progress, all democratic forces, including the Communists, support measures that are taken in the interests of the working people. From this point of view the prohibition of proimperialist parties and feudalistic parties, representing the interests of the reaction, is an expression of social justice and, therefore, consistent with the principles of democracy for the people. Invariably, the main thing is whose interests the parties express and whether they promote or inhibit social progress. By itself, the existence of a one-party or a multiparty system, as has already been noted, is not a criterion of democracy.

There are many reasons why a revolutionary-democratic party plays a leading role in the specific conditions of a

country developing along the non-capitalist road. The principal reason is its status in society as the vanguard of diverse, including petty-bourgeois, strata united in their common endeavour to create conditions for the subsequent transition to socialism.

Socially, revolutionary-democratic parties are as yet not parties of the working class, society's most advanced class, the less so because the working class in many socialist-oriented countries is still in the process of formation and is inadequately equipped with a Marxist-Leninist world outlook. But under the specific conditions of non-capitalist development these parties can be the vanguard of various working strata. Article 7 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen stipulates that the "union of democratic forces of the people is organisationally embodied in the National Front Political Organisation".

At the initial stages of non-capitalist development the ranks of the revolutionary-democratic parties, their membership can include representatives of non-working sections of the population. Among other things, this leads to heterogeneity of the party's social structure and at times to inconsistency in its social policy. True, in some countries (Guinea, for example) under the party rules exploiter elements may not hold leading posts, and in others there are norms which close the door to party membership to all exploiters. These norms, however, are not always fully observed. Yet it should be noted, that while accepting representatives of all the progressive sections of the population to membership, revolutionary-democratic parties orient themselves mainly on the working people. This trend is reflected in the constitutional provisions on the alliance of the toiling sections (although not always scientifically interpreted), in party rules and in procedure governing the admittance of new members. The Arusha Declaration of TANU says that above all the party should accept workers and peasants to membership; the 1972 Rules of the Congolese Workers' Party stipulate that the party "draws its strength from the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and revolutionary intellectuals" (Article 3). Quite often revolutionary democrats regard the peasantry as the party's main social base, but gradually they are coming to recognise the historical role of the working class. Mention of this is made in the Rules of the Congolese Workers' Party (1972), in the documents adopted by the

First Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1971) and the Unifying Congress of the United National Front Political Organisation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (1975).

Furthermore, a revolutionary-democratic party plays a guiding role because it adopts certain basic premises of the truly scientific theory of social development—scientific socialism—and strives to master this teaching. The theoretical foundation underlying the activity of the Congolese Workers' Party is Marxism-Leninism (Rules, Article 3).

True enough, in the ideology of revolutionary-democratic parties the principles of scientific socialism sometimes intertwine in a most fantastic manner with the views of communal socialism and petty-bourgeois theories and, in individual countries, with religious teachings. But a revolutionary-democratic party strives to give a progressive interpretation of all these non-Marxist theories and attaches increasing significance to scientific socialism in its ideological and practical activity. In the course of the past years some parties and leaders of a number of socialist-oriented states declared that their ideology rests on scientific socialism, on Marxism-Leninism (Angola, Benin, Mozambique, the Congo). In this connection revolutionary democrats criticised the thesis on the multiplicity of types of scientific socialism.

Another factor, which enables a revolutionary-democratic party to play a guiding role, is the form of its organisation. Being the higher form of organisation of the alliance of various sections of the people, the party under the conditions of non-capitalist development, naturally, guides the other detachments of this alliance, namely, the social organisations, which unite representatives of diverse social strata along professional, age and other lines.

In some countries, which had liberated themselves from colonial dependence, the army is regarded as the best organised social force. And sometimes this is offered as a reason for the establishment of military governments. In actual fact a revolutionary-democratic party in a socialist-oriented state is not only the advanced, but also the best organised detachment of the alliance of all progressive forces. That is why even in countries, which had military governments at the outset, power subsequently passed into the hands of the party.

A revolutionary-democratic party exercises its guidance in a diversity of forms, including the elaboration of the political course and political directives determining the nature and activity of state bodies and social organisations, party control, promotion and recommendation of loyal and capable people for work in state bodies and social organisations, etc. Sometimes these forms reflect the party's specific role under the conditions of the integral system of national democracy: appointment of certain organs of the party and social organisations, fulfilment by party bodies of state tasks, and so forth.

In many socialist-oriented countries steps are being taken to strengthen the party's guiding role and improve forms and methods of leadership. Revolutionary democrats are searching in various directions for a solution to these problems. One of the most important is the formation of a vanguard party. "A vanguard party," it is written down in the Programme of the National Liberation Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, "is the sole guarantee of guidance of the revolution and the attainment of provisional and long-term objectives."¹ The unifying congress of the three parties in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1975 set the task of building a vanguard party within three years. But there are countries where this task is still in the process of being given priority (Guinea-Bissau).

Judging by developments in some countries (Ghana up to 1966 and Mali up to 1968) the automatic inclusion of members of social organisations into the party and the efforts to create a party of the "whole people", while class antagonisms continue to exist do not strengthen the party, but, on the contrary, weaken its fighting capacity. Hence, the growing conviction in some countries that a revolutionary-democratic party ought to be a mass party, but one which should have a definite social base and accept only individual members (the Congo, Burma). In Burma a mass party was created by enlarging the original narrow "cadre" party (it included only members of the Revolutionary Council, some leaders of the former Union Party and the Chairmen of the Councils of State of the Shans and Karens.² In

¹ *The Programme of the National Front Political Organisation*, Aden, 1972, p. 39 (in Arabic).

² In 1973 the Burma Socialist Programme Party already had

other countries a vanguard party can be formed in a different manner—in the process of the emergence within the framework of a mass party of a vanguard organisation consisting of its most advanced members and the subsequent growth of this vanguard organisation.

Furthermore, a revolutionary-democratic party strengthens its guiding role by perfecting its relations with the state bodies and social organisations and by tackling only fundamental issues, thus freeing party bodies of the need to deal with questions of secondary importance and performing functions, which are alien to the party. These tasks were set, for example, at the congresses of the Burma Socialist Programme Party and the Congolese Workers' Party, at the national conferences of TANU and regional conferences of the Syrian Arab Socialist Renaissance Party.

It is also important that correct relations are established between a revolutionary-democratic party and social organisations. In its decisions a national conference of patriotic and democratic forces of the Congo which was held in 1972 emphasised that mass organisations are the driving belts in the system of national democracy. The party must guide their work, but not by injunction: it must use democratic methods, taking into consideration the experience of the masses themselves.¹

In order to be able to enhance its guiding role a revolutionary-democratic party has to become a party of revolutionary action. Its membership should include only those people, who energetically work in industry, social organisations and the ideological sphere and thus actively participate in the building of a new society. The personal contribution of each member to the fulfilment of the tasks set by the party makes the latter efficient and promotes its prestige among the broad sections of the population.

A regime of national democracy presupposes extensive growth of social organisations, those uniting the working sections of the population in the first place. The main social organisations in the socialist-oriented countries are trade unions, unions of young people, co-operative societies, wo-

"96,701 fullfledged members, 374,724 candidate members and 883,919 party's friends" (see *The Guardian*, April 9, 1973, p. 1).

¹ See *Bulletin quotidien de l'Agence congolaise d'information*, Brazzaville, August 7, 1972, p. 2.

men's and other mass associations. Besides, there are many voluntary social organisations, including such important ones as vigilance committees, civil defence committees and people's volunteer squads.

All these organisations are a powerful instrument promoting the activity and initiative of the masses in all spheres of social, state, economic and cultural life. Article 49 of the 1973 Syrian Constitution stipulates that social organisations actively participate in the work of state bodies with the view to building socialist society and protecting people's rule; planning and guiding the socialist economy; solving everyday problems bearing on the life of their members (working conditions, health protection, culture, etc.); promoting scientific and technical progress and improving production methods; and ensuring people's control over the state apparatus. They draw broad sections of the population into the revolutionary process of transforming society.

Social organisations in a socialist-oriented state operate under the guidance of the revolutionary-democratic party. But very often the party's links with the wide sections of the population, which are united in these organisations, have distinct forms. In some countries the leaders of social organisations are appointed by party bodies (Tanzania), in others the social organisations themselves are set up by presidential decree (for instance, the Algerian-Soviet Friendship Society established in 1971), and their heads are appointed by state bodies.

The trade unions are the socio-economic organisations of the working class in the socialist-oriented countries; in Burma their functions are performed by workers' councils.

The role played by the trade unions in the socialist-oriented countries differs basically from that of their counterparts in bourgeois countries. They support the people's rule, vigorously contribute to state development, co-operate with party and state bodies in carrying through socio-economic changes, participate in production planning and draw workers and employees into the management of state-operated enterprises. The trade unions protect the interests of factory and office workers, they play a prominent role in deciding how the part of the profits, which is assigned for the social and cultural needs of the workers' collective, should be spent, display concern for raising the skill of the

workers, supervise the observance of labour legislation by the management, take steps to improve cultural and leisure facilities for the working people and to abolish illiteracy. There are countries where trade unions play an important role in policy-making and production management. The above-mentioned ordinances of 1973 on the introduction of a triple administration at Congolese enterprises were adopted on the basis of proposals put forward by the Fourth Congress of Trade Unions (April 23-29, 1973) in a special resolution calling for the democratisation of the administration at state enterprises.¹

Since there are private enterprises, including foreign firms, in the socialist-oriented countries it is the task of the trade unions to fight against ruthless exploitation. With this end in view they organise strikes at foreign-owned enterprises and the state supports the strikers' demands.

In Algeria and other countries there are national peasants' unions. But in Syria, for example, they embrace a mere 10 per cent of the peasants.

Youth organisations in the socialist-oriented countries are regarded either as an integral part of the party (Guinea) or as non-affiliated organisations, which are closely connected with the party and operate under its guidance (the Congo, Burma). They educate the young people in the spirit of the struggle for the non-capitalist path of development and for socialist ideals.

According to the new Rules of the Congolese Socialist Youth Union, adopted at its Second Congress in 1973, the Union is a form of organising the youth movement under the guidance of the Congolese Workers' Party and that it ought to be an integral part of the working-class movement and fight for the victory of socialism. The Union is described as the party's reserve from which it draws the necessary cadres.² In 1975 the Union had nearly 10,000 members.

As assistants of revolutionary-democratic parties, the youth unions take part in state and economic development. Taking full advantage of their right they participate in the discussion of matters connected with the operation of enterprises, co-operatives, offices and educational establishments. Helping the revolutionary-democratic parties in training re-

¹ See *Etumba*, No. 290, 1973.

² *Ibid.*

serves of young cadres, they promote their own representatives to positions in state and economic organisations.

In some socialist-oriented countries youth unions face special tasks related to the efforts to abolish illiteracy, emancipate women, introduce a new mode of life, promote the self-help movement, etc. The creative activity of the young people finds its embodiment also in the establishment of other volunteer organisations of young people (civil militia, youth patrols, etc.) for the purpose of upholding law and order and fighting against counter-revolution.

There are many socialist-oriented countries where co-operative associations have attained a certain level of development (Burma, Syria, Tanzania). Their distinguishing feature is that they are both economic and social organisations, which fulfil production tasks and also educate their members in the spirit of collectivism. Now there are not enough peasants' and artisans' production co-operatives in the socialist-oriented countries. The principal types of co-operatives are sales and supply, credit and other associations.

In their day-to-day activity co-operative associations also have to fight against the forces and traditions of the old society. In some countries, as we have mentioned earlier, the law decrees that co-operative boards should include a specified number of poor peasants. But the dependence of the peasants on the kulaks and often on the landowners, who manage to get in the co-operatives, is still great.

In a number of countries the co-operatives are headed by state-appointed administrators and their boards are empowered to tackle only a specific range of issues.

Women's organisations are called upon to play an important role in the system of national democracy. This is because women make up a half and frequently more than a half of the population. Revolutionary-democratic parties are anxious to secure the participation of women in socio-political and economic activity. In the Congo and some other countries women's associations play a fairly prominent role, but on the whole, particularly in countries where the Muslim religion is predominant, women so far play a small part in state and social affairs. For example, of the 170 delegates at the Fifth Congress of the National Liberation Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which met in 1972, only five were women, and there was the same number of

women among the 664 deputies, who were elected to the people's councils in Syria in 1972. Among the 2,216 candidates, to the wilaya communal assemblies in Algeria in 1974, 125 were women. Beginning with 1972 centres of assistance to the women's movement are being established at Guinean enterprises. So far they operate as state bodies and will be reverted to the status of social organisations some time in the future.

The socialist-oriented countries have a number of other organisations, including Afro-Asian solidarity organisations, peace-defence committees and societies for friendship with foreign countries. By stimulating the activity of the working people, all these organisations are component parts of the system of national democracy.

3. Constitutional Rights and Duties of Citizens

Freedom of the individual is a very important factor of democratic development. Legally, this freedom is secured with the help of the institute of fundamental rights and duties of citizens, which in their sum total determine the basis of the legal status of citizens in society and the state. In view of their exceptional importance these rights and duties are defined in constitutions.

Constitutional rights and freedoms are one of the most important elements of democracy. But it is their implementation and not their proclamation that is decisive. However important they may be, constitutional rights and freedoms are only derivative elements of democracy. They stem from the nature of political power and, in the final count, are rooted in property relations. That is why only popular rule and public ownership of the means of production can guarantee real freedom of the individual.

The demand for individual freedom was comprehensively formulated for the first time by ideologues of the bourgeoisie which thirsted for political power, and then laid down in bourgeois constitutions. "Liberty consists in the possibility of doing everything which does not harm others," proclaims the 1789 French Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

The purpose of a democratic state, in the opinion of bourgeois ideologues, is to establish for each person his partic-

ular sphere of activity. Within this sphere he can do what he wants without considering the interests of other individuals and collectives, and the state is not supposed to interfere in this "personal" sphere. It follows that in a bourgeois society a person is recognised as being free only when he can stand apart from society and pursue only his own interests. But it is private property alone that induces a person to stand apart from society. Therefore, the right of a person to freedom in bourgeois society is above all the right to private property. Thus, private property and private enterprise in such a society are the foundation of the freedom of the individual.

Bourgeois ideologues say that in any system personal interests do not coincide with the interests of society. They believe that certain values, either social or personal, are always sacrificed. Under capitalism, they declare, the greatest value is placed on the freedom of the individual, while socialism, allegedly, subordinates individual freedom to society and the state. Founded on bourgeois egoism, these assertions indicate that their authors are far from understanding the actual relations between society, the collective and the individual. The point is that since man is a social being it is impossible to comprehend the essence of the problem of freedom of the individual by divorcing the individual from society and the collective. "One cannot live in society and be free from society," Lenin wrote.¹ Thus, the question is what social system can in fact ensure the freedom and the all-round development of the individual. The contrasting nature of the interests of society and the individual is not rooted in the nature of man, but in the dominating social relations, above all in the private ownership of the means of production, which leads to the exploitation of man by man, enriches some people and impoverishes others and gives rise to a situation when all are against all. This means that the problem of freedom of the individual should be removed from the sphere of abstract theoretical arguments and included in the sphere of revolutionary practice, that its solution is to be found through the transformation of all aspects of social activity in the interests of man.

True freedom does not lie in illusory independence from

society; it is determined by those material and spiritual opportunities which exist in society. A person is free only to the extent to which social conditions permit him to enhance and apply his abilities and satisfy his requirements. In a capitalist society the bourgeoisie, which opposed feudalism under the slogans of equality and fraternity, in practice asserted freedom of private ownership and exploitation of man by man. In such a society a person's social status depends to a decisive degree on his wealth. Money, capital become the main source of freedom of the individual. Representatives of the ruling class, who own the means of production, have every opportunity to develop and apply their abilities and satisfy their requirements, while those of the working classes are deprived of such an opportunity and occupy a dependent position.

True freedom of the individual is possible only if there is no exploitation of man by man. A revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system and the building of a socialist society emancipate the masses from exploitation and oppression and this is the foundation of all other socio-economic, political and personal freedoms of the man and citizen. Joint possession of social wealth, public ownership of the means of production, equal rights and duties, community of basic aims of the people under socialism and freedom of speech for all members of society create the necessary conditions for the participation of all people in running the affairs of the whole of society and the collectives of which they are a part.

But freedom is not something that has no limits. There are certain restrictions in society arising from the level of production: a society is able to satisfy only those requirements of the people for which it has ripened. Besides, a socialist society prohibits actions, which are detrimental to the interests of the people. It outlaws exploitation of man by man, the propaganda of war, racial hatred and other man-hating ideas. Society persecutes the infringement of other laws, too, such as attempts on public property, on the life, health and dignity of people, abuse of power, and so forth. Apart from being directed against persons who encroach on the welfare of the people, these bans and restrictions are designed to ensure real freedom for all working people in a socialist society. Thus, true freedom of the individual lies in the organic combination of the interests of the whole of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Party Organisation and Party Literature", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 48.

society, of the collective and the individual, and not in the opposition of the interests of the individual and of the society. This is achieved by building socialism, which in the long run may result from non-capitalist development.

As the building of a new society profoundly changes the entire pattern of social life, the socialist-oriented countries move away from the abstract understanding of the concept "freedom" and concentrate on its practical purpose. Article 33 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen rules that "the rights of all citizens in conformity with the aims of the national-democratic revolution are ensured by the state", and makes the point that the fundamental rights and duties of citizens are "an expression of political, socio-economic and cultural relations whose implementation enhances the political activity of the working people and leads to social justice". The Provisional Constitution of Syria and the constitutions of the Congo and Burma also note that the rights granted to citizens enable them more actively to participate in political affairs. This means that even if so far the fundamental laws of the socialist-oriented countries do not say directly that the rights and freedoms are granted to citizens in conformity with the interests of the working people (such provisions are characteristic of socialist constitutions), their constitutions are developing in this direction. The first clear indication of this is to be found in the Burmese Constitution whose Article 157 states that every citizen shall have freedom of speech and the press to the extent that "the enjoyment of such freedom is not contrary to the interests of the working people and of socialism". Granting other rights and freedoms the Constitution "outlaws all actions which undermine the unity and solidarity of national groups, state security and socialist law and order" (Article 153).

Inasmuch as under collectivism individual freedom depends on the participation of citizens in the building of a new society, persons whose activity runs counter to social interests may be restricted in their political rights. Provisions to this effect are included in the constitutions of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Burma. It was mentioned above that in some other countries, too, the exploiters are restricted in their political rights.

The demand to restrict the rights of reactionaries in a country which is building a society consistent with the in-

terests of the majority of the population is absolutely justified, because a person who seeks to satisfy his requirements on the basis of collectivism should take part in creating the necessary conditions for this. Hence, as distinct from bourgeois views that individual freedom allegedly stands only for rights and not for duties, the operating principle in a society which is building socialism is unity of rights and duties and at a certain stage of their equality, too.

The constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries set forth not only the rights, but also the duties of citizens. For example, Part I of the Second Chapter of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is entitled: "The Principal Rights and Duties of Citizens".

An important aspect of the new approach to the problem of individual freedom in the socialist-oriented countries is not that certain rights are formally proclaimed, but that steps are being taken to ensure them. This finds its reflection in that the constitutions secure the material, political and legal guarantees of these rights. Yet these guarantees are still incomplete, first, due to the social nature of society under the conditions of non-capitalist development (existence of private ownership of the means of production, participation of the non-working groups of the population in exercising power), and second, to the low level of development of the productive forces inherited from colonialism.

So far constitutions, for example, do not say that a guarantee of the right to work is abolition of unemployment, undivided domination of the socialist system of the economy, etc. This level is yet to be attained. They stipulate that the state will ensure the right to work by stepping up economic development and protecting the working people against unjustified dismissals (Article 35 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). Legally securing the right to education the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen envisages the implementation of a programme for the abolition of illiteracy as a guarantee of this right (Article 37). The Syrian Constitution makes primary education compulsory (Articles 18 and 37). The Iraqi Constitution proclaims that the state fights to make primary education compulsory (Article 27). Proclaiming the right to medical service some constitutions prescribe the dissemination of medical knowledge among the people and other measures as a guarantee of this right.

It should also be noted that progress along the non-capitalist road broadens the citizens' rights and strengthens their guarantees. The first constitutions of a number of countries lacked a detailed list of the rights of citizens and their guarantees. The latest constitutions have special chapters and sections devoted to this question, but even so it cannot be said that they list all the rights to which the citizens should be entitled. Many constitutions either have no provisions guaranteeing the right to work or couch them in indefinite terms in view of the still existing unemployment. Sometimes nothing is said about the right to medical service because Asian and African countries do not have a ramified network of medical institutions; and absolutely no mention is made about the right to social security (reference is made only to corresponding assistance from the state).

The fundamental rights of citizens in the socialist-oriented countries fall into several groups. The first group includes social, or as they are sometimes called, socio-economic rights such as the right to work, rest, education, health protection, to private property within specified limits, etc. The second group embraces political rights and freedoms. These are directly connected with the participation of citizens in social and political affairs and include franchise, freedom of speech, press and assembly, the right to unite in organisations etc. The third group consists of personal rights and freedoms: freedom of conscience (freedom of religious worship and atheism), inviolability of the individual and his home, privacy of correspondence, freedom of movement, the right to personal property, etc.

The principle of the equality of citizens occupies a place of its own. Without representing a special right, this principle in a true democracy permeates all the fundamental rights and duties of citizens.

Constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries speak of the equality of citizens before the law, of national equality and the equality of women and men. The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen proclaims the equality of the rights and duties of citizens irrespective of their origin, level of education and social status. The 1970 Constitution of Iraq decrees that all citizens have equal rights irrespective of sex, race, language, social status and religion (Article 19).

The legal equality of citizens should be matched by their factual equality. So far this is comprehensively expounded only in the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Article 34), although it, too, speaks only about the state creating equal economic, political and cultural opportunities for all citizens.

At present the principle of equality of citizens does not preclude certain restrictions prescribed by the constitution itself or other laws. For the most part these restrictions are dictated by revolutionary-democratic conceptions of social justice and promote progressive change (deprivation of some reactionary strata of certain political rights, the privileged position of workers and peasants in elections of some state bodies, curtailment of the right to large-scale and sometimes medium-size private property etc.). At the same time, there are restrictions, which do not flow from social reasons, but reflect the specific conditions in the given countries, particularly their mode of life and ideological views of the revolutionary democracy. Such, for example, are provisions (this is true for the majority of these countries) that only members of the ruling party and people who can write in Arabic can be elected deputies, provisions proclaiming Islam the official religion, the legality of polygamy, etc. In some countries the establishment of a one-party system by legislative means is not objectively motivated and may lead to a violation of the rights of citizens, particularly among the working class.

By legally securing social rights, the constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries overcome the narrow confines of the formal bourgeois democracy.

Speaking of the right to work they characterise it as a sacred duty of every able-bodied citizen (Article 35 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Article 32 of the Constitution of Iraq). The Congolese Constitution proclaims that work is "an honour, right and sacred duty" (Article 20). The Congolese and Burmese constitutions speak about the duty of the citizens to work to the best of their ability and of their right to be remunerated according to the work done (Articles 20 and 148 respectively). In recent years (the Congo in 1975) new labour codes legally consolidating the gains of the working class have been adopted. Working people enjoy the care of the revolutionary-democratic state. In some countries (Tanzania, Burma,

Syria) orders and medals are awarded to front-rank workers, and there are countries where the honorary title of Hero of Labour has been instituted.

The new character of the social rights of citizens in the socialist-oriented countries is reflected in other constitutional provisions. For example, constitutions proclaim the right of the working people to rest and paid leave, and to remuneration according to the quantity and quality of the work done, and speak of benefits to people suffering from occupational injuries, invalids, and sick and old people (Articles 148 and 151 of the Burmese Constitution). Constitutions also make it incumbent on citizens to safeguard public property and actively promote the growth of socialist accumulations. They speak not only of the right to education, but also of the duty of the state to abolish illiteracy, stressing that education is connected with the requirements of society and production, and that the system of education is designed to bring up a generation, which will be imbued with a scientific world outlook and will fight for freedom and socialism and for human progress (Article 21 of the Syrian Constitution). The Iraqi Constitution announces that the purpose of education is to bring up a generation, which will fight against the philosophy of capitalism, exploitation, reaction, Zionism and colonialism (Article 28).

Constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries contain a long list of political rights and freedoms. By legislatively securing them, the fundamental laws of the socialist-oriented countries reflect the new nature of national democracy. The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen proclaims the right of every citizen to participate in defining the development of political, socio-economic and cultural life in the Republic as a whole, in its provinces, cities and villages (Article 38), and the right of citizens to submit grievances and proposals to state bodies, either directly or through social organisations. The TANU Rules, which are a component of the Constitution, envisage the right of every citizen to take part in government at local, regional and national level (Article 2).

The right of association is one of the political rights set down in the fundamental laws of the socialist-oriented countries. The Syrian Constitution proclaims the right of citizens to unite in trade unions, women's youth and other mass organisations; the Burmese Constitution speaks of the right

of citizens freely to participate in political, social, class and mass organisations, which are permitted to function under the law. While consolidating the one-party system the constitutions of the majority of socialist-oriented countries do not mention other political parties among the list of associations, which the citizens are allowed to set up.

A national-democratic regime approaches the solution of the question of the freedom of assembly from its own specific positions. Some constitutions specifically mention the peaceful nature of assemblies.

The constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries attach much attention to the personal freedoms of their citizens. Besides establishing the above-mentioned personal freedoms, they contain other provisions. For example, the constitutions of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Iraq outlaw torture and corporal punishment (Articles 39 and 22 respectively) and brutal and inhumane sanctions. It is against the law to carry out medical or any other scientific experiments on a person without his or her consent. Under the Burmese Constitution a person cannot be kept under arrest for more than 14 hours without the sanction of a competent judicial organ. Many constitutions proclaim freedom of movement and choice of domicile of which the working people had been deprived under the preceding feudal regimes, but do not permit their citizens to be exiled to other countries (Article 30 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). Freedom of religious worship and performance of religious rites is secured in the constitutions of Syria (Article 35) and Iraq (Article 25). At the same time, the Burmese Constitution stipulates that religion and religious organisations should not be used for political purposes (Article 156).

In contrast to the fundamental laws of bourgeois states, the constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries lay down the fundamental duties of their citizens. Above all they stipulate that it is the duty of every citizen to take part in building a new society and protect the progressive gains of the people.

Some constitutions characterise defence of the country as the sacred duty of each citizen (Article 40 of the Syrian and Article 16 of the Congolese constitutions). The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen contains a formula, which reflects the social aspect of this duty:

it speaks about the defence of the "national-democratic system" (Article 51).

A number of constitutions make military service statutory (Syria, Burma) and the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen qualifies government service as an honorary duty (Article 58).

It is the duty of every citizen to safeguard and fortify public property as the essential material foundation of the national-democratic revolution (Article 52 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Article 169 of the Burmese Constitution). The national duty of each citizen is to be active in public life.

There are constitutions, which say that it is the duty of each citizen to pay taxes and public dues (Article 14 of the Congolese Constitution, Article 41 of the Syrian Constitution).

The exercise of the constitutional rights and undeviating execution of duties promote the initiative and activity of the citizens, strengthen social and state discipline and thus serve to consolidate the national-democratic regime and the progressive gains of the people.

THE SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

1. The Basic Principles and Means of Solving the National Question

A consistently democratic solution of the national question is an important condition for the advancement of the independent Asian and African states along the path of social progress. This implies the need to eradicate all forms of national oppression and national inequality, and also to remove the causes breeding national discord, hostility and suspicion between tribes, nations and nationalities.

The national question in the young states has its specific colouring owing to the peculiarities of their historical development. As distinct from the continental European states, where national movements usually resulted in the formation of nation-states, the majority of the young Asian and African states emerge on a still unformed national basis.

There are many states whose population is made up of dozens of tribes and nationalities. The People's Republic of the Congo has 77 tribes, Tanganyika (the continental part of the United Republic of Tanzania) has 120, Burma, where the Burmese make up approximately two-thirds of the population, is also inhabited by such large nationalities as the Karens, Chins, Shans and others. The Iraqi people, according to the country's Provisional Constitution of 1970, consists of two nationalities—Arabs and Kurds. These tribes and nationalities stand at different levels of socio-economic and political development, they have different languages and material and spiritual values.

The ethnic heterogeneity of the majority of the young states is a consequence of their colonial past. Firstly, these states emerged within the boundaries of the former colonial

possessions, boundaries which the colonialists established at will, without consideration for historical, economic and, most importantly, ethnic factors. As a result, a single colony would embrace fragmented parts of various ethnic groups and a single ethnic group would be divided between several colonies, which frequently belonged to different colonial powers.

Secondly, the establishment of the colonial regime and the policy pursued by the colonialists retarded and immensely handicapped the process of the formation of nations.

A nation crystallises at a specific stage of the development of the human society—in the epoch of capitalism. When the imperialist powers launched their colonial expansion the peoples of Asia and Africa had not yet taken the capitalist road and had not formed into nations. They had such characteristic forms of community as tribe and nationality. In contrast to these a nation is a stable community of people linked together by common territory and economic life, language and culture.

By holding up economic, political and cultural development of the enslaved peoples, colonialism for a long period of time inhibited the natural process of the merger of tribes into nationalities, and of the already formed nationalities into nations. In many countries, particularly in Tropical Africa, the process of national consolidation is still far from completion and in others it is only just beginning. "In the post-colonial Africa," noted Guinean President Sékou Touré, "the state precedes the nation as a rule."¹ In other words, the state emerges before the various ethnic groups living on its territory unite into nation (or several nations).

The colonialists took advantage of the ethnic heterogeneity and of the fact that the process of national consolidation had not reached its completion to pursue their policy of "divide and rule". This policy was designed to pit the various ethnic groups against one another, foment national and tribal discord (tribalism) and exacerbate religious-communal contradictions. In their efforts to split the national liberation movement the colonial authorities encouraged the formation of political parties and groupings on a tribal basis. They supported the separatist movements of the feudal and tribal

nobility, which demanded the preservation of "native states" (feudal principalities and kingdoms in Burma, Uganda, India and some other countries) and even "independence".

This policy bred reciprocal mistrust and alienation of individual ethnic groups and communities, which under specific conditions overflowed into overt hostility and acute conflicts that carried away thousands of human lives. One of the most important objective causes of these conflicts was the factual inequality of ethnic groups in economic, political and cultural spheres, which was consolidated by the system of colonial domination.

After the winning of political independence the governments of the young states with an intricate ethnic pattern of the population had to tackle the task of formulating their own national policy. Naturally, this is a field in which each country has its specific problems. In some countries these are problems, which arise in the process of national consolidation (such as the existence of a tribal structure and organisation, tribal and feudal fragmentation, lack of a national language and diverse manifestations of tribalism and separatism). Others are faced with the problem of establishing friendly and egalitarian relations between ethnic groups and communities, getting the more advanced peoples to assist the less developed, and so forth. In many countries priority is given to forms of state structure, administrative-territorial division, representation of various ethnic groups in the state apparatus, the army and other issues.

But whatever the features characteristic of each country with a heterogeneous population, the national question occupies an important place in the general process of revolutionary change in all newly independent states. It has a considerable impact on the rate and nature of this process. Failure to solve the national question or underestimation of its significance can result in dire consequences. Proof of this is the aggravation of national conflicts in a number of the developing states in Asia and Africa (Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Sudan and others), which retards socio-economic change, leads to political instability and creates favourable conditions for imperialist interference.

Frequently underestimation of the importance of the national question is manifested in a simplified approach to the problem of national unity. Such unity is "asserted" by means of ignoring the ethnic composition of the population. In this

¹ Sékou Touré, "The Guinean Revolution and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4, April 1967, p. 26.

case the state is identified with a nation, which, however, has not yet crystallised. In some countries the national question is narrowly interpreted and usually reduced to the problem of tribalism, i.e., inter-tribal discord. Yet this discord can be attributed to fully objective causes: national inequality and disproportion in the level of socio-economic and cultural development. This means that condemnation alone cannot eradicate tribalism and that it is necessary to remove its political and socio-economic roots.

The national question is a part of the general issue of democratic changes carried out in countries, which had liberated themselves from colonial dependence. In some of them it acquires a top priority significance. Disregard for the national question and underestimation of its significance can seriously handicap, and judging by the experience of a number of developing states, have handicapped their development along the path of social progress.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to regard the national question as a matter of self-contained importance. Although it occupies a prominent place in the revolutionary struggle it is still a secondary issue, subordinate to the interests of the struggle of the working masses for a new society. In the final count national relations are determined by class relations. In a bourgeois society private ownership of the means of production forms the foundation not only for social, but also for national inequality, for oppression and violence. It disunites people and gives rise to class and national antagonisms. National oppression and inequality, and national hostility can be liquidated only through the abolition of private property, and, consequently, as a result of the victory of socialism.

The *Manifesto of the Communist Party* states: "In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end."¹

The political precondition for the solution of the national question is establishment of the rule of the working people; the economic prerequisite is consolidation of public owner-

ship of the means of production, which unites different nations and nationalities into a single family. Marxism-Leninism has formulated and substantiated the basic principles of the national policy ensuring a democratic solution of the national question: 1) full equality in rights and actual equality of the nations and nationalities in all spheres of state, economic and cultural activity; 2) the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states; 3) proletarian internationalism.

Consistent democratisation of the social and state system is an important means of solving the national question. Lenin underlined this on more than one occasion. "It is *impossible* to abolish national (or any other political) oppression under capitalism," he wrote, "since this *requires* the abolition of classes, i.e., the introduction of socialism. But while being based on economics, socialism cannot be reduced to economics alone. A foundation-socialist production-is essential for the abolition of national oppression, but this foundation must *also* carry a democratically organised state, a democratic army, etc."¹ The democratic organisation of a multinational state (from the point of view of the solution of the national question) envisages not only consistent implementation of national equality and the right of nations to self-determination, it also envisages the need to take into consideration the national factor in the administrative-territorial structure and emancipate the national regions from bureaucratic patronage from the top. Such forms of national statehood as federation and national-territorial autonomy can serve as important state and legal means (under specific conditions, of course) of solving the national question.

The Soviet Union was the first state where the national question was solved on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. The experience of the Soviet multinational state has confirmed that a consistent solution of the national question is possible only on the basis of the socialist reorganisation of society and that socialist democracy alone guarantees the peoples equal rights and opportunities, creates conditions for the solution of national issues with due consideration for the vital interests of the working people of different nationalities.

¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 125.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 325.

This experience profoundly influences also the course of national development in multinational countries, which had cast off colonial dependence. Naturally, the solution of the national question in these countries depends on the path of social development which they select. In those of them, which are following the capitalist path, national antagonisms are inevitably stimulated by the development of capitalist relations and the increasing class differentiation of society. The slow and inconsistent introduction of general democratic changes inhibits the process of national consolidation (for instance, in countries of Tropical Africa). The preservation of archaic forms of social organisation and difference in the economic and cultural level of individual ethnic groups tend to worsen relations between them. A specific role here is played by a policy of fomenting conflicts between national, tribal, religious and language groups pursued by internal reaction. The reactionary forces incite discord between nationalities in order to divide the working people and divert their efforts from the struggle for social emancipation. This policy frequently dovetails with the activity of the neocolonialists, who encourage all forms of reactionary nationalism and separatism and exploit them to undermine the still frail inner-state unity of the liberated countries and interfere in their internal affairs.

The adoption of the non-capitalist road opens favourable opportunities for solving the national question. Socialist-oriented countries are carrying through increasingly deep-going social, economic and political changes consistent with the interests of the masses. The restriction of private ownership of the means of production and exploitation of man by man, the democratisation of the state system and the involvement of the working people in government gradually remove the causes giving rise to national oppression, national friction and conflicts. Yet, developments in the socialist-oriented countries attest to the enormous difficulties attending the solution of the national question. This is quite natural, inasmuch as the national question embraces a wide range of problems, including the establishment not only of legal, but also of actual equality, the problem of languages, the training of national personnel, problems of the state structure, abolition of tribalism and separatism, ideological work to foster a spirit of friendship and co-operation between various ethnic groups, etc.

The formation of nations (or a nation) is still in process in a number of socialist-oriented countries. This aspect of the national question creates additional difficulties and its solution requires the introduction of special state and judicial means. For instance, the tribal and feudal fragmentation inherited from colonialism is a serious barrier to national consolidation and is a source of inter-ethnic conflicts. Firstly, it inhibits the development of broad economic links between the various ethnic groups and the formation of a common domestic national market, i.e., economic consolidation; secondly, it stands in the way of unification and cohesion of territories divided by tribal and feudal barriers within the state, i.e., political consolidation; thirdly, it prevents national awareness from ousting tribal consciousness, and, lastly, the formation of a national language and culture.

The disunity and isolation of ethnic groups inevitably breed egoism, parochialism and separatism. Consequently, without abolishing the tribal and feudal system and the administrative-territorial structure, which rests on it, it is impossible to accelerate national consolidation and wipe out inter-ethnic discord.

In the socialist-oriented countries traditional institutes (institute of cantonal and village chiefs in Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo, "native authorities" in Tanzania, feudal principalities in Burma and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), as the basis on which the colonial authorities artificially preserved and sustained population disunity, have been fully liquidated.

These measures accelerate national consolidation. An important part in this connection is played by the abolition of tribalism. All questions connected with the fight against tribalism occupy a prominent place in the programmes of a number of revolutionary-democratic parties. For instance, Article 6 of the Rules of the Congolese Workers' Party, adopted in 1972, defining the duties of a party member stipulates that he should "resolutely combat regionalism and tribalism"⁴. There are similar provisions in the Rules of the Democratic Party of Guinea adopted in 1969. The uprooting of tribalism envisages not only the liquidation of archaic forms of social organisation and tribal and feudal disunity, but also

⁴ Status adoptés par le 2^{me} Congrès extraordinaire tenu du 27 au 31 décembre 1972.

the pursuance of a corresponding policy during the formation of cadres for the state apparatus, adoption of a range of special legislative measures (in some countries, for example, it is against the law for people to wear tribal markings on their faces).

Introduction of socio-economic transformations (especially the agrarian reform), development of the educational system and cultural growth all help to erase tribal distinctions and promote the formation of a national community. Nations, as we know, are the products of capitalist development. But the experience of the Soviet Union shows that some peoples became nations under socialism, bypassing capitalism. This experience is very important for countries where nations have not yet been formed. Non-capitalist development creates objective and subjective conditions for the formation of nations on a non-capitalist foundation and the subsequent emergence of new socialist nations. This task is being tackled by a number of revolutionary-democratic parties, including the Democratic Party of Guinea whose Rules say that it aims at uniting the citizens of the Republic into a "single, powerful, democratic and socialist nation".¹ In the majority of the socialist-oriented countries the practical solution of the problem of the formation of nations is still in its initial stage. But the experience they have accumulated to date convincingly substantiates the universal nature of the basic principles and methods for solving the national question formulated by the Marxist-Leninist theory. It also confirms the fact that the example of how the national question had been solved in the USSR and other socialist countries exerts increasing influence on the national policy of the young states.

2. Principle of National Equality

From colonialism the young states inherited national enmity and tribal discord, which were fomented not only by the policy of "divide and rule", but also by the extremely unequal level of economic, political and cultural development of individual nations, nationalities and tribes. That is

¹ "Status du Parti Democratique de Guinée", *Horoya*, No. 1640, 1969.

why one of the tasks confronting the young states in the field of national relations is that of abolishing all forms of national inequality and establishing at first legal and then, in the process of economic and cultural development, actual equality in all spheres of public life.

In the multinational states with already formed or emerging nations (India and Burma, for example), the solution of this task is essential for the free development of nations and the establishment of friendly relations between them. In the countries of Tropical Africa, where there are no formed nations, the consistent implementation of the principle of equality of all ethnic groups and communities is crucial for accelerating the process of national consolidation and alleviating the inter-ethnic conflicts, which break out in the course of this process.

The revolutionary-democratic parties in the socialist-oriented countries look upon national equality as a basic democratic principle of their policy. Addressing a commission concerned with drafting the 1965 Constitution President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania said: "There shall be no discrimination ... on grounds of race, tribe, colour, sex, creed, or religion. ..."

"There shall be no propagation of group hatred, nor of any policy which would have the effect of arousing feelings of disrespect for any race, tribe, sex or religion."¹

This viewpoint is reflected in the legislation of the socialist-oriented countries that abrogated the colonial laws, which had consolidated discrimination against the native population or the privileged status of some ethnic and race groups. By proclaiming the equality of citizens irrespective of their nationality, race or tribe, the constitutions of these states envisage strict responsibility for any violation of this principle. The Republic of Guinea, states the Preamble to its 1958 Constitution, "proclaims the equality and solidarity of all its citizens without distinction as to race, sex or creed", and Article 45 legally guarantees this principle by stipulating that "any act of racial discrimination as well as all propaganda of a racial or regional character shall be punishable by law". The Guinean Penal Code of 1965 includes special articles defining such crimes. Article 109, for instance, qualifies as racist all statements made at meetings and in

¹ Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, London, 1967, p. 263.

public places favouring the predominance of any race or tribe, and also dissemination of either written or printed appeals of this sort. Any racist activity carries with it a penalty of imprisonment ranging from one to ten years and prohibition to take part in elections, hold administrative posts and be a guardian, witness or expert (Articles 111 and 112).¹

A most important element of national equality is the legal and actual equality of the languages of all nations and nationalities making up a multinational state. This envisages, in the first place, the absence of an official language and, in the second, the provision of a real opportunity for studying in educational institutions in the local languages and their use by the mass media (books, magazines, newspapers, radio and TV broadcasts, etc.), and also in business correspondence, the keeping of accounts and records, etc.

Being a component of the national question the language problem in the developing Asian and African states has its specific features and is a most acute and complicated issue related to the formation of nations.

Many countries have no formed national language or languages, but only numerous tribal languages and dialects, which have no written system, as a rule. Such is the state of affairs in the majority of countries in Tropical Africa, for example, where the establishment of the colonial regime cut short the natural development of the national languages. The colonialists implanted the language of the home country as the official language and impeded the development of the national language in every way. For instance, a decree was issued in the French colonies in Equatorial and West Africa outlawing the use of African languages in schools. Although in British colonies written systems were created on the basis of the Roman alphabet for a number of languages and dialects, this circumstance inhibited rather than stimulated the formation of a national language. The fact of the matter is that British colonial authorities and missionaries orthographised tribal dialects. For example, in the Gold Coast colony, now the Republic of Ghana, four written systems were created for just one language—Akan—on the basis of its dialects. Thus, language disunity was perpetuated there.

¹ See *Republique de Guinée. Code Penal*, Conacry, 1965.

This policy resulted in that the countries of Tropical Africa had no national languages when they gained political independence. In these circumstances the majority of them adopted as official the languages of the former home countries (English or French). Only a handful of countries gave their national languages an official status alongside French or English (for instance, Tanzania, the Malagasy Republic, Burundi, Mauritius and Rwanda).

Community of language is an important attribute of a nation. Lenin said that language was the most important means of human intercourse,¹ a condition "for the complete conquest of the home market and for complete freedom of economic intercourse".²

The linguistic fragmentation in the countries of Tropical Africa is a sign that the process of the consolidation of nations in them is still unfinished. This gives rise to the question what is the best way of uniting the ethnic groups speaking different languages into a single nation. Should this unification take place through the spread of the language of the former home country or through the creation of a national language? The solution of this problem largely depends on the state's linguistic policy, which is a fundamental component of its national policy.

The language problem causes numerous controversies in the African countries. Some politicians and representatives of the national intelligentsia consider it expedient not only to preserve the official status of the language of the former home country, but also to turn it into a national language. This point of view is supported by the ideologues of neo-colonialism, for a linguistic policy of this sort would enable the imperialists to preserve and intensify its ideological influence in the newly independent states.

However, the majority of African political leaders and intellectuals favour the development of the national languages, since every people is entitled to promote its own culture and language. At the same time, there is a doubt whether it would be advisable to develop all languages, including those of the small and tiny tribes, i.e., to orthographise and use

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 396.

² V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 48.

them in the system of education. Apart from the fact that all this would entail large material outlays, the principal argument against this policy is that in view of the intricate ethnic composition of the population the consolidation of linguistic fragmentation may further increase the disunity of ethnic groups and thus impede national consolidation.

The formation of a national language is a protracted process in the course of which one group of kindred tribal languages, owing to diverse economic and social reasons becomes more widespread and as it pushes other languages out of the scene enriches itself at their expense at the same time. A state can influence this process by promoting the development of one or another language or languages. In doing so, however, it has to take account of the national processes taking place in the country, i.e., whether one or several nations and nationalities are crystallising within its borders.

In a multinational country the forcible imposition of one of the languages as the official language is inevitably connected with the establishment of national privileges and, consequently, leads to national inequality. As a rule, this intensifies national disunity. "...A compulsory official language involves coercion, the use of the cudgel," Lenin indicated. And coercion can have only one result, it will "sharpen antagonism, cause friction in a million new forms, increase resentment, mutual misunderstanding, and so on".¹

The imposition of an official language will neither make it widespread nor turn it into a means of communication between the nationalities concerned. The shift to one or another national language and its spread will not lead to friction and the growth of tribal "nationalism" only if effected on a strictly voluntary basis.

Taking into consideration that European languages will, evidently, remain a means of intercourse between different ethnic groups for a long time to come, and also the protracted nature of the process of the formation of a national language, many progressive functionaries believe that it would be best to pursue a policy of linguistic pluralism. The success of

this policy has been proved by the rise of nations in the USSR and other socialist countries.

In the Soviet Union, where there are more than 100 nationalities, there is no official language, i.e., a language which is compulsory for all and is the sole language used in schools, state, economic and other institutions and the press. The Soviet state proclaimed the principle of equality of all languages shortly after its formation, and the right of all citizens to speak, and to bring up and educate their children in any language without any restrictions or coercion was guaranteed in all Soviet constitutions, beginning with the first Constitution of the RSFSR adopted in 1918. This right has been further developed and guaranteed also in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR.

More than 40 nationalities, whose languages prior to the October Socialist Revolution had no written forms, acquired a science-based writing system in the post-revolutionary period and now have developed literary languages. As a result, they can study in the native language and develop their national culture on its basis. Under the conditions of complete equality and free development of all national languages, the Russian language emerged as the inter-language used for intercourse and cooperation.

Practice shows that the socialist-oriented countries, whose governments are putting in a great deal of work to study and develop the local languages, use the experience of the USSR. Many of them are being orthographised and used to abolish illiteracy among the adult population and are also taught at school. In Guinea, for instance, writing systems have been created for eight basic languages. Large editions of textbooks and other study aids have been published in these languages, which are also used in legal proceedings. In Tanzania education in schools is conducted in Swahili, which is also the national language in which books and newspapers are published and legislative acts are drafted. Legislation is published in it (sometimes with parallel English translations) and so are the textbooks.

The principle of the equality of languages is proclaimed in the programmes of a number of revolutionary-democratic parties. The Statement of the Revolutionary Council of Burma of February 12, 1964 says that each nation independently tackles all problems connected with the national lan-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Is a Compulsory, Official Language Needed?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 72-73.

guage, national literature and national culture.¹ This provision is included in the 1974 Constitution whose Article 21 says that "citizens of all nationalities have the right ... freely to use and develop their national languages, culture and literature".

When the languages of all nations and nationalities are absolutely equal and are able freely to develop and mutually enrich themselves, then life itself raises one of them to the level of a national language or an inter-language.

In many young countries religion adversely affects the development of national relations. The colonial authorities used to foment religious and communal strife, which often led to inter-ethnic religious conflicts (India, Burma, the Sudan, etc.). In order to remove the impact of religion on national relations it is necessary to ensure freedom of conscience and religious worship and outlaw discrimination on religious grounds. Freedom of conscience stands for freedom to profess any religion or none at all. Any infringement of the freedom of conscience violates the equality of citizens on religious grounds. When, for instance, the state extends direct or indirect privileges to any religion, it creates advantages for the population group, which professes this religion. Thus, an essential condition for freedom of conscience is to have the church separated from the state. An official religion, just as an official language, is incompatible with the principle of national equality. In a multinational state, particularly where ethnic groups have their own religions, recognition of one religion as the official religion inevitably leads to national discrimination and, consequently, to national discord on religious grounds.

In the majority of socialist-oriented states the church is separated from the state. There are corresponding constitutional provisions stipulating the state's secular nature (Article 1 of the Guinean Constitution, Article 1 of the Congolese Constitution, etc.).

Initially the 1947 Burmese Constitution established no official religion. In 1961, however, U Nu's bourgeois government managed to secure the adoption of the third amendment to the Constitution proclaiming Buddhism the official religion and granting a range of privileges to it so that the discrimination against the Kachins, Shans, Chins and other

national minorities, embracing Christianity or ancient cults, became legal. With the establishment of revolutionary-democratic rule in the country the Revolutionary Council promulgated a special statement on its policy and views concerning religion. Proceeding from the party's programmatic principle concerning the right of "each nation to freedom of religious worship and the performance of religious rites", it declared that "all the peoples of the Burmese Union have the right freely to profess any religion". As regards Buddhism, the religion of the majority of the population, the Revolutionary Council firmly said that it "would not use it and the Buddhist monks for political purposes, but neither would it tolerate any political activity conducted by individuals or organisations under the cover of religion."¹ Steps were taken to abolish the privileged status of the Buddhist religion. The views of the Burma Socialist Programme Party on the question of religion have been embodied in the new Constitution, which proclaims freedom of conscience and religious worship and the right of each nation to profess its own religion (Articles 21, 156).

The existence of several religions and religious-communal groups in a multinational state is not by itself an impediment to the establishment of friendly relations between peoples professing different religions. Reactionary elements will be able to take advantage of religious distinctions to foment national-religious strife only if there is no freedom of conscience and citizens are discriminated against on religious grounds.

Asserting the equality of citizens the constitutions of the socialist-oriented states also guarantee them freedom of conscience and religious worship and outlaw religious discrimination (for example, Articles 41 and 45 of the Guinean Constitution).

An important role in eradicating the influence of religion on national relations is played by constitutional provisions making it illegal to use religion and the church for political purposes and to build political parties and organisations on a religious foundation (Article 18 of the Congolese Constitution, Article 156 of the Burmese Constitution).

Equality of all citizens before the law, prohibition of discrimination on tribal, national or race grounds, the equal-

¹ See *Working People's Daily*, April 16, 1964.

¹ See *Working People's Daily*, April 19, 1964.

ity of languages, freedom of conscience, and so forth, are an essential, but far from adequate condition for solving the national question. The main thing is to secure the real equality of all the peoples of a multinational state in economic, social, political and cultural fields.

A consequence of colonial domination is the actual inequality of ethnic groups and communities in the developing states. This inequality is an upshot of the extremely uneven socio-economic development of the colonial countries.

As a rule, a colony was divided into two unequal parts: the central and outlying regions, which was consistent with the very nature of imperialist exploitation. The monopolies chiefly concentrated on developing regions with fertile soils, rich mineral deposits and water resources where they built mines and roads and set up large plantations. Though slowly the capitalist relations, the working class and the local bourgeoisie began to emerge in these central regions. The rest of the country, in which monopoly capital was not interested for the time being, was kept in reserve for subsequent exploitation. These fringelands were artificially separated from the central regions and their isolation was consolidated by the system of colonial administration (for instance, the division of India into "native" and "British" parts, Burma into Burma proper and the frontier states, the establishment of "closed regions" in the Sudan, i.e., regions inhabited by African tribes, etc.). As a rule, traditional feudal and tribal institutes and obsolete precapitalist forms of economy were preserved in the peripheral regions.

Here are a few facts illustrating the uneven development of individual regions in the colonies. In the Sudan the Blue Nile Province, accounting for 20 per cent of the country's population (Arabs), yielded 46 per cent of the government revenue in 1956, while the three southern provinces taken together ("closed regions"), which accounted for 30 per cent of the population (Negroid tribes), yielded a mere 3 per cent. The average annual per capital income in these provinces was approximately 50 per cent lower than in the country as a whole. Such disproportion was characteristic of many countries. In the Ivory Coast colony, for example, the per capita income in areas producing marketable crops was six times higher than in other parts of the country and the number of schoolchildren ten times higher than in other parts of the country.

The different levels of socio-economic and cultural development of the peoples in the central and outlying regions are responsible for their actual inequality. It is not by chance that in some African countries command positions in the political and economic fields are held by the more advanced ethnic groups (such as the Kikuyu and Luo in Kenya, Fang in Gabon, Ashanti in Ghana, and so forth).

It follows that while there is legal equality there is still no actual equality between the advanced and the still backward nationalities. Some of them have wide opportunities for using the results of the socio-economic and political reforms taking place in their countries, while others do not. For instance, literate cadres are needed in order to run state affairs, production and cultural development. Under the law all citizens, whatever their nationality, have the right to hold any government office. But in this respect representatives of the ethnic group with a higher percentage of literacy and a larger number of trained specialists are in an objectively privileged position.

The socialist-oriented states are taking steps to eradicate the actual inequality inherited from colonialism in order to secure the participation of all peoples of a multinational state in building a new society and removing the causes of tension in their relations. Revolutionary-democratic parties believe that the solution of the national question does not lie in a mere proclamation of legal equality, but in the establishment of real equality and in the boosting of the socio-economic and cultural level of the formerly backward peoples with the fraternal help of the more advanced peoples. Very characteristic in this connection are the views of the Burma Socialist Programme Party on the national question expounded by General Ne Win, who said in 1964 that there were at that time great distinctions in the level of economic and social development of the peoples inhabiting the country and the task of obliterating or alleviating these distinctions ought to be recognised as one of prime importance. He added that in fulfilling this task the relatively more advanced peoples should forgo their interests and help the less developed peoples.

Revolutionary-democratic parties and governments are speeding up economic and cultural development of the formerly backward outlying regions by building industrial enterprises and roads and enlarging the numbers of cultural

institutions and hospitals. Such, for example, is the policy of the Guinean Government in Forest Guinea inhabited by the Guerze, Kisi, Toma, Koranko and other peoples; that of the Algerian Government in Kabylie inhabited by Berbers. The head of the Algerian Government Houari Boumediène repeatedly stressed that it would do everything possible to do away with the division of the country into economically developed and underdeveloped regions, into "poor Algeria and rich Algeria". Special plans for the development of Kabylie and other backward regions, envisaging considerable allocations for the promotion of industry and agriculture, health protection and education, were adopted in the period from 1968 to 1970.

In Burma the central government's overall outlays on socio-economic and cultural development of the national states in 1968 and 1969 increased by more than twofold as compared with 1954 and 1955. With the view to training national personnel for schools, agriculture and the state apparatus an Academy of Nationalities was opened in 1964.

All these measures undermine the socio-economic foundations of the actual inequality of the ethnic groups and create conditions for erasing mutual mistrust and suspicion and establishing friendly relations between them.

Consistent implementation of the principle of national equality is the basic method of solving the national question. But in some countries with an intricate ethnic pattern of the population, where national contradictions are particularly acute and a threat is created to the very existence of the state, the normalisation of national relations requires the introduction of other methods. In these circumstances an important role is played by such state and legal measures as the formation of a federation or national-territorial autonomy.

3. Federation and National-Territorial Autonomy

The majority of the young states with an intricate ethnic pattern of the population have a unitary system of government. Many Asian and African politicians and statesmen regard centralised unitarianism (i.e., a unitary state without any autonomous formations) as the only acceptable form of

state structure. In their opinion this form helps eliminate tribal and feudal fragmentariness, separatism and regionalism, and makes for the unification of all tribes and peoples into a single nation.

There are two reasons for the negative attitude towards federation and autonomy in the newly independent states. In the first place, the colonialists used these two forms to undermine the inner-political unity of the newly independent states and consolidate the domination of the reactionary forces in them. In many countries (Nigeria, Uganda, Malaya, Ghana, Kenya) these two forms were forcibly imposed by the former home countries. The establishment of a federation and territorial autonomy on an anti-democratic basis not only failed to solve the national question, but, on the contrary, heightened national antagonisms and stimulated separatist movements. In the second place, there are many countries where the local reactionaries also seek to capitalise on these forms to bolster their economic and political positions. It was not by accident that the most zealous advocates of federation in Burma, Uganda and Ghana, for example, were the feudal lords and the tribal nobility.

Such an experiment seriously compromised the idea of federation and autonomy in the eyes of the progressive public in the developing countries. And this, among other things, accounts for the fact that federations or autonomous formations were eventually liquidated in Uganda, Kenya, Ghana and some other countries.

The negative attitude towards the federative or autonomous forms of state structure imposed by the colonialists is fully justified. Yet, it would be wrong categorically and in all cases to reject federation and national-territorial autonomy as a means for solving the national question.

A consistently democratic solution of the national question presupposes, as we have already noted, the recognition of the right of each nation or nationality to free self-determination. This means that each nation or nationality can either establish an autonomy or form a federative state together with other nations or nationalities or secede and set up a national state of its own.

How the problem of the form of self-determination, of the practical implementation of the right to self-determination is resolved depends on concrete historical conditions in the given multinational country (i.e., on the state of national

relations, political and economic conditions and other factors). For instance, recognition of the right of secession does not necessarily mean that each nation or nationality must unfailingly exercise this right and that secession is expedient under any circumstances. In each specific case the solution of this problem must be in the interests of the struggle for social progress. While upholding a democratic solution of the national question, in this case the right to self-determination, it is essential to bear in mind that it could be abused. Proof of this are the imperialist-inspired reactionary separatist movements in Nigeria, Burma and some other countries. For example, progressive forces in Nigeria resolutely opposed the secession of Eastern Nigeria on the grounds that the formation of the so-called Republic of Biafra promoted the interests of internal reaction and imperialism. It would have brought about the disintegration of a large state into a number of dwarf states, which could easily fall into neocolonial bondage and split up the forces fighting for social progress of all the peoples inhabiting Nigeria.

The secession of the former Eastern Province inhabited by 75 million Bengalis from Pakistan was a totally different thing. During 24 years of Pakistan's existence as a sovereign state this province was in fact an inner colony of West Pakistan. The Bengali nation suffered from heavy national oppression and its demands for broad autonomy and liquidation of national oppression and inequality were rejected by bourgeois-landowner governments. Under these conditions secession from the reactionary state became the only possible and expedient form of self-determination for the Bengali nation.

This example proves that a democratic state structure plays an important role in solving the national question. The broader the democracy and the freer the nationalities and nations inhabiting a multinational state feel themselves, the lesser are the chances of their developing a wish to secede.

It is clear from the experience of some multinational Asian and African states that a refusal to recognise the right to self-determination and to use federation and autonomy as a means for solving the national question merely worsens national relations and strengthens separatist and regionalistic movements.

In a socialist-oriented state federation and autonomy may become a means for solving the national question if they

are created on the basis of new organisational and political principles.

To begin with let us examine the principles for building a federation of a new type. In the first place, a federation in a multinational state should be built along national lines. This means that national states are the subjects of federation. For the first time this principle was implemented in the federative Soviet state set up in 1922. All its 15 Union republics are the national states of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Uzbek and other peoples. In this respect the example of the Soviet Federation considerably influenced the federative structures of not only the socialist-oriented countries, but of some of the newly independent multinational states. The states making up the Indian Union are also in the main built along the national-linguistic lines. But not all federative states in Asia and Africa adhere to this principle. Rejection of the national principle in setting up a federation as a rule worsens national relations and creates a threat to the unity of the state. A case in point is Pakistan and Nigeria. There were five large nations, Bengali, Pushtu, Punjabi, Sindhi and Baluchi in Pakistan. The country's progressive forces favoured the transformation of Pakistan into a federation of equal autonomous provinces built along national-linguistic lines. But the federation was created on a purely territorial principle, and two provinces, East and West Pakistan, were formed. This deprived the peoples of Pakistan of the right to create their own national statehood. Only the 1973 Constitution made the national-territorial principle the foundation of the country's federative structure.

Prior to 1967 the Federal Republic of Nigeria consisted of four regions and a federal territory, which were formed arbitrarily, without account for the ethnic factor, which resulted in the strengthening of separatist movements, in frictions and conflicts between the country's numerous peoples. In 1967-1976 nineteen states were formed with account for some of the demands of individual peoples. But so far the question of Nigeria's state structure has not been fully solved.

Another no less important principle of a federation of a new type is the voluntary unification of nations and nationalities into a federal state. The forcible imposition of a federal structure (practised by the colonialists), or, on the contrary, of unitarism (for example, in Nigeria and Pakis-

tan) is equivalent to curtailing the right to self-determination. A guarantee of the voluntariness of such unification is the right of free secession from the federation. But, as we have already said, this right ought not to be identified with the expedience of secession. The 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma, for instance, envisaged the right of free secession of the national states. But the feudal reactionary circles associated with imperialism attempted to capitalise on this progressive provision. The feudal rulers of the autonomous states strove to preserve and broaden their rights and privileges instead of promoting the interests of the national minorities.

The equality in rights of the subjects of federation is yet another key principle of a federation of a new type. It consists in that all members of the federation have equal rights irrespective of the size of their territory and population. This equality can be ensured by diverse legal means: the establishment of identical spheres of competence, equal participation in the formation and activity of the federal bodies of state power and administration (for example, equal representation in the house of nationalities, in government, in higher judicial bodies, etc.). But it is not only a question of legal equality, it is also a question of actual equality. The more advanced peoples should help the backward nations in every way to promote their economy and culture.

Inequality, actual in the first place, is characteristic of some federations in the Asian and African countries. In this respect a striking example was the Pakistani federation (prior to 1971). East Pakistan was in an unequal position compared with West Pakistan. This manifested itself in all walks of life: economy, distribution of expenditures, composition of the federal bodies, and so forth.

The principle of democratic centralism is a very important feature of a federation of a new type. It does not rule out federation; it is fully consistent with it. Federation, Lenin indicated, "if carried out within limits that are rational from an economic point of view, if it is based on important national distinctions that give rise to a real need for a certain degree of state separateness—even federation is in no way in contradiction to democratic centralism".¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 207.

In Chapter III we dealt with the substance of democratic centralism as a general principle of the organisation of a socialist-oriented state. As a principle of building a federation democratic centralism presupposes centralism in the basic spheres of administration of a federal state (for example, the economic, defence, etc.) in combination with broad initiative and independence of its members. This principle finds its concrete expression in the distribution of competences between the federation and its members, in the structure and reciprocal relations of their organs of state power and administration.

The federal state structure of some of the young Asian and African states has a high degree of centralisation. This is manifested in the limited competences of the federation's members, in establishing control over the activity of their organs of state power and administration (for instance, the appointment of the head of executive power by the president of the federal state, the right of the president to dissolve the states' elective bodies, and the like).

A federation resting on principles of self-determination, voluntariness, equality and democratic centralism can be instrumental in bringing about a solution to the national question, establishing friendly relations between nations and nationalities and promoting their economic and cultural growth. This has been proved in the course of the more than 50 years' existence of the Soviet federation, the most viable and perfect form of organisation of a multinational state.

In those multinational Asian and African countries, where national contradictions are especially acute and the disintegration of the state is a real possibility, a federation of a new type can help to keep a large state intact, strengthen state, economic and cultural links between its nations and nationalities. It can also promote the unification of peoples formerly divided by colonialism. It was for this purpose, for example, that the United Republic of Tanzania was formed on a voluntary basis. This federation has several distinguishing features. But whatever the specific principles regulating relations between the fifteen-million people of Tanganyika and the 300,000 inhabitants of Zanzibar and Pemba, they are being built on democratic principles.

Special links, combining the features of actual and individual union, exist between Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Cape Verde. This is a very rare form of state structure, and in the given instance it has a temporary character.

In some countries with a complex ethnic pattern of the population national-territorial autonomy can become one of the means of solving the national question. Autonomy envisages self-government within the framework of a unitary state for one or several regions with a distinctive mode of life, ethnic structure and a certain degree of economic unity. Thus, national-territorial autonomy has two characteristic features: firstly, it is created on a territory with a degree of economic unity, and, secondly, it is built along national lines, i.e., it is granted to a population with a distinctive language and mode of life. All the organs of state power, administration and justice in an autonomous formation should be formed primarily of people of the indigenous nationality and use the language of that nationality. A state's constitution may also contain provisions on the representation of a national-territorial autonomy in the central state organs (in parliament, government and others).

The forms of autonomy may vary depending on the national composition of the population and the degree of consolidation of national groups (nation, nationality, tribe). In the USSR, for example, there are autonomous republics, autonomous regions and autonomous districts.

The use of autonomy as a form of state structure guarantees the free development of nations and nationalities and friendly relations between them.

In some socialist-oriented states the creation of national-territorial autonomy along democratic lines plays an important role in the general process of democratisation of social and political activity. A case in point is the settlement of the Kurdish problem in Iraq. For a long time it remained unresolved and the result was a sharp worsening of national relations and civil war between the Kurds and Arabs. In March 1970 the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish leaders signed an agreement (Manifesto of March 11), which recognised the Kurds' right to autonomy. Later this right was embodied in the 1970 Provisional Constitution. A law on Kurdistan's autonomy was passed in 1974 under which national state organs, the legislative assembly and executive

council, were formed. The Kurds also have their representatives in the central bodies of state power and administration and Kurdish is the official language alongside Arabic in the Kurdish regions.

The state structure of Burma under the new Constitution (Article 31) has some features, which are typical of an autonomy. The country's territory is divided into seven "national states" and seven areas. The states (Arakan, Kachin, Kayah, Kawthule, Mon, Chin and Shan) have been formed along national lines in areas inhabited by non-Burmese peoples (Kachins, Shans, Mons and others), and areas on the territory of Burma proper. The legal status of the states and regions is identical: they enjoy a considerable degree of independence in local affairs, each of these units has an equal representation in the Council of State, which fulfils the functions of a collegial head of state, and their borders cannot be changed without the approval of the majority of the population.

It is quite possible that national-territorial autonomy may yet be set up also in countries where the process of national consolidation has not been completed. Where the formation of several nationalities or nations has already started or where there are real prospects for this process to begin, national-territorial autonomy may become an important means of solving the national question.

Stringent centralisation can be justified only as a provisional measure, particularly in countries where tribal structure and organisation are still preserved, and which inevitably give rise to a spirit of tribal loyalty and parochialism. To a degree it facilitates the struggle against tribal regionalism and separatism. At the same time, if implemented by means of bureaucratic methods such centralisation may lead and, judging from developments in some African countries, does lead to opposite results—to tension between ethnic groups. It does not strengthen national unity, but, on the contrary, weakens it. "... Bureaucratic interference in purely local (regional, national, and other) questions," Lenin wrote, "is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and political development in general, and an obstacle to centralism in serious, important and fundamental matters in particular."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 47.

It is only natural, therefore, that in a search for a solution of the national question, including the question of the selection of one or another form of the state structure of a multinational state, account should be taken of the concrete historical conditions of its development. But in any case the solution of this question should further the struggle of the working people not only for national independence, but for social emancipation, too.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW STATE MACHINE

1. The Break-Up of the Old State Machine and the Creation of a New One

The developing states have inherited the colonial administrative machine, which was created by the colonialists and adapted to their requirements. It was a repressive, bureaucratic machine mainly designed to maintain "law and order" advantageous to the colonialists. And it was this consideration that determined the composition of its personnel, structure, organisation and *modus operandi*.

Right up to the proclamation of independence key posts in the main segments of the state machine—army, police, courts and the administrative apparatus—were held by metropolitan officials. For instance, in 1960 there were only 20 African judges in 17 French-speaking countries of Tropical Africa. In other words, the majority of them had only one judge from the local population and some none at all (the Belgian Congo, Rwanda, Burundi). In 1957 the Army of Ghana had 25 Chananian officers (the highest rank was that of major) and 220 British officers holding command posts, including chief of staff of the defence forces. The Nigerian Army had 377 officers of whom only 57 were Africans, in Tanganyika only six out of 64 officers were Africans, in Zambia one out of 135, etc.

The colonialists also strove decisively to influence the formation of national personnel; their policy in this field was aimed at building up a bureaucratic caste standing aloof from the people and consisting of conciliatory elements, which became agents of neocolonialism after the winning of independence. For this purpose they resorted to direct bribery in the form of high salaries, the granting of diverse privileges and other methods. In the French African colonies,

for instance, a monthly salary of a high African official was from ten to twenty times higher than the average annual income of a peasant.

The main function of the colonial administrative machinery was to safeguard and consolidate the colonial rule. This repressive machinery concerned itself with matters of economic, social and cultural development only to an extent essential for the performance of its main function. The repressive substance of the colonial machinery manifested itself most vividly in methods of operation, which were characterised by police and administrative tyranny, outright rejection of even formal principles of bourgeois legality and mass judicial and other reprisals against fighters for national independence. Bureaucratic officialdom and punitive organs were the mainstay of the colonial apparatus. The legislative assemblies and governments, which were created a few years prior to the winning of independence and consisted either wholly or almost wholly of the representatives of the local population, performed only consultative functions.

So-called traditional institutes ("native authorities", "native courts", etc.) occupied a special place in the colonial administrative machinery. By involving representatives of the feudal and tribal elite in government affairs, the colonialists built up a social and political foundation for their domination.

Tribal chiefs and feudal rulers were endowed with administrative, police and judicial powers. They became the paid officials of the colonial administration and enforced the policy of the colonialists. No less reactionary was the role played by the traditional institutes in the social field. They kept the peasant masses fettered to the old traditions and customs, thus stunting the growth of their national and political awareness.

Such were the basic features of the colonial administrative machinery, which was a component of the state machine of the home country.

The very nature of the state machinery, which was inherited from the colonialists, and the potential opportunities for using it as a means of suppressing the working masses determined the attitude towards it on the part of the different forces of the national liberation movement. The old machinery of state was not broken up in the countries, which

had taken the road of capitalist development. Of course, organs of direct colonial rule were abolished, a part of the personnel was replaced by local cadres and a number of new organs concerned with exercising national sovereignty were formed. But all these measures did not affect the mainstays of the old state machine. It has remained an instrument for suppressing the aspirations of the masses to genuine national liberation and social emancipation. Its typical features are the existence of a bureaucratic caste of officials, who stand apart from the people, corruption, nepotism and arbitrary treatment of the working masses. Can such an apparatus, adapted as it is to safeguard the interests of the proliferating bourgeoisie, be used to carry through fundamental socioeconomic changes paving the way for the transition to socialism? The historical experience of truly popular revolutions provides a negative answer. Revolutionary rule cannot simply take over the old state apparatus, which had once served as an instrument for safeguarding the interests of the exploiting classes, and use it in the interests of the working masses. A revolution dooms itself to defeat if it does not break up the old and create a new state machine. Substantiated by the experience of the socialist countries, this conclusion is a matter of considerable importance also for the future of national-democratic revolutions, which result in the emergence of socialist-oriented states.

The need to break up the old state machine and have it replaced by a new one is mentioned in the programmes of a number of revolutionary-democratic parties and also in the constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries. "In our road to socialism the existing bureaucratic administration is a big stumbling block," states, for instance, the Policy Declaration promulgated by the Revolutionary Council of Burma in 1962. "To achieve our socialist aims with this effete machinery is impossible. Steps will have to be taken to remove this bureaucratic machinery and lay the firm foundations for a socialist democratic one."¹ The First Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party held in 1971 confirmed the need to reorganise the administrative machinery with the view to bringing it in conformity with the principles of socialist democracy.

¹ *The Burmese Way to Socialism. The Policy Declaration of the Revolutionary Council*, April 30, 1962, p. 5.

"A contemporary state," it is written down in the Programme of the Congolese Workers' Party, "is a legacy of colonialism. The machinery of neocolonialist rule must be smashed and replaced by a revolutionary, democratic and people's state."¹

The break up of the old and the creation of a new machinery of state means, first, abolition or cardinal reorganisation of the old institutions, second, modification of the social composition of the personnel of the state apparatus, and, third, alteration of its structure, principles of organisation and activity. This process, which is a general law of genuinely popular revolutions, follows a specific pattern in each given country depending on the concrete historical conditions of revolutionary development. Thus, the destruction of the old and the formation of a new state apparatus followed a different pattern in Russia in 1917, in the People's Democracies after the Second World War and in Cuba after the victory of the 1959 revolution.

In the course of the Great October Socialist Revolution the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus was carried out at a relatively rapid pace and involved all the key state and legal institutions. The old army was disbanded and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was formed, bourgeois courts were liquidated and people's courts were formed, the police and gendarmerie were replaced by people's militia, etc.

The revolution in the People's Democracies was not accompanied by the immediate destruction of the old machinery of state and its conversion to new, socialist principles took a relatively long time. In some countries punitive bodies, the army, for example, were not disbanded, but thoroughly reorganised (the high command was replaced, the officer corps was partially renewed, etc.).

In the Soviet state, the representative organs of the state—the Soviets—which appeared even before the victory of the socialist revolution, immediately became the bulwark of the new administrative machinery. In the People's Democracies the old forms of parliamentary, local self-government and administrative institutions were in use for quite a long period of time.

These examples show that the pace, ways and methods of removing the old and forming a new machinery of state can be quite different. They depend on the correlation of class forces both in the given country and on the international scene, peaceful or non-peaceful development of the revolutionary process, existence of democratic traditions and many other factors.

This is also evidenced by the experience of the socialist-oriented countries, where the break-up of the old and the formation of a new, revolutionary-democratic state machinery have common features reflecting the specifics of the national-democratic revolution and its basic stages of development. This process also has a number of distinguishing aspects growing out of the concrete conditions under which a country effects the shift to the non-capitalist path of development. The methods and forms of destroying the old machinery of state as a whole and its individual elements depend on whether the transition to the non-capitalist path is effected in the course of continuous armed struggle (Algeria, Guinea-Bissau), as a result of the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois and bourgeois-landlord regimes (Burma, the People's Republic of the Congo) or by peaceful means (Guinea, Tanzania). In some countries (Algeria, Angola, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Guinea-Bissau), for instance, armed forces were formed during the struggle for national independence, in others, the old colonial army was disbanded after independence had been won. A case in point is Tanzania where the armed forces, which were formerly a part of the King's African Rifles, were disbanded in 1964, and a new army consisting wholly of members of the ruling TANU Party, mainly of its Youth League, was formed. In some countries the old army is being radically reorganised (chiefly by discharging the old commanders, introducing new principles of conscription, etc.).

The method of gradual modification is also applied with regard to other punitive institutions (police, courts). At the same time, people's militia, revolutionary courts, state security courts and other organs are formed for the purpose of safeguarding the revolutionary-democratic power.

In a number of countries the abolition of such reactionary institutes as "native authorities", "native courts" and councils of feudal rulers did much to further the democratisation of the state apparatus. These organs, once a bul-

¹ Etumba, No. 295, 1973, p. 6.

wark of the colonial administration, have been liquidated in Guinea, Tanzania, Burma and the People's Republic of the Congo.

Whatever the method—complete break-up of the old institutes or their gradual transformation—the crux of the matter remains unaltered. Under all circumstances a state machinery, which had been formed by the overthrown ruling class, should be destroyed and replaced by a new one. Otherwise, there can be no development along the non-capitalist road, and no transition to socialism.

Of fundamental significance for the establishment of a new machinery of state is the question of the social composition of its personnel. The break-up of the old machinery of state entails above all the dismissal of top-ranking officials associated with classes or social strata, which have been removed from power. These cadres are replaced by people, who are loyal to the ideals of the national-democratic revolution and prepared consistently to carry through the policy of the revolutionary-democratic party and the government. Inconsistency and procrastination in this matter may, and, judging from the experience of some countries (Ghana, for example), do result in the defeat of the revolution. Analysing the reasons for such a defeat Kwame Nkrumah arrives at the conclusion that "after a people's revolution it is essential that the top ranks of the Armed Forces, Police and Civil Service be filled by men, who believe in the ideology of the Revolution, and not by those whose loyalties remain with the old order".¹

Of course, in view of the acute shortage of qualified personnel, a heritage of the old order, it is impossible to reject the services of all the old specialists even if they do not approve the selection of the non-capitalist path. But their activity should be subject to stringent control by the ruling party and mass organisations, and resolute steps should be taken to cut short possible sabotage, abuse of power and other hostile acts. The ideological re-education of the old cadres is also a matter of considerable importance. This is mentioned in the programmes of revolutionary-democratic parties. They speak of the need ideologically to re-educate all cadres, which have been schooled in colonialism, corrup-

tion and individualism and have become infected with anti-communist prejudices.

It is clear from the experience of socialist countries that given a correct policy it is possible to use the culture and knowledge of the old specialists in the general effort to build a new society.

Yet, the most important issue is, naturally, the training of new personnel for the state apparatus. This involves many problems (development and radical reorganisation of public education, and higher and specialised education, elimination of illiteracy among the adult population, enlistment of foreign specialists, the training of personnel at home and in foreign countries and the ideological and political education of the personnel). All these tasks, however, have a common purpose—that of rapidly training new personnel for the state apparatus educated in the spirit of loyalty to the socialist cause and possessing adequate professional skill. Much has been achieved in this field in the socialist-oriented countries. A number of them (Guinea, Algeria, Burma and the People's Republic of the Congo) have set up administrative schools for training senior officials for the state apparatus and are opening schools and courses at which workers for various administrative departments are trained. Very serious attention is paid to the ideological and political education of the personnel in which an important role is played by the system of party education which includes schools, courses, seminars, circles set up by party organisations at various levels. Work of this sort is also carried on by trade unions and women's and youth organisations.

The political and legal principles governing the selection of cadres, the placement and activity of people employed in state institutions are also being substantially changed. Bourgeois states proclaim a principle according to which the state apparatus and its personnel should be "politically neutral", i.e., stand "outside of politics" and be independent of political parties. In practice, however, this so-called political neutrality of the bourgeois state apparatus is pure fiction. The state apparatus is an instrument with which the ruling class carries through its policy. It should be noted that initially many developing states also adopted the principle of "political neutrality" of the state apparatus. For instance, under constitutions of some young states civil servants were not permitted to hold leading posts in political parties, and cer-

¹ Kwame Nkrumah, *Dark Days in Ghana*, New York, 1968, p. 67.

tain categories of employees were altogether denied the right to be members of political parties and engage in political activity.

Officials, who had been trained by the colonialists, could use the principle of "political neutrality" to sabotage the policy of the party and the government. That is why this bourgeois principle has been discarded in all socialist-oriented countries. Revolutionary-democratic parties select and place personnel according to their political affiliation and business qualities (for example, see Article 4 of the 1969 Rules of the Democratic Party of Guinea). However important the criterion of professional training may be, the decisive factor under the conditions of an acute class struggle is fidelity to the interests of the working people and to the cause of building a new society. Civil servants ought to be active proponents of the party's policy in all sections of the state apparatus.

The old legislation, which as a rule, was modelled along bourgeois lines, consolidated the privileged status of the officialdom, particularly its elite. This found its reflection in the rules governing the hiring, dismissal and transfer of state employees and ensured the virtual irremovability of the privileged bureaucratic upper strata and its transformation into the privileged caste standing aloof of the people. We have already said that in order to bribe a part of the officials from among the local population the colonialists paid them high salaries and granted diverse privileges. In the capitalist-oriented countries the bureaucracy not only retained, but considerably broadened its privileges. In these countries expenditures on the maintenance of the state apparatus are increasing all the time, consuming a lion's share of the state budget. Suffice it to say that the Ivory Coast, for example, spends 58 per cent of its budget and Senegal 47 per cent on salaries to state employees. Some developing countries in Africa spend up to 75 per cent of the state budget on the maintenance of the administrative machinery.¹ The well-known French scholar René Dumont aptly observed that the state apparatus is turning into the principal industry of these countries.² The excessively high salaries, various benefits and payments pro-

¹ See F. Gazick, *Fonction publique dans le monde*, Paris, 1972, p. 75.

² See R. Dumont, *L'Afrique noire est mal partie*, Paris, 1966, p. 69.

mote the growth of bureaucratic capital and the emergence of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

Measures are being taken in the socialist-oriented countries to put an end to the privileged status of the officials. Top-ranking officials had their salaries cut, and certain payments and privileges to which they were entitled under the colonial regime have been abolished.

As the revolutionary-democratic parties see it, regulation of the system of salaries of state officials is not merely a financial measure designed to reduce the cost of maintaining the state apparatus, but above all a very important political step to forestall the bourgeoisification of its cadres.

This is also the purpose of the legislatively established principle of prohibiting all state employees from engaging in private enterprise of any kind. In Guinea, for example, this law, which formerly concerned only members of government, is now obligatory for all state employees. According to the General Law on Revolution of 1973, state employees are forbidden to conduct trade either personally or through middlemen, engage in private enterprise, lease out houses, employ hired labour, etc. This ban also extends to the spouse of a state employee. Similar ordinances were adopted in the People's Republic of the Congo (the Law of October 13, 1969) and in Tanzania (the Leadership Code 1967).

Revolutionary-democratic parties have made tangible progress in building up new cadres for the state apparatus, and yet it still includes a large number of corrupt bourgeois elements, which sabotage progressive measures. Party leaders and the party press in the socialist-oriented countries continuously point out that these elements and their hostile activity are harmful to the revolutionary-democratic rule. It will take a long and difficult struggle radically to change the social composition of the state machinery's cadres. This struggle will be the more successful the faster and the more resolutely the ruling parties get rid of bourgeoisified elements, the more effectively they control the key sectors of the state apparatus and the greater the number of working people involved in running the state.

The new state apparatus differs from the old one not only in terms of its social nature. The break-up of the old machinery of state also envisages the rejection of its endemic organisational and operational principles and the introduction of new, democratic ones.

A crucially important principle is the active participation of the working masses in the affairs of the state in framing and effectuating its policy.

Revolutionary-democratic parties regard the involvement of the masses in state administration as an essential feature of the form of democracy, which arises in socialist-oriented states. And the principle of the participation of the masses in the organisation and activity of the state apparatus, which is proclaimed in the programmes of the revolutionary-democratic parties, is gradually translated into reality as the national-democratic revolution continues to develop. This is borne out by the reorganisation of representative bodies in a number of countries, the enhancement of the role played by mass organisations and the emergence of new forms of the masses' participation in managing production, which have taken place in recent years.

The principle of the participation of the masses in state administration is legally secured in the constitutions of a number of socialist-oriented countries. Article 38 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for example, stipulates that each citizen has the right to take part in promoting the political, socio-economic and cultural activity of the Republic in the provinces, cities and villages "in the interests of the national-democratic revolution". The Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to submit proposals to state organs either directly or through social organisations.

The concrete forms in which the masses participate in the organisation and activity of the state apparatus depend on the specific national features of their respective countries.

The following are the basic forms of the activity of the masses in this sphere: 1. Direct involvement of the people in forming organs of state power and in their activity (participation in election campaigns, in elections of representative bodies, in discussing drafts of constitutions and important legislation). 2. Participation in the formation and activity of state organs through mass social organisations (representatives of these organisations are included in economic, social and cultural administrative bodies). 3. Discussions of key issues of state, economic and cultural development at meetings or conferences organised by ruling parties and governments jointly with mass social organisations (econom-

ic conferences, personnel conferences at which the development of individual branches of the economy and the work of regional, district and territorial administrations are examined). 4. Formation of voluntary organisations to assist punitive bodies in upholding law and order, safeguarding state-owned property, combating counter-revolution (people's militia, vigilance brigades, committees for the defence of the revolution, etc.). 5. Participation of workers and employees in the collective administration of state-operated enterprises (committees of production units in Guinea, working people's assemblies in Algeria and the like).

Of course, other forms of participation of the working people in the state machinery take shape in individual countries in the process of state development. In Burma, for instance, class organisations—workers' and peasants' councils—were set up through which broad sections of the working masses actively participate in state administration (workers' councils unite more than 1,500,000 factory workers and peasants' councils have about six million members).

In order to build socialism it is necessary to unfetter the revolutionary energy, initiative and creative ability of the masses. And this calls for the all-round development of democratic forms of the daily and decisive participation of the working people in the administration of the state and for the establishment of close links between the state apparatus and the masses.

Revolutionary-democratic legality becomes a key principle of the activity of the new state machinery. This principle is asserted in the fight against administrative arbitrariness, abuse of power, bureaucracy and other characteristic features of the old state machinery, and presupposes undeviating observance of laws and rulings based on them by all officials and state bodies. The significance of legality as a principle of the activity of the state machinery is reflected in the constitutions of some socialist-oriented countries. Article 53 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen says that state employees are obliged "to observe the rules laid down by the law and safeguard the interests of the state".

Revolutionary-democratic legality is an inalienable element of democracy and its undeviating implementation by all officials and state bodies is a crucial guarantee of the strengthening of the democratic order. And, on the contrary, any

deviation from legality and violation of the citizens' rights and freedoms by individual officials and state bodies restricts democracy and undermines the trust of the masses in the revolutionary-democratic power.

An effective method of ensuring legality is the supervision over the activity of the state machinery by both party bodies and special state control agencies. Diverse forms and means of exercising this control have emerged in the course of state development. Some countries have set up ministries for state control (Guinea) or bodies of administrative inspection concerned with supervising the implementation and fulfilment of laws and ordinances by all government institutions. There are also departmental inspections supervising the activity of various branches of the administration (trade inspection, labour inspection, etc.) or the activity of financial, economic and other administrative bodies. In accordance with the 1974 Constitution, workers' inspection committees elected by representative bodies (People's Assembly and local councils) have been set up in Burma. These committees operate on a national scale and in administrative-territorial units.

In some countries the courts supervise the observance of legality in the activity of the state administrative agencies. People's control by mass social organisations is becoming increasingly widespread. This form of control is envisaged in their constitutions. Article 49 of the Permanent Constitution of Syria stipulates that mass social organisations actively participate in the work of state organs and other institutions. Such participation of the masses is designed among other things to establish "people's control over the apparatus of state authority". A case in point is the activity of collegial administrative bodies of state-owned enterprises, which include representatives of trade unions (production unit committees in Guinea and working people's assemblies in Algeria). These bodies and also special agencies (committees for control over production in the People's Republic of the Congo, workers' control committees in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) supervise the activity of the administrations of state enterprises.

The consistent implementation of the principle of revolutionary-democratic legality in the activity of the state apparatus necessitates the extirpation of such a dangerous phenomenon as bureaucracy. The essence of bureaucracy, as Lenin

pointed out, was administration through "privileged persons divorced from the people and standing *above* the people".¹

The old administrative machinery inherited by the socialist-oriented states was bureaucratic owing to its very nature. The destruction of this machinery, however, does not automatically erase bureaucracy and not only because the new state machinery continues to employ the old personnel reared in the traditions of bureaucratic guidance and corrupted by the colonial regime. There also remain bureaucracy's social roots: multistructural economy, predominance of the peasant population, small-scale fragmented agriculture, poverty and illiteracy of the masses, the burden of tribal customs and traditions, and so forth.

Bureaucracy isolates the state apparatus from the masses and creates conditions for abuse of power, encroachment on the rights and freedoms of citizens and other violations of revolutionary-democratic legality. Bureaucracy is dangerous also because hostile elements among the state employees use it as an instrument for sabotaging and discrediting the political line of the revolutionary-democratic parties. The ruling parties have intensified their struggle against these elements in recent years. They have passed decisions and the governments have adopted legislation on purging the state machinery of corrupt officials. In Guinea, for example, the 1973 General Law on Revolution envisages the immediate dismissal of state officials, who violate the decisions of the party and the government and jeopardise the cause of socialist construction (by being corrupt and incompetent, by leading a capitalist mode of life or by violating revolutionary morality). In 1973 the Tanzanian Parliament passed a law on the establishment of a special committee for enforcing the Leadership Code, listing the rules of behaviour for people employed in the party and state apparatus. The Committee examines all cases of misconduct and reports its findings to the President, who punishes the violator according to the existing legislation and party rules.

But in the opinion of revolutionary-democratic parties the most effective way of combating bureaucracy is by drawing the working people into state administration and bringing the machinery of state closer to the masses.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 486.

In contemporary conditions, when hostile elements are attempting to decompose the state apparatus by using corruption, bureaucracy and similar means, it is of primary importance to strengthen revolutionary-democratic legality in its activity. Therefore, revolutionary-democratic parties are introducing measures designed to strengthen party, state and people's control, uproot corruption and bureaucracy and bring the state apparatus closer to the masses.

2. The Revolutionary-Democratic Party and the State Machine

In order to function effectively the new state machine should be guided by the ruling revolutionary-democratic party. The building of a new society does not take place spontaneously. Above all it has to rest on scientifically grounded programme of revolutionary change, which theoretically illumines society's path to socialism. It also calls for the unification and direction of the efforts of all state and social organisations towards the attainment of a single goal. This role of political leader and organiser is beyond the ability of any part of the state machinery (the army, for example) or of any mass social organisation (trade union, youth, etc.). Only a political party, which expresses the interests of the working masses and is equipped with a genuinely scientific theory—scientific socialism—can lead and guide society towards socialism.

As a rule, the leading role of a revolutionary-democratic party is guaranteed by the constitution of the socialist-oriented countries (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and others). According to Article 7 of the Permanent Constitution of Syria, the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party is the leading party in society and the state.

Provisions concerning the party's leading role in the state organs are incorporated in various legislative acts. For instance, according to decrees adopted after the reorganisation of the government in Guinea in 1969, various ministries are obliged to carry through the party's policy in various spheres of economic, political, social and cultural activity. The ministry guiding the economy, for example, "carries through the party's policy in the sphere of economic development" (Article 1 of Decree No. 277, June 14, 1969).

The leading role of the revolutionary-democratic parties is also mentioned by their leaders. "...We give full effect to the principle of the leading role of the party in all spheres of activity: social, economic, political, administrative and military," writes Sékou Touré. "The party exercises the right to make decisions, the right to control at all levels."¹

It is not enough, however, to proclaim and constitutionally embody the party's leading role. It is necessary that it should actually play this role, practically guiding and controlling the activity of all the segments of the state machinery. It is common knowledge, for instance, that political functionaries in Ghana (up to the 1966 coup) and Mali (up to the 1968 coup) spoke a great deal about the leading role played by the Convention People's Party and the Sudanese Union, about their dominance over all state organs and the subordination of these to guidance and control by the party apparatus from top to bottom. But subsequent events showed that in fact the state machine as a whole and also its key components, such as the army, police and security organs, were not brought under party control.

In what way does the leading role of a political party with regard to the state machine manifest itself in the socialist-oriented countries?

Firstly, the party programme determines the main direction of the state's development and the tasks which are to be fulfilled at the various stages of this development. On the basis of these programmatic premises the party passes decisions on all domestic and foreign policy issues and carries them into effect through government organisations. All state organs—parliament, government, ministries and departments—base their activity on the party's directives. These organs cannot solve a single important political or organisational issue without the party's guiding instructions. Judging by the practical activity of the ruling political parties, in the socialist-oriented countries, party bodies (conferences, Congresses, the Central Committee and Politbureau) issue directives authorising the compilation of economic development plans and initiate the elaboration of vital legislation and government enactments. For instance, legislation on nationalisation, the agrarian reform, the budget, the constitution and

¹ Sékou Touré, "The Guinean Revolution and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4, April 1967, p. 28.

constitutional acts, etc., are adopted on the basis of the decisions taken by party bodies. A new state machine is formed under the direct guidance of the revolutionary-democratic parties.

Here are a few examples showing how revolutionary-democratic parties use this form of exercising their leading role. At its First Congress in 1971 the Burma Socialist Programme Party decided that a new Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma had to be drafted and defined its fundamental principles: socialism—the aim of the state; socialist economy—the country's foundation; socialist democracy—the foundation of the constitution; unity and equality of all nationalities, etc. The Constitutional Commission took all these principles into account, and the draft constitution, which it drew up, was adopted in 1974. The Congress also adopted directives concerning the state plan for the development of the economy of Burma, which envisage the elaboration of a long-term, twenty-year plan, the first four-year plan for the period 1971/72-1974/75 and also annual plans. The directives make it clear that they are guidelines for the revolutionary government and that it should fulfil the plan under the party's leadership.

In the period from 1967 to 1976 the National Assembly of Tanzania passed numerous important laws on state, socio-economic and cultural development, which also embodied and further developed the principles of the Arusha Declaration, the decisions of national conferences and the National Executive Committee of TANU. Accordingly, in keeping with the programmatic provisions of the Arusha Declaration stipulating that persons owning private property and exploiting the labour of others may not be elected to representative organs of power, the government adopted the 1967 Law No. 40 amending the Interim Constitution of 1965. Corresponding changes were made in the election laws, too. In May 1969 a TANU Conference examined the question of the second five-year plan for 1969-1974 and a corresponding law was then passed by the National Assembly. In 1975 a TANU Conference passed a decision on amending the Constitution with the view to enhancing the party's leading role and more clearly defining the targets of social and state development. In conformity with this decision the National Assembly in June 1975 introduced the necessary amendments into the Constitution.

Secondly, the leading role of a revolutionary-democratic party manifests itself in that it campaigns for the election of its members to all representative bodies and promotes them to all key posts in the state apparatus. Since the party's policy in the state apparatus is carried into effect by the latter's personnel, it is natural that the promotion of party members to the command posts in the state apparatus is one of the most important forms of leadership by the party. This form of leadership has its specific features in different countries, but it also has common features characteristic of the majority of them.

In the first place, as we have mentioned earlier, it is a combination of functions of party and state leadership. As a rule, members of the leading party bodies are also heads of the most important state bodies. Usually the leader of the party is head of state and government, members of the Politbureau (Central Committee or other leading party body) are ministers and department heads, secretaries of territorial party organisations are the heads of the local administration, and so forth. In some socialist-oriented countries such combination of functions is prescribed by law. For example, in keeping with the Constitution of the People's Republic of Angola (Article 31) the President of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola is also head of state. A similar provision is contained in the Mozambique Constitution (Article 47).

In keeping with the constitutions and election laws representative bodies (parliament, local councils) in a number of socialist-oriented countries with a one-party system are formed exclusively of members of the ruling party. If a party embraces practically the entire adult population, i.e., if it is a party of the National Front type, this is quite understandable. But is it necessary for the state apparatus and elected organs of power in countries where the consolidation of a socialist vanguard party has just got under way to be formed exclusively of party members? As distinct from a party of the National Front type, a vanguard party unites the advanced and the more conscious section of the working people and not the entire adult population. At the same time, there are people who are not party members, but are loyal to the revolutionary-democratic rule and whose experience and knowledge can be put to good use in the work of various state bodies.

Of course, the party promotes its members to key posts in the state apparatus and strives to secure a preponderant majority in parliament and local councils. At the same time, the nomination of non-party candidates in election and the appointment of non-party, but honest people to government posts would not only be of great practical significance, but, as can be seen from the experience of the socialist countries, would bring the vanguard party closer to the masses and help it strengthen its ties with them. Revolutionary-democratic parties in some socialist-oriented countries (Algeria, Burma, the People's Republic of the Congo) are following this course. Under their laws not only members of the ruling party, but also unaffiliated people may be elected to representative bodies of state power. The Burmese Constitution (Article 179) stipulates, for example: "The Burma Socialist Programme Party, in consultation with mass and class organisations formed under its leadership and with the electorate of the constituency concerned, shall submit lists of candidates for election as people's representatives to the Pyithu Hluttaw (the highest organ of state power.—*Ed.*) and to the People's Councils at different levels." The nomination procedure of candidates to the People's Assembly and People's Councils in the first elections, of January-February 1974, was as follows. The initial list was compiled by the Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the Burma Socialist Programme Party and submitted to the electorate for approval. The candidates proposed by the party could be rejected and replaced with others by a majority vote at co-ordination conferences of the electors.

The inclusion of persons without party affiliations into representative organs of state power in the People's Republic of the Congo is viewed by the Congolese Workers' Party as practical realisation of the ideas of the anti-imperialist front.

Thirdly, the leading role of the revolutionary-democratic party manifests itself in that it systematically controls the activity of all state organs. The party checks their work and rectifies shortcomings and omissions. Judging by the experience of some socialist-oriented countries, discussion of the activity of different state institutions by party organs is an important form of such control. These questions are regularly examined at all levels, beginning with the top party organs and ending with primary party organisations.

In this connection the organisational structure of a revolutionary-democratic party is a matter of considerable importance. As a rule, it corresponds to the administrative-territorial structure of the country. In this way the corresponding party organs (district, regional, provincial and others) are in a position to guide all state organs of the given territory and control their activity. Overall guidance and control of the entire state apparatus rest with the higher party organs (Central Committee, Politbureau).

Until recently the primary party organisations of the majority of revolutionary-democratic parties were also built along territorial lines. This meant that the primary party organisations, which according to party rules constitute the foundation of the party, were created only in rural and urban communities.

By applying the territorial principle the party was in a position to extend its influence to such sections of the population as peasants, artisans, petty traders and professionals. And this was its positive aspect. At the same time, the party had no cells in workers' collectives at industrial enterprises and offices in the first place and also at educational establishments, in the army and state security organs, and, consequently, was unable to control the corresponding organs of the state machinery.

In recent years revolutionary-democratic parties have started to shift from the purely territorial principle to the territorial-production principle in the establishment of primary party organisations.

Thus, according to the Rules of the Congolese Workers' Party (Article 24), primary party organisations shall be set up at enterprises, in the army and in offices. The party committees of these organisations "shall closely co-operate with the masses and the administrative apparatus". Other revolutionary-democratic parties (the Burma Socialist Programme Party, TANU) have also set up primary organisations at enterprises. By 1975 the United National Front Political Organisation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen completed the conversion to territorial-production principle.

The manner in which the party guides the work of the various units of the state machinery depends on their structure and functions. For instance, the party guides and controls the activity of the administration of state enterprises, state societies and institutions primarily through party mem-

bers united in primary party organisations or production and revolutionary committees. These organisations are called upon consistently to implement the party's line in the activity of corresponding state organs. They strengthen state discipline and take steps to eradicate such negative features as bureaucracy, abuse of power and parochialism. Besides, primary party organisations have their representatives in the collegial administration of state enterprises and societies.

Revolutionary-democratic parties are seriously concerned with improving economic management which becomes increasingly ramified with the development of state and cooperative sectors of the economy. Facts show that in this field there are serious shortcomings often stemming from the incompetence and negligence of the officials and crimes such as fraudulent appropriation of public property, corruption, use of one's official status for personal enrichment, etc.

In recent years the ruling parties have perceptibly strengthened their control over the apparatus guiding economic, social and cultural development. A step in this direction has been the establishment of financial, economic, trade and other commissions within the framework of higher party organs (such commissions have been formed, for example, in the Politbureau of the Democratic Party of Guinea and the Politbureau of the Congolese Workers' Party), the inclusion of representatives of party organisations in all the leading organs of the state apparatus, etc. In Syria, for example, organisations of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (they are called "base organisations") have been set up in all ministries.

It is a matter of the utmost importance for the party to strengthen its leading role in the armed forces. Developments in Ghana and Mali have proved that if the party conducts no ideological and political work in the army and has no organisations in it, it loses control over the armed forces. In their programmes and congress decisions revolutionary-democratic parties emphasise the need to intensify political work in the army, the people's militia and security organs (the Programme of the Congolese Workers' Party, the 1971 Directives of TANU, the Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the National Liberation Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). Undivided guidance of the army by the Congolese Workers' Party and the establishment of party organisations at all levels in the army have been characterised as crucial

principles of army development at a conference on this question, which took place in the People's Republic of the Congo in July 1974.

Party guidance of the armed forces has its specific features and requires a high degree of centralisation. The specific forms of party guidance of the armed forces depend on conditions in the given country. The activity of the Congolese Workers' Party can serve as an example. A permanent military commission directly concerned with all matters relating to the armed forces has been set up within its Central Committee. There are primary party organisations in all army units. At the same time, party and political work in the army is also conducted by political organs. A Political Administration has been created within the framework of the Supreme Command in line with the Ordinance of February 6, 1969 and Decree of November 9, 1969. It consists of a political commissar and his deputy, who are nominated by the party and confirmed by the government. The Political Administration is assigned the task of organising the political education in the Armed Forces and maintaining links between them and the party. The institute of political commissars has also been introduced into the army of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Primary party organisations have been set up in all the units of the Guinean Army. Their activity is guided by a political commissar for defence, who is a member of the party's Politbureau. In fulfilment of a decision passed at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, party organisations are being established in the Burmese Army, too.

Party guidance of the elective institutions—parliament and local councils—also has its specific features. In some countries party members, who are elected to these organs, form party groups through which corresponding party organisations (central committees, politbureaus, leading party organs of administrative-territorial units) supervise the activity of the representative bodies. This is legislatively secured in a number of constitutions. According to Article 5 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo, "representatives of the people in all organs of state power are responsible to party organs".

The Communal Charter of Algeria (1966) stipulates that local party organisations of the National Liberation Front

guide the communal organs by directing their activity towards the attainment of the objectives set by the party and by supervising this activity. Local party organisations are responsible for the discipline of the elected representatives, for keeping them informed and organising their political education. The Charter also envisages such a form of guidance as joint conferences of representatives of communal organs and party organisations. The decisions of party organs are binding on all members holding elective posts.

In some countries there are institutional means enabling the party organisations to supervise the activity of deputies of representative bodies. In Tanzania, for example, all members of the National Assembly, according to the TANU Rules, are delegates of the national party conference and also, consequently, of their local district and regional party conferences.

As they supervise the activity of their representatives in the elective organs, revolutionary-democratic parties take measures to strengthen the deputies' links with the electors and prevent the formation of a caste of professional parliamentarians, who are divorced from the people and take advantage of their high posts as a means for personal enrichment.

Guidance of the state apparatus by a revolutionary-democratic party does not in the least amount to a substitution of state organs by party organs nor to a mixing of the functions of party and state organs. The relations between the party and the state apparatus ought to rest on a precise delimitation of the functions of both party and state organs. The party is committed to political and not administrative guidance. This means that it orientates the activity of the state organs and controls and instructs them. But it implements its decisions through the state organs and not apart from them, within the framework of the Constitution.

In some socialist-oriented countries, however, there is an oversimplified understanding of the party's leading role. It is widely considered that the party is the political authority and the state and its apparatus is the administrative authority. Thus, the state machine is assigned to play only a technical function, that of implementing the political decisions of the party organs. The party's leading role is in fact identified with the execution of state power. This leads to a fusion of the party apparatus with that of the state; in other words,

party organs are vested with functions of government, management and the administration of justice all of which are alien to them.

In the Republic of Guinea, for example, the bureaux of party committees in villages and urban communities are also organs of local revolutionary power. Party organs are also vested with a range of judicial functions. In rural and urban communities there are people's tribunals of first instance, which consist of a chairman and four members of a bureau of a party committee. In the regions there are people's tribunals of second instance consisting of a secretary and members of the leading committee of a section of the Democratic Party of Guinea. All these tribunals examine cases of divorce, misdemeanours, etc. In 1971 local party bodies took part in judicial proceedings involving people accused of counter-revolutionary activity. In Tanzania the secretaries of regional and district party organisations, as we have already said, are also heads of the local administration—regional and district commissars—appointed by the President of the Republic.

Practice shows that such a fusion of the functions of party and state organs, the merger of the party and state apparatus can be detrimental. In the first place, this tends to bureaucratised the party apparatus and weaken the party's role as a political leader. This happened, for example, in Ghana, where in spite of the slogan "The Party Above All", the Convention People's Party ceased to be the political leader of the masses and became an appendage of the state apparatus, whose nucleus consisted of elements hostile to the revolutionary-democratic regime. Figuratively speaking, the state swallowed the party. In the second place, democracy, whose development is essential for a country advancing towards socialism, is restricted. Indeed, when, for example, party organs substitute for representative institutions, the working masses are in fact barred from exercising state power.

It should be noted that some aspects of the relations between the revolutionary-democratic parties and the state apparatus in the socialist-oriented countries stem from objective causes: in one group of countries—from the lack of politically reliable and qualified cadres, and in another—from the fact that the formation of the state and the ruling party itself is still in progress. This explains, for example, the existence of united organs of party and state leadership (revolutionary councils) in some countries. The Provisional Con-

stitution of Syria stipulated that prior to the formation of the higher representative organ—People's Council (it was set up in 1971)—its functions were to be performed by the regional leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party. This organ of the party had the powers to modify the Constitution, appoint and remove the President of the Republic and the Chairman and members of the Council of Ministers, declare war, proclaim universal mobilisation, etc.

But in the course of the creation of a new state apparatus and the formation or transformation of the ruling parties in the socialist-oriented countries, the relations between these components of the political system are modified and perfected. In Algeria, for instance, following the formation of representative organs in the communes, it was necessary to define the relations between them and the National Liberation Front. The 1966 Communal Charter has a special provision prohibiting the merger of party and communal bodies: "Communal bodies should be separated from local party organs." According to Article 101 of the 1976 Constitution the competences of the party and state organs must not overlap. Measures designed more precisely to delimit the functions of party and state bodies are being introduced in other socialist-oriented countries. Thus, as a result of the formation of the People's Council in Syria the party ceased to perform government functions, which are alien to it. With the establishment of the higher organs of party leadership of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (Central Committee, Executive Committee of the CC, Secretariat of the CC, Party Control Committee) the functions of these organs and those of the Revolutionary Council were strictly delimited. The new Constitution designates the functions of the state and party organs and also ensures the party's leading role in the state apparatus. The question of more precisely defining the relations between the party and state organs was discussed at the Second Congress of the Congolese Workers' Party in 1973 and at the Sixth Congress of the United National Front Political Organisation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1975. Decisions were adopted which emphasised the need to strengthen the party's control over the state organs, but without petty interference into their affairs. These provisions were confirmed in the documents of the Unifying Congress of the three political parties in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1975.

Experience shows that all these measures do not weaken, but, on the contrary, enhance the leading role of the revolutionary-democratic party.

All this proves that there will be correct relations between the ruling party and the state apparatus provided 1) that the functions of the party organs and those of the state apparatus are precisely delimited; 2) that party organs are prevented from substituting for state organs in adopting decisions falling within their sphere of competence; and 3) that the party exercises overall leadership of state organs without petty patronage, which fetters initiative and lowers the responsibility of the employees of the state apparatus. These premises, tested in practice in the socialist countries, are no less important for state development in the socialist-oriented countries.

3. The Structure and Organisation of the New State Machine

The break-up of the old state machine presupposes liquidation or radical reorganisation of its components and modification of relations between individual state organs. In other words, the new social nature of the state machine should have a corresponding structure and organisation.

In some countries the state machine, which was left behind by colonialists and then slightly modified by the bourgeoisie that came to power, rested on bureaucratic officialdom, traditional institutions and punitive organs (army, police and the courts). Elective institutions—parliament and local self-government (where they had been set up)—played an insignificant role in running the state.

Increasing debilitation of the elective organs and strengthening of executive power and punitive organs—such is the general trend of the bourgeois state in both the advanced and developing countries. In any bourgeois state, Lenin wrote, "the real business of 'state' is performed behind the scenes and is carried on by the departments, chancelleries and General Staffs"¹. It is in the activity of these organs that the class substances of a bourgeois state as a machinery of coer-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 423.

cion and suppression of the working masses is most strikingly manifested.

The situation is different in socialist countries where the central and local representative organs of state power are the foundation of the state machine. This means that state power is wholly in the hands of these organs. They form all the other state bodies, invest them with power and control their activity. The concentration of full power in the hands of the elective institutions expresses their genuinely representative nature. It is also the embodiment of the supreme principle of the socialist state—genuine people's power.

Characterising, for example, the substance of Soviet government, Lenin emphasised that it is the permanent and only foundation of state power, the entire machinery of state, the mass-scale organisation of the classes who even in the most democratic bourgeois republics have in fact been debarred from participation in political life.¹

The programmes of revolutionary-democratic parties speak of the transformation of representative institutions into organs of genuine people's rule and of their heightened involvement in government. These principles are embodied in the constitutions of some of the socialist-oriented countries. Article 3 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo, for instance, proclaims that the "people's masses exercise power through representative organs of state power—the People's Councils". And Article 9 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen reads: "All organs of power shall work for the welfare of the working people, who exercise . . . their political power through the freely and democratically elected People's Councils".

It should be noted, however, that the construction of a new state machinery is still far from complete in the majority of the socialist-oriented countries, and the system of elective organs of state power is also in the process of establishment. In some states the old elective organs—parliaments and local self-governments—were dissolved and new ones are yet to be formed (Iraq). In others, representative organs have been established only at local (Angola) or national (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) levels. There are considerable distinctions in the way representative organs are

formed in various countries and in their powers and structure. Yet some common trends characterising the development of the system of representative institutions as organs of state power of a new type are becoming more and more clearly discerned.

We have already mentioned that one of the most important forms of the working people's participation in government is their involvement in the formation of representative bodies—parliament and municipal, village and other councils. In order, however, that this participation would not be a mere formality, as is the case in the bourgeois countries, but truly effective the election system should be of a genuinely democratic nature.

The democratic nature of elections is guaranteed in the first place by the introduction of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. These four principles are legally secured in the constitutions and election laws of the majority of socialist-oriented countries. At the same time, there are deviations from these principles in the laws of a number of countries.

In the first place this concerns the principle of universal suffrage. In the socialist countries universal suffrage is understood as the right of all adults (barring those certified as mentally ill) to take part in elections irrespective of social and property status, race, nationality, religion, sex, literacy, occupation, etc. In bourgeois-democratic societies constitutions also proclaim universal suffrage. Actually, however, it is restricted by a number of qualifications, i.e., requirements which a citizen must meet in order to have the right to vote (active suffrage) and also the right to be elected (passive suffrage). Election qualifications in bourgeois countries, for instance, include literacy (ability to write and read in the official language) and domicile (residence in an election district for a specified period of time) and others. At the same time, the right to be elected involves much more stringent qualifications (the age level for candidates is higher and they are not allowed to hold certain posts, etc.). There are countries where members of the armed forces are deprived of the right to be elected. All these restrictions are in fact designed to secure the formation of elective organs, which would uphold the interests of the bourgeoisie.

In the socialist-oriented countries universal suffrage is also subject to certain restrictions, some of which curtail

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "First Congress of the Communist International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 465.

the political rights of exploiters and elements hostile to the revolution, chiefly in the sphere of passive suffrage. Under the Constitution (Article 27) and the 1970 Election Law (Articles 46 and 47) of Tanzania a person is not eligible for election to the National Assembly and local councils if he or his spouse owns shares in any company, holds the office of company director, owns houses or other buildings rented to other persons and employs hired labour. There are similar restrictions in Guinea and Algeria.

Under the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen persons may be disfranchised "for perpetrating actions hostile to the working people" (Article 10), and the Burmese Constitution disfranchises ministers of religion.

In keeping with constitutions and election laws voters may be excluded from the franchise on the basis of a court sentence. In Guinea, for example, under the 1963 election law persons sentenced on embezzlement charges or for encroachment on the state's internal and external security (Article 5) may not be registered as voters and are thus deprived of the active voting rights. Article 41 of the Communal Charter of Algeria disfranchises persons, who "acted against the country's interests" in the period of the national liberation struggle.

On the other hand, the restrictions, which have remained in force in some countries, prove that the influence of the bourgeois concepts of democracy is still to be overcome. These restrictions deprive a person of the right to be elected on the grounds of "incompatibility" of offices. For instance, state officials (judges, procurators, members of the police and security organs, officers of the armed forces and others) cannot be elected to people's communes in Algeria. There are similar restrictions in the Guinean election law and Syrian legislation.

In a bourgeois-democratic society the concept of "incompatibility" of the mandate of a member of parliament or a self-government body with the holding of one or another specified government post rests on the so-called separation of powers. This is designed to create the impression that members of the elective bodies are independent of the executive organs.

A socialist state adheres to the principle of unity of state power. This principle is also proclaimed in the constitutions

of some socialist-oriented countries (Article 62 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for example). Unity of state power precludes the institute of "incompatibility" and its rejection not only strengthens the principle of unity of state power, but also broadens the right to vote. Provisions to this effect have been included in the latest constitutions and election laws in a number of socialist-oriented countries (Tanzania, the People's Republic of the Congo, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). According to Article 10 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, "any employee of the state apparatus has the right to vote or to put forward his candidature for election without resigning his post". A similar amendment has been inserted into the Interim Constitution of Tanzania.

The common trend in the development of the franchise in the socialist-oriented countries is the lowering of the qualifying age of the voters and candidates. Thus, initially the 1965 Constitution of Tanzania granted the franchise to citizens, who have reached the age of 21, but in 1970 an act was passed lowering this age to 18. In the People's Republic of the Congo and Syria the right to vote is granted to all citizens, who have attained the age of 18. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the right to vote is granted to all citizens, who have reached the age of 18, and citizens, who have reached the age of 21 are eligible for election to the local people's councils and those who have turned 24 are eligible for election to the Supreme People's Council. In Guinea-Bissau persons, who have reached the age of 15, voted in the elections to local regional committees, which took place in 1971 during the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialists.

According to the constitutions and election laws in a number of socialist-oriented countries (Tanzania, Guinea), only the members of the ruling political party are eligible for election to the representative organs. If a ruling party unites the majority or the bulk of the adult population (the Democratic Party of Guinea and the Revolutionary Party in Tanzania, for example) this circumstance curtails the franchise only to a certain degree. But with the formation of a vanguard political party the preservation of "party" qualification would have considerably restricted the right to be elected.

Equal suffrage is secured by the fact that a citizen has only one vote and participates in the elections on an equal footing with the other voters.

Under certain circumstances, however, in some socialist-oriented countries not all classes and social strata have equal electoral rights. Articles 8 and 9 of the 1976 Algerian Constitution, for instance, stipulate that working people and peasants shall make up the majority in the People's Assemblies and that membership in them is incompatible with the possession of wealth and with private business activity. In practice this means that big capitalists, traders and landowners are not nominated for election and that workers, small peasants and representatives of other toiling sections are predominant in the People's Assemblies. Under the 1971 law on local self-government in Syria, workers, peasants, artisans and other categories of people in the low income bracket hold 60 per cent of the seats in the people's councils. These acts ensure the majority representation of the working people in the elective organs. The actual participation of the working people in the parliaments of some countries is guaranteed by constitutional provisions (Article 53 of the Syrian Constitution) according to which workers and peasants should make up not less than 50 per cent of their deputies.

Direct vote means that deputies to the representative organs of state power are elected by the voters themselves. In some socialist-oriented countries this principle is not fully implemented. In Tanzania, for example, some members of the National Assembly are elected by the elective members of the Assembly and not by the voters. In this case candidates are nominated by what are called national institutes (National Union of Tanganyika Workers, United Women's Organisation of Tanzania and others), which are designated by the President and by regional development committees.

The formation of truly representative organs of state power largely depends on the democratic organisation and conduct of the elections. This means, among other things, that the electors participate in nominating candidates at other stages of the elections, too.

In a number of socialist-oriented countries election laws establish the principle according to which the right to nominate and approve candidates in parliamentary and local elections is, a rule, granted to party organisations.

It should be noted in this connection that legislation in some countries with a one-party system envisages the nomination of two candidates to contest one seat, and sometimes this provision is obligatory. For instance, Article 37 of the Communal Charter of Algeria stipulates that there should be twice as many candidates for election to people's assemblies and communes as there are available seats. The Constitution and the Election Law of Tanzania rule that there can be either one or two candidates for one seat.

Candidates are nominated by local party organisations. In Tanzania, for example, this is done by district (parliamentary elections) or branch party conferences in villages and city communities (local elections) specially convened for this purpose. The participants in these very representative conferences discuss the candidates and approve their nomination by secret ballot. Their decisions are communicated to corresponding higher leading organs of the party (National Executive Committee and the Central Committee), which approve the final list of the candidates. Usually the party's leading organs, as can be judged by the 1970 and 1975 elections, agree with the decisions of the local party organisations.

Representatives of the party, mass and social organisations also take part in the work of the election commissions. But the decisive role in organising and conducting elections is played by party organisations and this is legislatively secured. Under the Tanzanian election law (Article 66), the executive committees of district and branch party bodies organise the election campaign and present the candidates to the electors (they draw up the agenda of the meetings, fix the list of speakers, etc.).

If the revolutionary-democratic parties have a mass character, i.e., if they embrace almost all the voters, then the above procedure of organising elections is indeed democratic, and the electors do actually take part (through party organisations) in all the stages of the election campaign. It is clear, however, that with the transformation of a ruling party into a vanguard one, this procedure has to be modified with the view to boosting the initiative of the mass social organisations, collectives of industrial and office workers, etc. This has taken place in the People's Republic of the Congo and Burma where the vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties are being formed. Thus, candidates for election to the People's National Assembly and People's Councils of the People's

Republic of the Congo, which took place in June 1973, were nominated by meetings of voters in villages and city communities with the participation of representatives of the Congolese Workers' Party and mass social organisations. Of the 6,000 nominated candidates, the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party approved 1,625, including both party and non-party members.

The election procedure in the socialist-oriented countries with a multiparty system also has its specific features. Their political parties which are united in the National Front advance joint lists of candidates. For instance, during the election of provincial people's councils in March 1972 and of the People's Council of Syria in May 1973, the lists of candidates were drawn up by the National Progressive Front embracing the leading Baath Party, the Communist Party of Syria, the Arab Socialist Union and other parties.

It is important to note that some socialist-oriented countries have preserved certain elements of the bourgeois electoral system. In Tanzania, for instance, there is a rule in keeping with which if only one candidate is nominated in a constituency he is automatically considered elected without the electors going to the polls (this rule has been borrowed from the English electoral system). Its application restricts the principle of the electivity of representative institutions. This principle was invoked in Ghana prior to the 1966 coup: in the 1965 parliamentary elections all the 198 candidates, who were nominated in 198 constituencies by the ruling Convention People's Party were proclaimed elected without voting. In other words, the people did not play the part they should have played in the formation of parliament.

In a socialist state the working people not only take part in electing representative organs of state power, but also systematically control their activity. This is ensured by: 1) the right of the electors to give mandates to their deputies; 2) the duty of the deputies regularly to report on their activity to the electorate; 3) the right of the electors to recall deputies, who had not justified their trust in them.

In bourgeois countries MPs and members of local self-government are, as a rule, independent of their constituents throughout their term of office. This independence is constitutionally guaranteed. A deputy is regarded as a representative of the whole nation and not of the constituency, which

elected him. Accordingly, bourgeois constitutions prohibit the imperative mandate (i.e., a deputy's obligation to fulfil the electors' mandate) and do not provide for the right to recall.

In constitutions recently adopted by a number of socialist-oriented countries there is an emergent trend to reject these principles of bourgeois parliamentarism. According to Article 86 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, a deputy of the Supreme People's Council "is obliged to communicate with his electors, accept their proposals and remarks and furnish honest replies to them". The Constitution also legally secures the right of the electorate to recall their deputy (Article 87). The electors have the right to file a motion of non-confidence in a deputy of the Supreme People's Council. The demand to have a deputy recalled is submitted by one-quarter of the electorate of a given constituency and a corresponding decision is passed by the Supreme People's Council by a majority vote. It is written down in the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo (Article 52) that a deputy of the People's National Assembly has an imperative mandate and can be recalled on the demand of the electorate. The new Burmese Constitution (Article 187) also provides for the recall of the deputies, who had forfeited the trust of their constituents.

Substantial changes are taking place not only in the status of deputies of representative bodies of state power, but also in the role they play. In bourgeois countries parliamentary deputies are turning into a caste of professional parliamentarians. Their parliamentary activity is their only occupation and they are very lavishly remunerated for it. The picture is the same in many capitalist-oriented states. Suffice it to mention that the salary of the members of the Kenyan National Assembly was raised three times within a period of seven years (1963-1970). At first they received £ 650, then the salary was raised up to £ 1,200, whereas now with various grants and benefits it totals £ 2,670.

In a socialist country a deputy continues to hold his old place of work upon being elected and receives no salary as member of parliament (only his expenses connected with his activity as a deputy are taken care of). This principle is now embodied in the constitutions of Guinea, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of the Con-

go and some other socialist-oriented countries. In these countries the deputies adopt laws and then implement these laws as they continue to work in various sectors of state, economic and cultural development. In this way the people's elective representatives perform their legislative functions and at the same time take part in implementing the laws. In this way representative organs turn into functioning corporations.

As regards the procedure of the formation of representative organs in the socialist-oriented countries, it should be noted that the principle of electivity is not fully implemented in some of them. In Tanzania, for example, 123 of the 200 members of the National Assembly are elected by direct or indirect ballot and 77 are appointed by the President. In Guinea parliamentary deputies are to be members of regional assemblies.

There are also countries where national and local representative organs are temporarily formed of representatives delegated by various political organisations until the election to these bodies is held. This was the case with the People's Council of Syria, which had functioned up to 1973 (in 1971 the President approved 173 members delegated by political organisations), the Provisional Supreme People's Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (whose members were appointed by the leadership of the National Liberation Front and also delegated by other political parties which had existed at the time, by trade unions and women's organisations), local organs in Burma—security and administrative committees—which had functioned prior to the election of people's councils in 1974.

In the socialist countries elective institutions are sovereign as well as representative organs. The principle of sovereign authority consists in that they directly exercise state power on a national and local scale, establish, appoint or approve all other organs of the state, endow them with competences and control their activity. In this sense the representative organs, as we have mentioned earlier, are the foundation of the new state machinery.

In the socialist-oriented countries, where the formation of the system of representative institutions is still in progress, the principle of their sovereign authority has not been sufficiently developed as yet. Nevertheless judging by the provisions of the latest constitutions adopted in some of them

the representative organs are gradually coming to play a greater role in running the state. This is manifested in the broadening of the competences of both highest and local representative organs, in the new principles of their organisation and activity.

In some socialist-oriented countries parliament (National Assembly, People's Assembly, Supreme People's Council, etc.) is the highest organ of state power and there are corresponding provisions in the constitutions of a number of these countries. "The Supreme People's Council," reads Article 63 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, "shall be the highest organ of state power." This supremacy is reflected in the relatively wide competence of the parliament.

First and foremost some constitutions proclaim parliament as the sole legislative organ. "The National Assembly alone shall pass laws. The domain of the law is unlimited," states Article 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of Guinea. The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, on the contrary, lists the issues on which the Supreme People's Council can pass laws (Article 73). An analysis of this list, however, shows that in practice the Supreme People's Council adopts legislation on all key issues of political, economic, social and cultural development (for example, on nationalisation, the organisation of the state sector, relations of production, social maintenance, national defence, etc.). Some constitutions decree that the highest representative body alone is empowered to pass laws on economic development plans (Article 65 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).

It should be noted, however, that in a number of countries the legislative power of the highest representative organs is restricted. First, their constitutions envisage the possibility of delegated legislation (Syria, Guinea-Bissau). Thus, the Syrian People's Council can, if necessary and under extraordinary circumstances, permit the President to issue decrees which carry the power of law. Second, the President has the right to exercise suspensive veto regarding legislation adopted by the People's Council. A similar right is vested in the President of Tanzania (Article 50 of the Constitution). In Guinea-Bissau the National People's Assembly has the right to grant legislative powers to the government—the Council of State Commissioners.

Highest representative organs play an important role in forming and modifying the composition of other state organs. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the Supreme People's Council elects the collegial head of state, the Presidential Council. Under the constitutions of Burma and Guinea-Bissau the collegial head of state—the State Council—is also elected by the supreme representative organ of state power. In Syria the People's Council nominates the presidential candidate and then puts them to popular vote (referendum). In other countries the head of state is elected directly by the population (Guinea, Tanzania) or by the highest party organ—the Congress (the People's Republic of the Congo).

There are also different ways of forming the government. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the Supreme People's Council elects the Chairman and members of the Cabinet (the majority of the government members have to be deputies of the Supreme People's Council). The election of the government by the highest representative organ of state power is also prescribed by the Burmese Constitution. A list of candidates for the Council of Ministers is drawn up by the Council of State and submitted to the People's Assembly which elects them by secret ballot. After the Council of Ministers is elected it elects the Prime Minister from among its members. In other countries (Algeria, Guinea, Tanzania), government members are appointed by the head of state and not elected by parliament.

Highest representative organs control the activity of other state organs. The form and range of this control depend on the structure of the system of state organs and the distribution of competences between them in the given country. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for example, the collegial head of state—the Presidential Council—is subject to control by the Supreme People's Assembly and is responsible to it. The latter has the right to form a new Presidential Council or dismiss individual members. If the Chairman of the Presidential Council is relieved of his post, the whole council has to resign (Article 67 of the Constitution). In Burma and Guinea-Bissau the collegial head of state—the State Council—is also wholly under the control of and responsible before the representative organ. The President of Burma, who by virtue of his election to this post also becomes Chairman of the Council of State, mainly fulfils representative functions. In other countries the head of state—the President—

is not responsible for his activity to parliament. He may be impeached only for treason or criminal offence (Article 91 of the Syrian Constitution).

Control over the activity of the government is also exercised in different ways. While in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Syria, for example, the government shoulders the collective responsibility and its members individual responsibility before the highest representative organ of state power (as provided for in the constitutions of Burma and Guinea-Bissau), in the majority of other socialist-oriented countries the government is answerable to the head of state.

An important means enabling the highest organ of state power to guide and control the activity of the government is the right of the deputies verbally and in written form to query the government as a whole and also individual ministers. It performs its supervisory functions also during the drafting of the legislation, in the course of debates on reports by the government and head of state, during the discussion of the draft of the state budget and the report on its implementation.

In other countries constitutions establish the responsibility of their state organs before parliament. According to the Burmese Constitution, the highest organs of the court of law, the procurator's office and working people's inspection are subject to control by the People's Assembly. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the activity of the Procurator-General is supervised by the Presidential Council, which is an organ of the Supreme People's Council (Article 129 of the Constitution).

It should be noted that the latest constitutions in a number of socialist-oriented countries not only broaden and specify the list of exclusive rights of the highest representative organ of state power, but also contain general provisions accentuating the supremacy of this organ of the state machine. For example, Articles 63 and 64 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen stipulate that the Supreme People's Council has the right to approve the basic principles of state policy and discuss key issues of the state's domestic and foreign policy. There is a similar provision in the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau (Article 29).

An examination of the activity of highest representative organs of state power in the socialist-oriented countries shows that they do indeed pass decisions on crucial issues of

domestic and foreign policy. Among other things this is borne out by the heightened legislative activity and more frequent discussions of foreign-policy issues.

But there are socialist-oriented countries whose highest representative organs have not yet become institutions endowed with sovereign authority. In some of them excessive power is concentrated in the hands of the head of state and government (frequently these two offices are combined). The President has the right to delegate legislation and he forms many organs of state, which are responsible to him alone. In other countries the President is vested with the right to dissolve parliament, and this substantially restricts the supremacy of the representative organ of state power (Tanzania). It is important to note, however, that the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen does not grant this right to the Presidential Council. Under the new constitutions this right is denied to the heads of state of Burma, the Congo and Guinea-Bissau.

Sometimes such concentration of power in the hands of the head of state is attributed to the complexity of the problems facing the nation, which require a centralised leadership, adoption of urgent measures and other factors.

However, the building of a new society imperatively calls for increased creative activity of the working masses and their extensive participation in running the state and all other government activity. The highest representative organs of state power embody the sovereignty of the people. Therefore, the enhancement of their role in the exercise of state power and the creation of democratic foundations for their activity is a key regularity of the development of a socialist-oriented state.

The latest constitutional legislation in these states is developing precisely in this direction judging by the more consistent implementation of the principle of collegiality in solving key problems of state policy. Some of them have established the institute of collegial head of state (constitutions of Burma, Guinea-Bissau and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).

The powers, which are vested in the collegial head of state, prove that it is competent to deal with a broad range of questions. These powers may be classified as follows:

1. Powers connected with the organisation and activity of the highest representative organs of state power: the con-

duct of elections to these organs and convocation of their sessions.

2. Powers in the field of legislation: legislative initiative, publication of laws adopted by representative organs, promulgation of normative acts, including those having the strength of law (with their subsequent approval by a representative organ).

3. Powers in the field of the organisation and activity of state organs, which are accountable to it and are under its control (for example, nomination of candidates for the post of chairman and members of the government, and in the period between sessions of the representative organ—appointment and removal of ministers).

4. Powers in the field of foreign relations: appointment and recall of diplomatic representatives, ratification and denunciation of international agreements.

The effective functioning of the highest representative organs largely depends on their structure and the organisation and activity of their inner organs.

The highest organs of state power in the socialist-oriented countries are unicameral.

In some of the unitary bourgeois states parliament has a higher chamber (Senate, House of Lords, etc.), usually non-democratically formed. More reactionary as regards its composition than the lower chamber it in fact restricts the rights of the latter.

The establishment of a second chamber is expedient only in a federal state where it represents the interests of the subjects of the federation. In the socialist federative states (the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) the second chamber is built along national lines and upholds the specific interests of the nations and nationalities making up the multinational state. The two chambers are elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, and enjoy equal rights. At present the United Republic of Tanzania is the only federal state among the socialist-oriented states. But it, too, has a unicameral parliament and the Constitution merely legalises the representation of one of the subjects of the federation—Zanzibar.

To a considerable extent the representative bodies exercise the functions within their spheres of competence through their inner organs—the guiding organ and standing or provisional commissions or committees.

Usually the guiding organ which parliament elects is its president. But in some countries a collegial guiding body is formed. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for instance, the Supreme People's Council elects for the period of its duration a standing committee made up of the president, three members and a secretary to guide the activity of parliament. In Syria a similar organ is the Presidium of the People's Council and in the People's Republic of the Congo—the Bureau of the People's National Assembly. The establishment of a collegial body of a representative organ attests to the further democratisation of its inner structure.

The standing or *ad hoc* commissions (committees) of the highest representative institutions are their auxiliary bodies. This means that their job is to preview and formulate questions which are brought before these institutions, present their conclusions and proposals and supervise the fulfilment of the parliament's decisions. But they are not independent bodies possessing legislative or administrative powers.

It is characteristic of the highest representative organs of state power in the socialist-oriented countries that they are increasing the number of their standing commissions (committees) concerned with the main issues of state, economic, social and cultural development and also with specific aspects of parliamentary activity. The Guinean National Assembly, for instance, set up six commissions: economic, financial, state apparatus, transport and communications, social matters, administrative and juridical. A special place is occupied by a Standing Committee consisting of members of the Bureau of the National Assembly and the chairmen of other commissions. In the period between the sessions of the National Assembly it has the right to pass decisions on questions falling within the competence of the Assembly. The National Assembly of Tanzania forms six standing committees (financial and economic, political, on state budgetary accountability, social matters and others). The People's National Assembly of Burma has 14 committees to which it elected 65 deputies at its first sitting after the 1974 elections.

Parliament resolves all questions falling within its competence at its plenary sittings, which are held during the sessions. Therefore, it is most important that sessions are held regularly. If a representative organ does not

hold regular sessions, it cannot exercise its functions to the full.

As a rule, the constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries prescribe two statutory sessions a year. Apart from that parliament may be convened for an extraordinary session (at the request of the head of state or a group of deputies) to examine urgent issues.

These are just a few of the questions connected with the organisation and activity of the highest organs of state power. But there are also other important issues, including the passage of draft legislation, rights and duties of deputies and others. Naturally, there cannot and should not be a common procedure for legally resolving all these matters. Only the basic democratic principles of organisation and activity of the highest organs of state power guaranteeing their representative nature and sovereignty are common.

An important role in a state, which is building a new society, is played by local representative organs. Since they stand closer to the population than other organs, the confidence of the masses in the revolutionary-democratic rule and the consolidation of its political foundation depend a great deal on their activity.

In the new state machine local organs are a part of a single system of representative institutions. This means that they, as do the highest representative organs, exercise the indivisible state power and are built on the basis of common democratic principles.

In bourgeois states there are usually two forms of local administration: local administration and local self-government. Local administration is a system of state officials appointed by the central authority (governors, prefects, subprefects, etc.) who are organs of the general administration representing the government, ministries and departments. The definitive principle of the system of local government is bureaucratic centralism. Local self-government is administration of local affairs by elective organs. In a bourgeois state machine they play a subordinate role, insofar as the basic functions of state power do not fall within their competence and they are subordinate to the government and its local agents.

Approximately the same principles underlay local government in the colonial period, too, the only difference being that, as a rule, there were no elective self-government

organs. All power in the localities was in the hands of provincial and district commissioners and other officials appointed by the governor of the colony. In some countries (in Tropical Africa, for instance) the role of representative organs was played by "native authorities" consisting of representatives of the feudal and tribal elite.

The adoption of the non-capitalist path of development presupposes the liquidation of these bureaucratic and anti-democratic forms of local government and their replacement by a system of genuinely representative organs of state power. Such a system is being gradually created in a number of socialist-oriented countries. What are the characteristic features of the process of the formation of this important part of the new state machinery?

First, local organs of the so-called native administration have been abolished (in countries where they had existed prior to independence—Guinea, Tanzania, the People's Republic of the Congo).

Second, the constitutions and laws on local organs provide for the creation of elective institutions, which are regarded as organs of state power. Thus, Article 61 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of the Congo reads: "People's Councils are organs of state power in the towns, communes, districts and regions and administrative units." There are similar provisions in the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Article 113) and the Constitution of Burma (Article 132). There are elective organs of state power in Algeria, Angola, Burma, Guinea-Bissau, the People's Republic of the Congo, the Syrian Arab Republic, Madagascar, and partially in Guinea. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Iraq local organs are made up of representatives delegated by political parties and social organisations. But under the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Article 114) state power will be subsequently transferred to elective people's councils. It says that this will take place "in conformity with the development of political and socio-economic relations". In 1974 the draft law on local councils was published for nation-wide discussion in the country.

Third, the range of competences of the local elective organs of state power is being considerably broadened. In contrast to the organs of bourgeois local self-government, local representative organs in the socialist-oriented

countries are coming to play an increasing role in guiding economic and socio-cultural development in their respective territories, dealing with national as well as local matters.

Indicative in this respect are the provisions of the Communal Charter of Algeria on the range of competences of communal people's assemblies. These assemblies participate in the elaboration of the national development plan and adopt their local plans within its framework. They co-ordinate and supervise the activity of the enterprises of the socialist sector in the territory under their jurisdiction, take part in setting up producer and sales co-operatives and in effectuating the agrarian reform and deal with questions concerning the development of the industry, handicrafts, trade and transport, etc.

Local organs of government in the People's Republic of the Congo possess extensive powers. In line with the 1973 ordinance people's councils guide all economic, social and cultural development in their respective territories, ensure public law and order and security and supervise the activity of the administrative apparatus (including the local organs of the central ministries and departments) and judicial organs.

Fourth, the organisation and the activity of new organs of state power rest on democratic principles. Constitutional legislation regards the people's councils as one of the most important forms of the working people's participation in the administration of the state. "People's councils," states Article 10 of the Syrian Constitution, "shall be democratically elected organs through which citizens exercise their rights to administer the state and direct the society." In performing their functions the people's councils must wholly rely on the masses, maintain close contact with them and be accountable to and controlled by them. This point is made, for example, in the Burmese Constitution (Articles 132, 142).

It should be emphasised, however, that although new forms have appeared in the organisation and activity of the local organs of state power and administration they have thus far retained some features typical of the bourgeois system of local administration. Alongside the elective institutions there are governors, prefects, commissars, commandants and other state-appointed officials, who exercise considerable control over the representative organs in all the administrative units. In Algeria, for example, the wali (head of a wilaya) has

the right to endorse certain decisions of the local people's assembly; likewise he has the right to cancel them within the limits fixed by the law. Furthermore, he can deprive a deputy of the people's assembly of his mandate for being absent from three sessions without a valid excuse.

The minister for internal affairs, the government and the head of state also have considerable rights with regard to the local elective organs. In Algeria the President of the Republic, for example, has the right to dissolve the people's assembly, and the wali can appoint a provisional assembly.

Thus, with the exception of Burma and the People's Republic of the Congo, representative institutions on both local and national levels have not yet become the sole foundation of state power as a whole. Nevertheless, the fact that these organs are being reorganised attests to their growing role in government and to increasing range of forms of the masses' participation in running the state.

The role and the structure of organs of state administration in the new machinery of state are not the same as in the old one. These organs are called upon to perform executive and administrative functions of the state, i.e., to organise the implementation of the laws and other legislation in the economic, political and cultural fields.

Democratisation of the state apparatus presupposes the establishment of new principles in the relations between these organs, on the one hand, and representative institutions, on the other. In its activity an executive and administrative organ, whether the government or an executive body of a local council, is under the control of and accountable to representative organs of state power. This principle, although with considerable deviations, is embodied in the latest constitutions of the socialist-oriented countries. Above we mentioned some of these deviations in individual countries (no provisions for the government's responsibility to parliament, concentration of power in the hands of the head of state and government, etc.). Legislative and executive functions in all countries, which so far have no highest representative organs of state power, are performed by only one organ—the Revolutionary Council (Iraq). The head of state and government is also the president of the Revolutionary Council. He forms the government most of whose ministers are members of this Council.

The development of economic, social and ideological activity of a socialist-oriented state leads to major changes in the structure of the government and subordinate administrative organs. In the new state apparatus a steadily increasing role is played by organs concerned with guiding economic and socio-cultural development. Thus, the growing scale of economic planning and the extension of the state and cooperative sectors imperatively demand the establishment of an efficient apparatus for managing the economy (planning bodies, sectoral economic ministries and departments, organs for the administration of state enterprises, and so forth). Without such an apparatus it is impossible for the state to function effectively in the sphere of socio-cultural development and the ideological education of the masses.

Specialised state agencies concerned with ideological work (ministries or secretariats of information and propaganda and social orientation and organs guiding the mass media) have been formed in many countries. Organs for ideological work among young people and women, and organising mass campaigns to propagandise socialist ideas are also being set up.

State development in the socialist-oriented countries shows that the deeper the socio-economic changes, the more ramified and specialised becomes the apparatus for the administration of economic, social and cultural affairs. It is, perhaps, the most mobile component of the new state machine, and one which requires the continuous improvement of the organisational forms of administration and their adjustment to the solution of new tasks.

An important role in the state machine of the socialist-oriented countries is played by organs, which ensure their defensive capacity and state security, i.e., the army, state security organs and the police (people's militia).

"No revolution is worth anything unless it can defend itself," Lenin used to say.¹ And today socialist-oriented countries have to tackle the crucial task of forming new armed forces and state security organs capable of safeguarding the revolutionary-democratic system against internal counter-revolution and imperialist aggression. This is achieved not only by altering the social composition of the personnel

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Report at a Joint Session of the All-Russia CEC...", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 124.

of these organs, but also by radically modifying the principles of their formation, organisation and activity. Thus, the creation of a genuinely people's army presupposes in the first place the rejection of use of mercenaries (which was characteristic of the colonial armies in a number of countries) and the introduction of universal conscription.

In some countries it is important to erase the discrepancy between the composition of the army and the ethnic composition of the population, a leftover from the policy of the colonialists who recruited into the army representatives of the national minorities or inhabitants of the most remote and backward areas. In some African countries the officers were, as a rule, representatives of the more advanced ethnic groups, while the rank and file consisted of the more backward ones. The purpose of this policy was to foment national and tribal discord, and its dire consequences made themselves felt on more than one occasion even after the young states had won political independence, as for example, in the People's Republic of the Congo.

The army, just as any other component of the state machine, cannot stay away from politics. In bourgeois countries the army's formal uninvolvedness in politics is legalised by a series of laws limiting the political rights of the military (prohibition to join political parties, disfranchisement, etc.). In actual fact all these measures are designed to isolate the army, its rank and file in the first place, from society's progressive forces and turn it into an obedient tool of the ruling classes. A bourgeois army was never "uninvolved in politics" and always helped to implement policy pursued by the ruling class. "Not to drag them (the armed forces-Ed.) into politics," Lenin wrote, "is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and of tsarism, who in fact have always dragged the forces into reactionary politics."¹

A people's army is called upon faithfully to uphold the progressive policy of a revolutionary-democratic state, and this calls for a high level of political awareness and the active participation in economic and social affairs by its per-

sonnel, the establishment of strong links between the army and the masses and the consolidation of the leading role of the ruling party in it.

These principles have found their reflection in the latest legislation on the armed forces adopted in the socialist-oriented countries. For instance, the Law on the National People's Army of the Congo adopted in 1969 stipulates that the army is not only dutybound to protect the country and its popular institutions, but also to take part in resolving the political and economic tasks of the revolution. The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Article 125) states that "the armed forces and security forces take part in the development of the country", and that the state ensures the political development of the armed forces and the security forces (Articles 126, 129).

Members of the armed forces have been restored in their political rights, although not in all countries (in Syria, for instance, under a law passed in 1971 servicemen are deprived of the right to run for election to local councils), and a system of political education of the military is being established. In Burma, for example, various courses (for cadre instructors, cadre workers, etc.) have been set up to promote the ideological education of the servicemen. In some countries the political education of future servicemen is handled by youth organisations (national or civil services).

All these measures heighten the political awareness of the officers and the rank and file and strengthen their ties with the masses.

A special place in the new machinery of state is occupied by judicial organs concerned with protecting the political and economic foundations of the revolutionary-democratic power and with safeguarding the citizens' rights in the political, labour, property and other fields. These tasks are laid down in the constitutions of a number of socialist-oriented countries. A case in point is Article 117 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: "Justice shall serve the interests of protecting and developing the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, its social and state structure. Justice shall ensure the implementation of democratic legality and also safeguard the freedom and the peaceful life of the citizens, their rights, interests and human dignity."

The effective accomplishment of these tasks necessitates the establishment of a judicial system resting on genuinely

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Armed Forces and the Revolution" *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 56.

democratic principles. The need for "a democratic reorganisation of justice and the elaboration of the rules of democratic legal procedure" is mentioned, for example, in Article 119 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The courts have their own forms of functioning. They administer justice by hearing civil and criminal cases on the basis of the law. It is natural, therefore, that the principles of the organisation and activity of the courts have their specific features. But these principles merely concretise the general democratic foundations of the new machinery of state.

These democratic principles include: administration of justice only by the courts; administration of justice on the basis of equality of all citizens before the law and the court, irrespective of their social, property and employment status, nationality and race; participation of the working masses in the work of the courts; collegiality of all court hearings; independence of the judges and their being subject only to the law; the conduct of judicial proceedings in the national language, or the provision of an interpreter for persons, who do not know that language in order to enable them to acquaint themselves with the materials of the case, and likewise the right to use their native language in court; the hearing of cases in public and the provision of the right of defence to the accused.

The implementation of these principles does much to strengthen revolutionary-democratic legality. Many of these principles are embodied in constitutions and laws on the legal system in the socialist-oriented countries and attest to its democratisation.

But the reorganisation of this system is still to be completed. Not all the above principles have been embodied in the organisation and activity of the courts. There are deviations from these principles, which are sometimes attributed to the specific conditions of the class struggle in different countries. For instance, the principle that justice should be administered only by courts of law is not always consistently observed. In Guinea, as we have mentioned earlier, certain court functions are performed by the leading party organs of the local party organisations. In 1971, in keeping with the law, the National Assembly was transformed into the Supreme People's Tribunal to investigate the counter-revolutionary

activity of the fifth column and the mercenaries, who attacked the Republic in November 1970.

The principle of equality of all citizens before the law and the court is guaranteed by uniform rules governing the examination of any criminal case within the framework of a single legal procedure and with equal rights for people involved. But under conditions of non-capitalist development there may be deviations from this principle. The objective circumstances of the class struggle may compel the state to introduce a more stringent procedure of examining cases involving particularly dangerous crimes. For example, some socialist-oriented countries have special courts exercising jurisdiction over economic crimes (Guinea, Algeria), crimes against state security (the People's Republic of the Congo). As a rule, the legal procedure in these courts is simplified and shorter than in others and their sentences are final and not subject to appeal.

The principle of the participation of the working people in the administration of justice is still largely a programmatic objective, even though it has been embodied in the constitutions of some socialist-oriented countries (according to Article 123 of the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen the state ensures the increasing participation of the working people in the administration of justice). As a rule, this participation takes the form of drawing citizens into the work of the courts in the capacity of assessors (or jurors). But in Guinea, for example, the question of the guilt and punishment of the six categories of the accused into which the members of the fifth column were divided in 1917 was submitted for discussion at all local party organisations and mass social organisations.

The election of judges and people's assessors (jurors) for a specified term directly by the electors or representative organs of state power is a form of the participation of the working people in the administration of justice.

This form is envisaged in the Constitution of Burma, for example, which stipulates that people's judges in the courts of all instances shall be elected by representative organs of state power—the People's Assembly and people's councils. The electivity of the judges is one of the objectives set forth in the Programme of the Congolese Workers' Party: "The people must set up people's courts whose members shall be

elected."¹ The collegial investigation of cases in all courts, which ensures greater objectivity of the court decision or verdict, is conducted either by hearing the case in the presence of people's assessors (jurors) or by submitting it to a body of judges.

The court reforms, taking place in the socialist-oriented countries, reorganise the very system of organs of justice. As a rule, a single judicial system is created (for example, the customary courts, which existed in a number of African countries have been abolished), the structure of the judicial organs is simplified, and so forth. Meanwhile, certain principles characteristic of the organisation and activity of the bourgeois court are still in force: appointment and irremovability of the judges, examination of broad range of cases by a single judge (particularly in the courts of first instance).

* * *

In the period directly preceding the winning of political independence, objective circumstances compelled the revolutionary-democratic parties to exploit the old machinery of state. But in the course of the development of the national-democratic revolution a new state machine is established under their guidance. It is a long process and should by no means be regarded as completed. Non-capitalist development towards socialism will inevitably be accompanied by a restructuring of the state machine. The deepening of revolutionary change and the emergence of new tasks necessitate continuous perfection of this machine, the strengthening of it by providing cadres ideologically loyal to socialism and consolidation of its links with the masses.

CONCLUSION

In the reform of the state in the socialist-oriented countries, the reform of the state is accompanied by the appearance of new organs of the state, the creation of a new system of relations between the state on the one hand and the parties and political organisations on the other, and the participation of the bodies of the working people in the functions of the state organs.

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By studying the rich and varied experience of countries, which have liberated themselves from colonial dependence, we can draw some basic conclusions regarding the key trends in the reform of the state with the view to building socialism.

In the first place, this experience shows that a deep-going, genuine reform of the state is an *historic necessity*. Political power can be fully exploited as a means of social progress only if a radical reform of the state is carried out. On the other hand, however, this reform is possible provided definite social prerequisites are on hand for it, namely, the transition to non-capitalist development. It follows, therefore, that the building of a modern state, a task which is being tackled in some Asian and African countries, is *inviolably connected with the adoption of socialist orientation*. If, in spite of declarations concerning the building of socialism, a country in fact develops along the capitalist path, then whatever serious changes are introduced into the structure of the state apparatus, a genuine reform of the state is not carried out and the country in question either remains a state of the exploiting type or turns into such a state. Thus, the reform of the state in the socialist-oriented countries is in fact a revolutionary transformation of the state in the course of the deepening of the national-democratic revolution under the conditions of non-capitalist development.

The reform of the state in the socialist-oriented countries is combined with the modification of the structure of the entire political organisation of society and cannot be an isolated phenomenon. Since state power is very closely connected with

¹ Etumba, No. 295, 1973, p. 6.

the other elements of the political superstructure, the reform of the state is accompanied by the appearance of new organisations of the working people, the creation of a new system of relations between the state, on the one hand, and parties and political organisations, on the other, and the participation of the bodies of the working people in the functions of the state organs.

Insofar as the reform of the state in the socialist-oriented countries is indissolubly linked with the building of a new society it presupposes the *extensive participation of the working people in its implementation*. Trust in the masses, reliance on their collective intelligence and the effectuation of the reform of the state not only from "above", but also from "below" with the help of popular initiative lead to the emergence of such forms of state activity that best ensure social progress. The main trend of these changes is the development and perfection of democracy in all spheres of social, state and economic activity.

The reform of the state in the socialist-oriented countries is in fact *comprehensive*. It includes a radical modification of the nature of state power, the forms of the state, a democratic solution of the national question, in particular, through the implementation of corresponding state and legal methods, reorganisation of the administrative and territorial division of the country, and so forth. An important component of the reform is the break-up of the old and the creation of a new state machine. The formation of the new state apparatus calls for the alteration of the social composition of its personnel, introduction of new principles of organisation and activity, modification of the structure and mutual relations between the state organs and the formation of such organs, which do not exist in a bourgeois state.

Naturally, the methods and means of the reorganisation of the state depend on the specific conditions in each socialist-oriented country. They spring from the level of development of one or another state, the national composition of its population, political traditions and certain other factors. But in all cases a genuine reform of the state envisages a revolutionary transition of power into the hands of the people, the broadest participation of the working masses in the daily work of building a new life.

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